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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies key questions located at the intersection of conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs), targeting mechanisms of CCTs, especially proxy means tests (PMTs) and outcomes 
in primary and secondary education. The research relies entirely on large and rich 
administrative datasets from Chile. The thesis is built around three empirical chapters or papers.  
 
The first paper contributes to the social policy targeting field. The chapter analyses whether a 
PMT can identify the poor and future school dropouts effectively. Despite both being key target 
groups for CCTs, students at risk of dropping out are rarely considered for CCT allocation and 
in targeting assessments. Using simulations, I compare the PMT with other mechanisms based 
on a predictive model of school dropout. I build this model using machine learning algorithms, 
one of their first applications in regard to school dropout outside a developed nation. Using the 
outputs of the predictive model in conjunction with the PMT increases targeting effectiveness 
except when the social valuation of the poor and future school dropouts differs to a large extent. 
 
The second paper analyses whether it is convenient to reward children for their academic 
performance. The chapter estimates the impact of a cash for grades programme on future 
attendance and average grade using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. The main causal 
estimates for the outcomes are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
The third paper contributes to the causal inference literature, particularly about RD designs. 
Despite the rapid development of the RD methodological literature, some threats to internal 
validity have been overlooked. The chapter elaborates on two threats, administrative sorting 
and intermediate contamination, in the context of three impact evaluations of CCTs. 
 
This thesis contributes to advancing knowledge both methodologically and for policy. 
Although the study focuses its analysis on one country, its results have implications for multiple 
contexts.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Income support programmes have changed substantially in recent decades across the globe. 
Increasingly, developing and developed countries have implemented or expanded programmes 
where cash transfers are exchanged in return for socially desired behaviour from their 
recipients.   
 
This thesis analyses key questions located at the intersection of conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs), targeting mechanisms of CCTs and outcomes in primary and secondary education. 
The research relies entirely on large and rich administrative datasets from Chile. The thesis 
contributes to advancing knowledge both methodologically and for social policy. Although the 
study focuses its analysis on one country, its results have implications for multiple contexts.  
 
This introductory chapter describes the policy and institutional context of my research. The 
first part of the chapter summarises essential features of CCTs. The second section focuses on 
the targeting mechanisms used by CCTs, especially proxy means tests. The third part explains 
the motivation behind the thesis. The fourth section provides details of the rules governing 
primary and secondary education in Chile. The last section of the chapter gives an outline of 
the entire document and summarises its most essential findings, contributions and implications.   
 
1.1 Conditional Cash Transfers: Components, Goals and Impact 
 
CCTs are social policies defined by distinctive characteristics. Most generally, these schemes 
consist of a regular (monthly, bi-monthly or annual) cash transfer. This cash transfer is given 
if certain conditions related to behaviour are met. Additionally, CCTs tend to be targeted at 
low-income households or individuals. These schemes can be found in both developing and 
developed countries. However, different formats of CCTs can be observed.  
 
Developing nations have primarily adopted cash transfers that focus their conditions on infants, 
children and adolescents. The popularity of these cash transfers, especially in Latin America, 
can be ascribed to the success of the Bolsa Família and Progresa programmes in Brazil and 
Mexico respectively in the late 1990s (Handa & Davis, 2006). CCTs rapidly expanded across 
the continent and then the world. By the end of the following decade, all the countries in Latin 
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America, except Cuba and Venezuela (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012), and a few countries in 
Asia, the Middle East and Africa had implemented a CCT (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). By 2015, 
CCTs were present in at least 64 countries (Honorati, Gentilini, & Yemtsov, 2015).  
 
CCTs in developing countries are commonly paid to the mother (Handa & Davis, 2006). The 
amount each household receives varies according to the number of children and how many of 
them meet the conditions. In a typical CCT design, the mother receives a health-related 
payment if all her children (no older than nearly 6 years old) regularly attend health check-ups. 
The education-related payment is generally given per child (aged between 7 and 17 years old 
proximately) attending primary or secondary school (Ibarrarán, Medellín, Regalia, & Stampini, 
2017). Deviations from this typical design do occur. For example, some CCTs are provided 
directly to secondary students while others require children to have completed their 
immunisations.  
 
One of the goals of CCTs is to increase the income of poor households or individuals. This 
goal has been framed in diverse but complementary ways in the literature, for example as 
providing poor households with a minimum consumption floor (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009) or 
as current poverty alleviation, reducing the incidence and depth of poverty (Handa & Davis, 
2006). 
 
The impact of CCTs on income-related indicators has been well documented. Overall, these 
schemes have increased food expenditure and consumption, reduced the poverty headcount 
index and the poverty gap (at the programme and the country levels) and in some cases 
contributed to drops in inequality (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). For example, Stampini and 
Tornarolli (2012) estimate, for 13 Latin American countries, that the short-run poverty 
headcount indicator would have been on average 13% higher if CCTs had not been in place. 
Additionally, Kabeer, Piza, and Taylor (2012) synthesise six studies estimating the effect of 
CCTs on consumption and find a statistically significant average effect of 7%. 
 
Despite these findings a common criticism of CCTs is that these schemes could reduce adults’ 
labour supply. This hypothesis has been analysed empirically. The research on this topic in 
Latin America has found results of very small magnitude or that are not statistically significant 
(Alzúa, Cruces, & Ripani, 2013; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). In a similar vein, the average effect 
of all the studies available regarding this matter is not statistically different from zero (Kabeer 
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et al., 2012). 
  
Additionally, CCTs are designed to promote human capital accumulation. Because of their 
conditions these cash transfers are expected to increase health care utilisation, school enrolment 
and attendance.1 Economic theory suggests that these schemes are useful for the last two 
purposes. Poor households face budget constraints that may deter human capital accumulation 
activities (especially secondary schooling) in favour of labour. However, households are 
expected to maximise their utility considering not only the marginal cost of children’s time at 
school but also the future benefits of human capital accumulation. A CCT then is expected to 
have an impact by lowering the opportunity cost of children’s time spent in school. This is 
presumed in particular among households for which the budget constraints are binding 
(Skoufias, 2005).  
 
Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Skoufias (2005) argue that the use of conditions is justified. 
The reason is the potential existence of factors that cause households to underinvest, from 
society’s standpoint, in the human capital accumulation of their children. Fiszbein and Schady 
(2009) elaborate more on these factors, citing as examples imperfect information about the 
expected returns on education or inconsistent day-to-day behaviour relative to long-term goals. 
 
Although it has been shown that multiple factors are correlated with the decision to drop out 
of school (Hunt, 2008; Rumberger & Lim, 2008), with economic need being just one of them, 
the effectiveness of CCTs has been corroborated by an extensive body of research. In Latin 
America, positive effects have been found on school enrolment in Brazil (Soares, Ribas, & 
Osório, 2010), Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2010; Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, & Perez-
Calle, 2011), Ecuador (Schady & Araujo, 2008), Honduras (Galiani & McEwan, 2013; Glewwe 
& Olinto, 2004), Mexico (Schultz, 2004) and Nicaragua (Maluccio & Flores, 2005). More 
generally, García and Saavedra (2017) conclude from a meta-analysis that the average effect 
of CCTs on primary and secondary school enrolment has been 3.0 and 7.1 percentage points, 
respectively. Likewise, a systematic review of 26 CCTs shows that these policies have 
increased the odds of a child being enrolled in school by 41% (Baird, Ferreira, Özler, & 
                                                          
1 At this point, it is important to acknowledge that human capital accumulation could also occur as a consequence 
of raising income, disregarding the changes in behaviour that might be introduced by the conditions. For example, 
households could have more food access (or of better quality) because of reduced income restrictions. Then, 
improved food access could have a positive effect on nutrition and health status for all or some household 
members. 
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Woolcock, 2014). 
 
There is also extensive research on the effect of CCTs on health-related outcomes. CCTs have 
had a substantial impact on health service utilisation in Colombia (Attanasio, Battistio, 
Fitzsimons, Mesnard, & Vera-Hernández, 2005) and Honduras (Morris, Flores, Olinto, & 
Medina, 2004); however the evidence is less conclusive for immunisation coverage (Fiszbein 
& Schady, 2009; Lagarde, Haines, & Palmer, 2007; Owusu-Addo & Cross, 2014). The 
empirical literature has not exclusively analysed the impact of CCTs on human capital in the 
short-run. For example, recent studies have evaluated whether CCTs are responsible for effects, 
on former children or adolescents, at later stages of the life-cycle. The evidence regarding the 
long-term impact of CCTs though is inconclusive (Molina-Millan, Barham, Macours, 
Maluccio, & Stampini, 2016).  
 
Developed nations, such as the United States, have primarily implemented cash transfers whose 
conditions are linked to labour or school performance. The former type of cash transfer is 
provided on a regular basis mostly to parents who are employed. These policies are recognised 
by different names such as tax credits, employee subsidies or worker subsidies.2 The latter type 
of transfer is given to students, or a household member, as a reward for their achievement in 
primary or secondary education. These programmes are commonly known as cash for grades.  
 
The impact of worker subsidies on labour force participation has been analysed from a 
theoretical perspective. Specifically, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States 
has been studied in more detail (Dickert-Conlin & Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Neumark, 2013). The 
models suggest positive impacts of worker subsidies on labour supply for those who are 
unemployed. This situation is explained by the increased opportunity cost of leisure. However, 
the EITC could reduce the number of hours worked for individuals who are part of the 
workforce.  
 
Expansions of the EITC have been evaluated empirically. The most influential study in this 
area finds that this policy increased the labour supply of single women with children relative 
                                                          
2 These concepts are not equivalent to a hiring credit or a wage subsidy. The former term has been defined as a 
subsidy to employers to hire workers (Neumark, 2013). The latter term has multiple definitions. For example, it 
has been broadly defined as any transfer from the government that can reduce the cost of labour and/or increase 
take-home pay (Almeida, Orr, & Robalino, 2014); hence it includes employer and employee subsidies. Other 
specific definitions also exist such as subsidies to employers to hire disadvantaged workers (Katz, 1998). 
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to single women without children (Eissa & Liebman, 1996). A subsequent study states that the 
EITC and other tax changes explain over 60% of the increase in employment rates of single 
mothers, relative to childless single women, between 1984 and 1996 (Meyer & Rosenbaum, 
2001). Eissa and Liebman (1996) find no effects on the number of hours worked for single 
mothers who were in the workforce, but Eissa and Hoynes (2004) observe a decline in labour 
force participation of married mothers. In the United Kingdom, there is a consensus that the 
Working Families’ Tax Credit has increased the labour force participation of lone mothers but 
had little overall impact on the labour force participation of parents in couples (Brewer & 
Browne, 2006).  
 
Regarding cash for grades programmes, these types of incentives should provide a price effect 
that makes specific behaviours more attractive. These effects are expected to increase students’ 
effort and performance (Fryer, 2011; Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 2011; Kremer, Miguel, & 
Thornton, 2009). However, from the psychological perspective, cash for grades programmes 
could undermine intrinsic motivation, negatively affecting the desired behaviours, especially 
after the reward is removed. However, this argument is contested, with scholars both in favour 
of it (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; 2001) and against (Cameron, 2001). 
 
The empirical evidence regarding cash for grades programmes is mixed. In developed countries 
some positive and statistically significant results exist. For example, Bettinger (2012) finds an 
effect on maths but he observes no impact on three other subjects. Angrist and Lavy (2009) 
find statistically significant results for girls but not for boys. In other cases, mostly no effects 
have been observed (Fryer, 2011; Riccio et al., 2013). In developing countries, effects near 
0.20σ on test scores have been found (Behrman, Parker, Todd, & Wolpin, 2015; Kremer et al., 
2009). 
 
Formally, the literature tends not to label worker subsidies and cash for grades as CCTs. The 
term is usually reserved for the design commonly observed in developing countries. However, 
there are many similarities among all these cash transfers. Given this resemblance and for 
convenience, I will use the term CCT flexibly. In most cases, I will interpret it narrowly as the 
design typically found in developing nations. However, in some specific contexts I will use a 
holistic meaning, encompassing all the cash transfers programmes described in this section.  
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1.2 Targeting of Conditional Cash Transfers and Proxy Means Tests 
 
The opposite of a targeted intervention is a universal approach. In the context of a cash transfer, 
a "universal basic income” style-programme where each individual is a beneficiary, 
irrespective of their welfare, contrasts with a cash transfer targeted at the poor.3 Targeting 
requires the definition of the target group (aligned with the policy goal) and the choice of a 
mechanism to reach this group. A targeting assessment then verifies whether the target group 
is reached.  
 
Given that one of the primary goals of CCTs is to increase income among poor people, targeting 
is an essential part of their design. These schemes are expected to be delivered to low-income 
households or individuals. The more resources that are directed towards the target group (poor 
people), the more likely a CCT is to achieve its goal of poverty alleviation. Coady, Grosh, and 
Hoddinott (2004) explain that the motivation for targeting lies in the grounds of efficiency. 
Targeting allows achieving maximum poverty reduction (or social welfare increase) within a 
fixed budget. 
 
CCT targeting evaluations show that these schemes have been far more successful in finding 
households or individuals who live in poverty relative to allocating the transfers at random 
(Maluccio, 2009; Robles, Rubio, & Stampini, 2015; Skoufias, Davis, & De la Vega, 2001). 
Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) show that the expansion of CCTs in Latin America led to 
increased inclusion of the poor. For example, by 2010, the three largest CCTs (in Colombia, 
Mexico and Brazil) had reached 50% to 55% of the poor. However, this increase in inclusion 
of the poor has been accompanied by a growing proportion of beneficiaries who are not poor. 
 
Azevedo and Robles (2013) explain that CCTs have fared well in reaching the poor but not in 
identifying households that under-invest in human capital. These households are an additional 
target group for CCTs. However, specific health and education deprivations have barely been 
used in CCT allocation and few targeting evaluations exist that analyse beyond income.  
 
CCTs are generally targeted using income-related measures. However, income or consumption 
                                                          
3 A long debate exists about targeted versus universal cash transfers. For example, Besley (1990) provides an 
analytical framework to compare these two approaches in terms of poverty alleviation. More recently, Hanna and 
Olken (2018) empirically analyse the trade-offs between the two approaches using data from Indonesia and Peru.  
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is difficult to observe accurately in developing countries. Coady et al. (2004) identify three 
families of targeting methods. In the first place they highlight individual or household 
assessments. These are mechanisms in which someone or something (usually a government 
employee or a computational system) directly assesses, case by case, the eligibility of the 
individual or the household. Within this category we can find verified means tests, simple 
means tests, proxy means tests (PMTs) and community-based targeting. Secondly, there is 
categorical targeting. In this mechanism all households or individuals within a specific category 
or group of categories (such as age, gender or geographical region) are eligible. Finally, there 
is self-selection, where the design of a universal programme encourages poor people to apply. 
 
Within the context of CCTs, few studies have assessed the performance of different targeting 
mechanisms. In Mexico, Coady (2006) finds that geographic targeting was more effective than 
a household PMT and targeting based on demographic composition. He also concludes that as 
Progresa expanded away from the poorest localities, the contribution of proxy means targeting 
substantially increased. In Indonesia, an experimental design shows that requiring beneficiaries 
to incur small application costs resulted in improved targeting through self-selection (Alatas et 
al., 2016). Also in Indonesia, for an unconditional cash transfer, a PMT shows an increased 
capacity to find poor households relative to community-based targeting or a hybrid mechanism 
(Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, & Tobias, 2012). However, the authors additionally conclude 
that the targeting mechanism choice would not affect the country's poverty rate significantly.  
 
In Latin American countries, most CCTs use geographic targeting, proxy means tests or a 
combination of both (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012). PMTs rely on 
observable characteristics of the household (such as the education of its members) to estimate 
their income. More formally, PMTs refer to a system where information correlated with income 
is used in an algorithm to approximate income itself. The formula is generally obtained through 
statistical analysis and tends to use data that is easily observable by public officials (Coady et 
al., 2004; Grosh & Baker, 1995). Beyond the continent, countries such as Armenia, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon and Rwanda have also used proxy means tests for targeting 
(Australian Aid, 2011; Brown, Ravallion, & Van de Walle, 2016; Coady et al., 2004). 
 
The proxy means test score is an essential eligibility criterion for many CCTs. Households or 
individuals with a PMT score below a certain threshold can access these programmes. 
Conversely, those who have a PMT score above this threshold or fail to obtain a score are not 
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eligible. For example, Ponce and Bedi (2010) explain that in Ecuador, the CCT Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano used the SELBEN PMT index to assign the scheme. The index scale 
ranged from 0 (the poorest) to 100 points (the richest). Households with a low quality of 
infrastructure or with members with little education were more likely to have a lower score in 
SELBEN relative to other households. Between 2003 and 2009, the threshold used by Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano was 50.65 points. 
 
CCT extensive use of index’ scores (such as PMTs) to determine eligibility facilitates using 
regression discontinuity (RD) designs to estimate their impact. RD designs are a popular 
approach for causal inference. The method relies on comparing units just below and above a 
threshold in a score (or running variable) that is used to assign an intervention. RD designs 
exploit the idea that variation in treatment assignment near the threshold is as good as random. 
Various RD designs exist for CCTs, for example in Colombia (Barrientos & Villa, 2015), 
Ecuador (Ponce & Bedi, 2010), Chile (Carneiro, Galasso, & Ginja, forthcoming), Jamaica 
(Stampini, Martinez-Cordova, Insfran, & Harris, 2018) and Cambodia (Filmer & Schady, 
2011).  
 
1.3 Why Study Conditional Cash Transfers?  
 
A first reason to justify a thesis on the topic of CCTs is the existence of the problems that these 
policies are trying to overcome. The following two paragraphs briefly explain the magnitude 
of the problem of low income and the gaps in school enrolment in Chile and Latin America. 
 
In 2013, with a GDP (PPP) per capita close to $22,000 USD, Chile was one of the wealthiest 
countries in Latin America, but one of the poorest OECD nations (OECD, 2015). In 2011 and 
2013 respectively, 10.9% and 7.8% of individuals lived in poverty (Ministerio de Desarrollo 
Social, 2015). The median monthly household income per capita reached only $146,555 CLP 
in 2011 ($279.6 USD using November 30th 2011 exchange rate) leaving approximately 39% 
of the population between this income level and the urban poverty line, which reached $61,366 
CLP ($117.1 USD). In 2013, 7.9% of adolescents between 15 and 19 years old, about 110,867 
individuals, were not attending any school and had not finished their secondary studies. Since 
2010, the percentage of children that drop out each year from secondary studies has been near 
3.0% (Opazo, Ormazabal, & Crespo, 2015), while dropouts in primary education are low. 
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Among Latin American countries social indicators have improved over time but poverty and 
school dropout remain relevant challenges. For example, Vakis, Rigolini, and Lucchetti (2016) 
show that extreme poverty (defined as those living with less than $2.5 USD PPP a day) declined 
from 24.5% to 12.3% between 2003 and 2012. Additionally, the percentage classified as 
moderate poor also decreased from 41.6% to 25.3% during this period. Regarding the 
completion of secondary education, Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz (2015) show that the regional 
average graduation rate (among those one year older than the school finishing age but younger 
than 27 years old) increased from 0.31 in the early 1990s to 0.54 in the late 2000s.  
 
An additional reason to devote this study to CCTs is the current state of these policies in terms 
of their outreach. In Latin America, the number of CCT beneficiaries overtook the poor 
population in 2006. The massive rise in CCT recipients on the continent has raised a debate in 
the literature about whether these schemes have gone too far (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012). 
As the relationship between CCT recipients and the population in poverty is not equal in each 
nation, the coverage of CCTs in many countries has exceeded the population living in poverty. 
In this context, finding new households living in poverty has become harder for CCTs. 
Additionally, their effectiveness (regarding poverty reduction) could be reduced by increased 
targeting errors. These problems are expected to grow as it is unlikely that governments will 
cut cash transfers and as poverty rates decline. 
  
Some social policy questions naturally arise from the previous analysis, such as: i) should CCTs 
be reduced in scope, or at least their growth stopped, for countries that have substantially 
reduced poverty rates? ii) are CCTs working for the non-poor or for those beneficiaries who 
barely qualify? iii) should the targeting of these programmes be expanded to other CCT target 
groups, beyond the poor, such as students at risk of dropping out of school or children with low 
health care services utilisation? and, iv) should developing countries shift from CCTs to 
employment subsidies or cash for grades schemes, which are rarely present in these nations? 
 
No single study can provide definitive answers to all these substantial questions. The focus of 
this thesis lies in the analysis of three specific questions located at the intersection of 
conditional cash transfers, targeting mechanisms of CCTs and outcomes in primary and 
secondary education using large and rich administrative datasets from Chile. In relation to the 
targeting of CCTs, the thesis focuses especially on proxy means tests. Chile is an ideal setting 
in which to conduct research related to PMTs, given that the country has been a pioneer in the 
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use of this mechanism (Australian Aid, 2011; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Grosh & Baker, 1995).  
 
1.4 The Primary and Secondary Education System in Chile 
 
Educational outcomes play an essential role in my thesis. Therefore, this section explains in 
detail the Chilean educational institutional context for the primary and secondary levels.4  
 
The right to education is stated in Article 19 of the Chilean Constitution, which establishes that 
the purpose of education is the development of human beings in different stages during their 
lives and that parents must educate their children. The Constitution additionally specifies that 
the State must give special protection to this right. In 2003, a constitutional reform introduced 
two significant changes. First, it establishes that both primary and secondary school are 
compulsory. As in the original Constitution, this new version forces the State to finance a free 
system at these levels to guarantee its access to the whole population. Second, the reform states 
that the traditional secondary school system can be provided until the age of 21. 
 
Other regulations define schooling length and age requirements. These regulations establish 
that: i) the traditional primary school system is comprised of eight grades (first to eighth) and 
lasts for at least eight years, ii) children have to be at least 6 years old by March 31st to be able 
to start the first grade, but iii) educational institutions´ directors are allowed to accept five-year-
olds whose birth date is no later than June 30th, iv) the traditional secondary school system is 
comprised of four grades (ninth to twelfth) and lasts for at least four years, and v) the maximum 
age at which an adolescent can start the traditional secondary school system is 16 years old. 
 
An important feature of the Chilean school primary and secondary systems is that students are 
not automatically promoted to the following grade. At the end of an academic year students are 
classified into one of the following categories: i) progress, ii) failure or iii) withdrawal. The 
first group is comprised of students who have completed the academic year and meet the 
requirements to progress to the following grade. The second group of students are those who 
have completed the academic year but do not meet the requirements to progress. The third 
group of students abandoned their studies during the academic year. Thus, because the primary 
                                                          
4 The information from this section comes from multiple laws and decrees dictated by the Chilean Ministry of 
Education. All these documents have been published by the Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (1980, 
1997, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2015). These documents can be found at https://www.bcn.cl/. 
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and secondary levels are compulsory in Chile, the second and third groups of students are 
expected to repeat the grade at which they did not progress in the next academic year. 
 
To explain the requirements to progress in detail it is necessary to describe some characteristics 
of the Chilean grading system and attendance measurement. For grading, the country uses a 
scale from 1.0 to 7.0 in every educational level (pre-school, primary, secondary and higher 
education). This scale is used for specific courses, such as Mathematics or Arts, and the average 
grade. At the primary and secondary levels, the average grade is mostly estimated as the simple 
average of the individual course grades and is reported to the central government using only 
one decimal place. Attendance is measured daily at the primary and secondary levels and is 
reported to the Ministry of Education monthly and yearly. The scale used is a percentage, from 
0% to 100%, without utilising decimal places. From fourth to twelfth grade, the requirements 
to progress to the next grade are to reach an attendance of 85% and a minimum average grade.5 
 
There is no curriculum differentiation from first to eighth grade. All primary schools are 
expected to implement a standard curriculum. The secondary system is mainly divided into two 
groups. Science and humanities schools had roughly 70% of the total enrolments in 2014, while 
technical-professional schools accounted for nearly 30%. In both types of schools, it is 
expected that students will complete their secondary education as established by the 
Constitution. 
 
Chilean schools can be classified into mostly three administrative categories. In 2014, private 
non-subsidised schools captured around 8% of total enrolments. Almost all these schools 
charge high fees and as a result virtually all their students come from wealthy families. Public 
schools are generally free and administered by local counties. These schools had approximately 
39% of total enrolments in 2014. Finally, private subsidised schools accounted for nearly 52% 
of total enrolments in 2014. These schools may charge a small fee, but most of them fully fund 
their operations with a voucher provided by the State. From 2016, new legislation forced these 
schools to eliminate charging fees progressively. Only private non-subsidised schools do not 
receive State vouchers, as public and private subsidised schools rely on them. 
                                                          
5 Specifically, one of the following criteria needs to be met: i) obtain a grade of 4.0 or higher in every specific 
course, ii) fail to obtain a grade of 4.0 in one specific course but obtain an average grade of at least 4.5, iii) fail to 
obtain a grade of 4.0 in two specific courses but obtain an average grade equal to or higher than 5.0. For the latter 
group of students in eleventh and twelfth grade it is required to obtain an average grade of at least 5.5 if 
Mathematics or Language is one of the two courses where the student fails to obtain a grade of 4.0. 
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The Chilean education system additionally recognises two other schemes. One of them is 
differential education for students with disabilities. Differential education is not classified by 
grades or levels (as in the traditional system). The other scheme is adult education, which uses 
the same classifications by level and grade as the traditional system. A relevant difference 
between the adult education system and the traditional system is that the former allows students 
to progress by more than one grade, generally two, in one academic year. Some of these schools 
(regular adult education providers) demand an 80% attendance level at classes and assess 
progress as in the traditional system, while others (flexible adult education providers) do not 
require attendance and assess progress using national examinations. In general, it is not possible 
for students to enter these types of schools unless they are at least 17 or 18 years old.  
 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 summarise the grade length and age requirements for all the options 
available for education provision at the primary and secondary levels, respectively. 
 
Table 1.1: Grade Length and Age Requirements in Primary Education 
Grade Traditional Education Adult Education Regular Flexible 
1st 1 grade per year, has to be 
at least 6 years old to start 4 grades per year 
Has to be at least 18 years old to start 
 
2nd 1 grade per year 
3rd 1 grade per year 
4th 1 grade per year 
5th 1 grade per year 2 grades per year 
Has to be at least 18 years old to start 6th 1 grade per year 
7th 1 grade per year 2 grades per year 
Has to be at least 18 years old to start 8th  1 grade per year 
Source: compilation based on official information, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Table 1.2: Grade Length and Age Requirements in Secondary Education 
Grade 
 
Traditional Education  
(All Types of Schools) 
Adult Education 
Regular Flexible 
Type of School 
Science and 
Humanities 
Technical- 
Professional 
No 
Classification 
9th 
1 grade per year, has to be 
less than 17 years old to 
start and cannot be over 21 
2 grades per year, has to be 
at least 17 years old to start 
 
2 grades per 
year, has to be 
at least 18 
years old to 
start 10
th 1 grade per year, has to be no more than 21 years old 
11th 1 grade per year, has to be no more than 21 years old 
2 grades per 
year, has to 
be at least 18 
years old to 
start 
1 grade per 
year, has to 
be at least 18 
years old to 
start 
2 grades per 
year, has to be 
at least 18 
years old to 
start 12th 1 grade per year, has to be no more than 21 years old 
1 grade per 
year, age rule 
not specified 
Source: compilation based on official information, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
The Chilean academic year starts in March and typically ends by mid-December. Currently, a 
Chilean student that graduates from secondary education and progressed each academic year 
in the traditional system can be described by the following pattern: i) entered the first grade of 
primary education at the age of 6 (or almost 6 if born between March and June), ii) entered the 
first grade of the secondary school system at the age of 14 (or almost 14), iii) entered the last 
grade of secondary education at the age of 17 (or almost 17) and finally, iv) completed this last 
grade at the age of 18 (or 17 if the student’s month of birth is in January or after this month). 
 
This traditional pattern of graduation may be affected in three ways. First, a student could have 
had a late start, in other words, he or she might have commenced the first grade of primary 
education at an age of more than six. Second, a student might not have progressed to the 
following grade due to failure to accomplish the attendance or academic requirements or 
because of withdrawal. Third, irrespective of whether a student progressed, failed or withdrew 
in a given academic year he or she might not have enrolled in any educational institution in the 
next academic year.6  
                                                          
6 School enrolment can be measured in different ways. The approach I consistently use in this document is defined 
by data availability and by the methodology used by the Chilean State (Ministerio de Educación, 2013) for 
estimating dropout rates. Only students in the traditional system or regular adult education are classified as 
enrolled. Students in flexible adult education are not classified as enrolled as the Ministry of Education does not 
have administrative records for these students. Students in differential education are not considered in this study. 
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If any of these three situations occurred at some point in the pathway, the student might be able 
to choose between the traditional and adult systems at a later stage in their life. For those who 
do not start secondary education before turning 17 years old or who do not graduate from school 
before turning 21 years old, adult education is their only choice to start or resume their studies. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
 
The rest of the thesis is built around three empirical chapters or papers. Each paper addresses 
a different type of question. The second chapter assesses how well two target groups of CCTs 
can be reached. The third chapter estimates the impact on educational outcomes of those who 
get a cash transfer. I use an RD design for this purpose. The fourth chapter elaborates on some 
limitations of the RD method in a setting of CCTs and proxy means tests targeting. 
 
The second chapter contributes to the social policy targeting field. This paper analyses whether 
a common targeting mechanism of CCTs, a proxy means test, can identify the poor and future 
school dropouts effectively. Despite both being key target groups for CCTs, students at risk of 
dropping out are rarely considered for CCT allocation and in targeting assessments. Using 
simulations, I compare the targeting effectiveness of a proxy means test with other mechanisms 
based on a predictive model of school dropout. I build this model using machine learning 
algorithms, one of the first applications of this type used to predict school dropout outside a 
developed country. 
 
The paper shows that using the outputs of the predictive model in conjunction with the PMT 
increases targeting effectiveness by identifying more students who are either poor or future 
dropouts. This joint targeting approach increases effectiveness in different scenarios except 
when the social valuation of the two target groups differs to a large extent. In these cases, the 
most likely optimal approach is to use solely the mechanism designed to find the target group 
that is valued the most. Overall, the paper shows that public officials that value these two target 
groups equally may improve CCT targeting by modifying the allocation rules of these 
programmes. 
 
The third chapter analyses whether it is convenient to reward children for their academic 
performance. This paper estimates the impact of a Chilean cash for grades programme, the 
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Bono por Logro Escolar (BLE) in 2013, on future attendance and average grade. The cash 
transfer was targeted using two scores from 2012, a proxy means test and academic 
performance. I implement a sharp regression discontinuity design along these two running 
variables. I show that students marginally at each side of the two thresholds used for targeting 
only differed in receiving the BLE in 2013. The main causal estimates for the outcomes are not 
statistically significantly different from zero. If a local average effect of the BLE in 2013 exists 
then this is at best modest in magnitude and at least smaller than those found in the literature in 
developing countries, where effects near 0.20𝜎 on test scores have been observed. 
 
The fourth chapter contributes to the causal inference literature. This paper elaborates on two 
threats, administrative sorting and intermediate contamination, which have been overlooked in 
the RD literature in the context of three impact evaluations of CCTs on school enrolment. 
 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) claim that “if individuals are unable to precisely manipulate the 
running variable then variation in treatment near the threshold is as good as random” (p283). 
The paper shows that variation in treatment assignment is not always as good as random even 
in the absence of manipulation. This can be the case when administrative procedures, beyond 
individuals’ control and knowledge, affect their position near the threshold non-randomly. If 
administrative sorting is not properly recognised it can be mistaken as manipulation. Timing 
also matters in RD designs. Intermediate contamination can emerge, and make units near the 
threshold no longer comparable, if a substantial time lag exists between the realisation of the 
running variable and its actual use to assign the treatment. In this type of setting, the paper 
highlights the value of checking variables related to this time lapse in RD falsification tests.  
 
The final thesis chapter summarises the findings of the three empirical chapters. Additionally, 
it discusses the main implications and contributions of these findings, both concerning policy 
and methodology, for improved design and evaluation of CCTs as well as beyond CCTs. 
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Chapter 2 Two Become One: Improving the Targeting of Conditional 
Cash Transfers With a Predictive Model of School Dropout 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses whether a common targeting mechanism of conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs), an income-proxy means test (PMT), can identify the poor and future school dropouts 
effectively. Despite both being key target groups for CCTs, students at risk of dropping out are 
rarely considered for CCT allocation and in targeting assessments. Using rich administrative 
datasets from Chile to simulate different targeting mechanisms, I compare the targeting 
effectiveness of a PMT with other mechanisms based on a predictive model of school dropout. 
I build this model using machine learning algorithms, one of their first applications for school 
dropout outside a developed country. I show that using the outputs of the predictive model in 
conjunction with the PMT increases targeting effectiveness except when the social valuation 
of the poor and future school dropouts differs to a large extent. Public officials that value these 
two target groups equally may improve CCT targeting by modifying their allocation 
procedures. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Conditional cash transfers have become a favoured social policy in developing nations. Their 
rapid expansion, from a few countries in the late 1990s to more than 60 by 2014 (Honorati et 
al., 2015), demonstrates their popularity. One goal of CCTs is to increase the income of low-
income households. Although CCTs have not stated their objectives identically across the 
globe, authors have pointed out that these schemes seek to reduce the incidence and depth of 
poverty (Handa & Davis, 2006) and provide a minimum consumption floor to poor households 
(Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). 
 
Targeting is a crucial element in the design of CCTs. These programmes have intended to 
allocate their benefits primarily or “rather narrowly” to the poor (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009) 
(p.7). This is not unplanned, as poor households or individuals are a key target group for CCTs. 
Targeting is a channel through which to increase a programme’s effectiveness within a fixed 
budget. The more resources that are directed towards the target group (the poor), the more 
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likely a CCT is to achieve its goal of poverty reduction. This explains why evaluations of their 
targeting (Maluccio, 2009; Robles et al., 2015; Skoufias et al., 2001; Stampini & Tornarolli, 
2012) have focused primarily on determining whether CCTs have been given to those who live 
in poverty.7 
 
Different targeting mechanisms exist for CCTs. Proxy means tests are one of the most common 
in Latin America (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012). A PMT refers to a 
system or situation where information correlated with income is used in a formula to proxy 
income. The formula is obtained through statistical analysis and tends to use data that is easily 
observable by public officials (Coady et al., 2004; Grosh & Baker, 1995). 
 
Targeting low-income households or individuals makes sense not only for CCTs but for a wide 
range of social programmes. Correspondingly, assessing targeting mechanisms of social 
policies in terms of their ability to find this target group is a widespread practice. For example, 
Coady et al. (2004) evaluate the pro-poor targeting performance of 122 social programmes 
from 48 countries. Similarly, Grosh and Baker (1995) assess whether PMTs provide useful 
information on income to target social programmes in three countries in Latin America. Social 
policy targeting has been implicitly associated with finding the poor and poverty alleviation. 
 
Since many CCTs are provided only if children or adolescents are enrolled in school, an 
additional purpose of most CCTs is to increase school enrolment (Handa & Davis, 2006). 
Hence, to maximise the likelihood of achieving this goal, CCTs need to be delivered to a 
differently-defined target group, namely students with the highest risk of dropping out of 
primary or secondary school. However, CCT targeting has been focused more on the income 
dimension. Thus, CCTs have rarely been assessed regarding their ability to direct their 
resources to those who are more likely to drop out of school. My paper addresses this gap in 
the CCT literature.8 
                                                          
7 Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) provide targeting assessments for 13 countries in Latin America. The authors 
show that the expansion of CCTs on the continent led to increased inclusion of the poor. For example, by the year 
2010 the three largest programmes (in Colombia, Mexico and Brazil) had achieved poor coverage rates near 50%. 
However, this was accompanied by growing levels of non-poor leakage (the proportion of CCT recipients who 
are not poor). On average, leakage increased by 0.46 percentage points for each additional point in poor coverage.   
8 Analysing the targeting effectiveness of CCTs in terms of reaching students at risk of dropping out of school is 
different from assessing the impact of CCTs on school dropout. The former evaluation assesses whether the target 
group is (or would be) reached by a programme. The latter assessment focuses on the (potential) effect of the 
programme after implementation. The literature on the impact of CCTs on school enrolment is vast, especially in 
Latin America. For example, positive effects of CCTs on school enrolment have been found in Colombia 
18 
 
 
Assessing the capacity of CCTs to reach potential school dropouts is very important. Without 
this knowledge the allocation process of CCTs could be sub-optimal from the human capital 
accumulation perspective. If the targeting mechanism used by a CCT is not an accurate 
predictor of school dropout, then some students will be given the CCT despite the fact that they 
would have finished their secondary education without any intervention. Conversely, other 
students who are at risk of leaving school will never have been the subject of the CCT. In both 
cases a problem of misidentification exists and its consequence is an ineffective use of 
resources.  
 
Not considering potential dropouts when targeting CCTs would be less of a cause for concern 
if school dropout were a negligible problem. But in Latin America the graduation rate (among 
those one year older than the school finishing age but younger than 27) only reached 0.54 in 
the late 2000s (Bassi et al., 2015). Similarly, dismissing potential dropouts in CCT targeting 
would be less of a problem in contexts where a high degree of overlap exists between the latter 
group and those living in poverty. However, this is not guaranteed. For example, in Chile in 
2013, only 16.1% of young school dropouts (aged 15 to 19 years old) lived in a poor household 
while only 12.4% of poor adolescents had dropped out of school (Opazo et al., 2015). 
 
Targeting CCTs exclusively according to the likelihood of dropping out of school would lead 
to a different problem. In this case, the ability of CCTs to find the poor would be weakened. 
The problem of targeting both groups for a CCT is well addressed by Maluccio (2009), who 
states: “It is clear that not all non-poor children attend school. Such children, then, would be 
missed under a pure poverty-based targeting scheme, but possibly not under a targeting scheme 
which focused on enrolment. Conversely, many poor children already attend school. While 
there certainly would be overlap among the beneficiary households selected under various 
possible approaches they almost certainly would not yield identical groups of beneficiaries” 
(p.5). 
 
This paper analyses whether a proxy means test can identify the poor and future school 
dropouts effectively. I evaluate the capacity of a PMT to jointly identify these two target groups 
                                                          
(Attanasio et al., 2010; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011), Ecuador (Schady & Araujo, 2008), Honduras (Galiani & 
McEwan, 2013; Glewwe & Olinto, 2004), Mexico (Schultz, 2004) and Nicaragua (Maluccio & Flores, 2005). 
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relative to alternative targeting mechanisms available to public officers. I use rich 
administrative datasets from Chile to simulate different targeting mechanisms. The core of the 
alternative mechanisms I test is a predictive model of school dropout. Therefore, the paper has 
two complementary parts. From its first part, I derive the predictive model using a range of 
machine learning algorithms (MLA). In the second part, I assess the targeting effectiveness of 
the PMT, the predictive model and mechanisms combining both sources of information. The 
paper seeks to advise about the merit of using other targeting mechanisms instead of PMTs for 
CCTs. 
 
My paper contributes to the body of knowledge on school dropout. The literature to date has 
mostly focused on the question of why students drop out rather than who will drop out. The 
work in the latter area is primarily confined to North America, where Bowers, Sprott, and Taff 
(2013) provide a comprehensive summary. Additionally, machine learning applications of 
dropout in educational contexts have been more salient for higher education with few papers 
focusing on primary and secondary schools (Knowles, 2015; Sara, Halland, Igel, & Alstrup, 
2015; Sorensen, 2018). Furthermore, the few existing papers that predict school dropout in 
developing countries (Adelman, Haimovich, Ham, & Vazquez, 2017) have not used MLA. 
 
My paper additionally contributes to the literature on the targeting of CCTs. There have been 
few attempts to assess CCT targeting that consider more dimensions than just income. A 
notable exception is Azevedo and Robles’ (2013) evaluation in Mexico. To assess the targeting 
performance of a CCT, their paper presents indicators separately for each dimension. My paper 
offers not only unidimensional indicators but also two indicators that combine information 
from the target groups, which facilitates making comparisons between targeting mechanisms. 
My paper provides a headcount index but also a measure of social welfare to assess targeting.9 
 
I compare the MLA using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.10 The most effective 
                                                          
9 Some other differences exist between Azevedo and Robles’ (2013) paper and mine. Their paper focuses on three 
dimensions (income, health and education) at the household level while I focus on two dimensions (income and 
education) for individuals in a specific age range for which these dimensions are critical. Their paper uses few 
variables or predictors to identify deprivation or risk in the educational dimension. Additionally, they use 
normative criteria (arbitrary selection of thresholds and weights to combine the predictors) for this purpose. My 
paper uses a larger pool of variables, which allows for predicting empirically which adolescents will drop out of 
school. 
10 An ROC curve presents the false positive rate and the true positive rate of all the possible results of a predictive 
model simultaneously. Its area under the curve measures the overall predictive performance of a model. A model 
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algorithm leads to an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.866. I observe this result for the model 
predicting school dropout at any point within two years. The most effective algorithm for 
predicting school dropout within one year produces an AUC of 0.893. My results are better 
than the ones obtained in Guatemala and Honduras (Adelman et al., 2017) and are in line with 
the best models tested in the United States (Knowles, 2015; Sorensen, 2018).  
 
In my targeting assessment, there is a trade-off between using the PMT relative to using the 
MLA-based predictive model. When I use the PMT to target a hypothetical CCT, the targeting 
indicators associated with the poor improve, but the indicators related to dropouts worsen. The 
opposite also holds. For different fixed budgets, total leakage (the fraction of students receiving 
the CCT who are neither poor nor a future dropout) is minimised when I use both instruments 
in conjunction with each other. In other words, it is more effective to combine the predictive 
model and the PMT than to use them independently. However, this is not true when the social 
valuation of the two target groups differs to a large extent. If allocating the CCT to a poor 
student is four times more valuable relative to allocating it to a future dropout, or vice-versa, 
the likelier optimal approach is to use solely the mechanism designed to find the target group 
that is valued the most. 
 
All these results have important policy implications. Firstly, the paper shows that appropriate 
predictive models of school dropout using administrative datasets can be available for public 
administrators. These models can prove useful not only for CCTs but also for further policies, 
such as Early Warning Systems, whose purpose is to prevent school dropout. Secondly, in 
contexts where public officials value finding the poor and future school dropouts equally, the 
paper demonstrates that the targeting of a CCT can be improved when other dimensions beyond 
income are considered in the design. This result highlights the importance of: i) avoiding 
misalignment between the policy goals, its target groups and the selection of the targeting 
mechanisms, and ii) developing targeting assessments that are in line with all these definitions. 
 
In summary, the paper provides novel contributions to the social policy targeting field. Overall, 
the paper’s findings are not only relevant for the specific Chilean case but for all developing 
countries that either have CCTs, wish to develop predictive models of school dropout using 
                                                          
that makes no predictive mistakes has an area under the curve of 1, while a model that predicts at random should 
achieve an area under the curve near 0.5. Further information about ROC curves is available in the next section.  
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administrative records or want to strengthen the targeting effectiveness of their social policies. 
 
The paper unfolds as follows. The second section introduces the data and describes the methods 
I use in the development of the predictive model of school dropout and the targeting 
assessment. The third section presents the results of the MLA predicting school dropout. The 
fourth section shows the findings for the targeting assessment. The concluding section 
discusses the paper’s main findings and comments on its main contributions and implications. 
 
2.2 Data and Methods 
 
This section describes in detail the data and methods. The first subsection introduces the data. 
The second part presents the methodological approach of the predictive model of school 
dropout. The third subsection elaborates on the procedures and indicators of the targeting 
assessment. Finally, the fourth part explains how I structure the dataset for the analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Data 
 
Most of the datasets I use were provided by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) at my 
request. I combine the datasets using the individual ID number provided by the Chilean State. 
For privacy purposes the ID numbers were changed by the MSD using an algorithm that is 
unknown to me but enabled me to merge the datasets. The two most important sources of 
information in this research are the Ministry of Education (ME) Performance Dataset and the 
Social Protection File (SPF) Dataset. 
 
Ministry of Education Performance Dataset 
 
This dataset contains information for the entire population of students who finish an academic 
year in primary and secondary education. The dataset only excludes students in differential 
education and flexible adult education. Each yearly dataset has approximately 2,950,000 
observations (one per student). I requested eight datasets (from 2009 until 2016) for this paper. 
 
The variables available in this dataset are: i) school ID (9,500 unique values), ii) type of school 
(with categories such as traditional primary education, scientific-humanistic or technical-
professional secondary education), iii) grade (first to twelfth), iv) academic performance, v) 
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percentage of attendance, vi) academic end of year classification,11 and vii) student ID. 
 
With this information I create additional variables such as school dropout. A full explanation 
of this indicator is available in the next subsection. Other variables I create directly from this 
dataset are: i) school size, ii) academic cohort size,12 iii) relative academic performance, iv) 
relative attendance,13 v) school mobility, and vi) historical dropout rates by school. 
 
More educational information at the school level is available from public sources. Using the 
variable school ID, as a key to merge, I obtain the schools’: i) administrative dependency (such 
as public or private subsidised), ii) geographic location, iii) urban or rural status, iv) average 
performance in SIMCE (the national standardised test), and v) management indicators.14  
 
Social Protection File Dataset 
 
This dataset contains information for Chilean households and all their members. The dataset 
has a two-level structure. Each observation represents an individual (adult or child) who lives 
in a household. No individual can belong to more than one household. Each household has a 
unique ID number that allows for identifying all the individuals who belong to it.   
 
Households voluntarily requested the SPF at the local government level. Having an SPF was 
essential to be eligible for multiple social policies. From January 2010, the dataset had 
10,782,270 individuals (Comité de Expertos Ficha de Protección Social, 2010), approximately 
63.5% of Chile’s population. I use four of these datasets (from 2011 to 2014) in this research. 
 
Some of the variables I access are: income, date of birth, proxy means test score, gender, race, 
                                                          
11 At the end of an academic year students are classified into one of the following categories: i) progress, ii) failure, 
or iii) withdrawal. Thus, because the primary and secondary levels are compulsory in Chile, the second and third 
groups of students are expected to repeat the grade at which they did not progress in the next academic year. 
12 Three variables define an academic cohort: i) the school, ii) the type of education received within that school 
(for example traditional or adult education, scientific-humanistic or technical-professional), and iii) the grade in 
which the students were enrolled. Students belonging to the same cohort have these characteristics in common. 
Most schools have a specific orientation. However, some schools offer more than one type of education in a given 
grade (especially in secondary education). Students can also change streams from one academic year to the other. 
13 I create the relative academic performance and relative attendance variables by ranking all students within an 
academic cohort and dividing the resulting ranking of each student by their academic cohort size.  
14 These are six variables associated with improving the quality of education within each school. The first two are 
linked with the educational outcomes obtained by the school (such as the trend in performance). The next two 
factors are related to the operation of the school (for example their ability to incorporate educational innovations). 
The remaining variables give an account of the involvement of the school community and the degree of equity.  
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head of household, schooling and employment.15 With this information I can generate 
additional variables for each individual such as poverty status (explained in detail in the third 
subsection) and number of children less than six years old within the household. 
 
I combine the information from the Social Protection File with the Ministry of Education 
Performance Dataset (at the individual level) to build variables for each academic cohort of 
students. Some of these variables are: average household income per capita, average schooling 
of the head of the household and proportion of students with a proxy means test score.  
 
2.2.2 Methods: Predictive Model of School Dropout 
 
This subsection explains in detail the methodological approach I take to build the predictive 
model of school dropout. The first part focuses on the predictors. Secondly, the subsection 
describes the outcome. The third part elaborates on the characteristics of the functions I use for 
the predictions. The subsection concludes with the criteria I use to assess the predictions. 
 
In general terms, the problem I address in this part of the paper is to find the best function to 
predict future school dropout given the information I observe from the past. Most formally: 
 
𝑌௜௧ା௞ = 𝑓(𝑋௜௧ᇱ , 𝑋௜௧ିଵᇱ , … … , 𝑋௜௧ି୨ᇱ , 𝑍௜ᇱ), 
 
I need to find a function 𝑓 that, given the vectors of variables 𝑋௧ᇱ (where t is year), 𝑋௧ିଵᇱ ,….., 
𝑋௧ି୨ᇱ  and 𝑍ᇱ available for each individual i, produces on average the most accurate prediction 
of the outcome 𝑌 in t+𝑘. Given that the outcome, school dropout, is a dichotomous variable, 
this is a statistical classification problem and 𝑓 is known as a classifier.  
 
The Predictors 
 
I include two types of predictors in the model. The first group of predictors are contained in 
vectors 𝑋௧ᇱ, 𝑋௧ିଵᇱ , … … , 𝑋௧ି୨ᇱ . Specifically, 𝑋௧ᇱ is a vector of variables that change through time 
for student i (such as academic performance, grade repetition, attendance and mobility). The 
second group of predictors are embedded within 𝑍ᇱ, a vector of variables for student i that do 
                                                          
15 The fourth chapter (subsection 4.3.1) explains in detail the proxy means test score of the Social Protection File.  
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not vary through time (such as race) or where I can only use one observation (such as age).  
 
The selection of variables I include in the model is motivated by the literature on determinants 
of school dropout and bounded by the availability of administrative records. 
 
Rumberger and Lim (2008) summarise 203 studies for the United States over 25 years to 
identify statistically significant predictors of school dropout. Some individual characteristics 
of students that are relevant predictors are: i) educational performance (for example academic 
achievement, mobility, grade promotion and age or difference between age and expected age 
for the grade), ii) behaviours (such as absenteeism, deviance and employment), iii) attitudes 
(like goals and self-perceptions), and iv) background (for example demographics and health). 
 
Their review also identifies institutional characteristics of students’ families, schools, and 
communities. For example, the structure, practices, financial and human resources of students’ 
families are singled out as predictors. Additionally, the student composition, structural 
characteristics, resources, processes and practices of schools are highlighted in their research.  
 
Hunt (2008) reviews the literature on factors associated with school dropout in developing 
countries. The author identifies similar predictors to Rumberger and Lim (2008), but also adds 
other intrinsic challenges that these nations face such as migration, conflict and limited school 
supply.  
 
The complete list of predictors I use is available in Appendix A. There are 50 variables in total 
that aim to cover all the dimensions highlighted by Rumberger and Lim (2008). Given the 
nature of the sources, the information is richer regarding educational performance and the 
characteristics of students’ families, relative to other predictors such as students’ attitudes 
towards education. 
 
A complementary source for predictor selection is Lamote et al. (2013), who argue that 
predictive models of school dropout need to account for the longitudinal and hierarchical 
structure of the datasets. This makes perfect sense due to the relevance of educational 
performance, which is a time-variant variable, and schools and communities as predictors of 
future dropout. Accordingly, where this is feasible, all my models use three years of historical 
information (𝑋௧ᇱ, 𝑋௧ିଵᇱ , 𝑋௧ିଶᇱ ) and include many variables that are at a higher level than the 
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students.16 
 
The dataset I assemble is appropriate for the task as it includes multiple strong predictors of 
school dropout. The dataset possesses multiple years of information on academic attainment, 
mobility, attendance in conjunction with information at the household level (such as years of 
schooling of its members and income per capita) and the school and academic cohort levels.  
 
The Outcome 
 
I use the Ministry of Education Performance Dataset to identify students who dropped out of 
school. The process involves merging different years of this dataset, and linking observations 
by the student ID. More precisely, I link each student in primary and secondary education who 
concluded their academic year t and did not graduate from their secondary studies with itself 
in years t+1 and/or t+2. Using this procedure, I identify the students that dropped out of school 
after year t.17 Student dropout can be measured in multiple ways. I use three different measures 
of school dropout to verify the consistency of the results. These measures are: 
 
 dropout_t1: The student finished the academic year t and then failed to enrol in t+1 or 
enrolled but withdrew before the end of the academic year t+1. 
 dropout_t2: The student finished the academic year t and (disregarding what happened 
in t+1) then failed to enrol in t+2 or enrolled but withdrew before the end of the 
academic year t+2. 
 dropout_t12: The student finished the academic year t and then failed to enrol in t+1 or 
enrolled but withdrew before the end of the academic year t+1 or failed to enrol in t+2 
or enrolled but withdrew before the end of the academic year t+2. 
 
Dropout_t12 takes a value of one if any of dropout_t1 or dropout_t2 takes a value of one. Along 
these lines, dropout_t12 can be interpreted as dropping out of school at any point within two 
years of completing an academic year. Likewise, dropout_t1 can be interpreted as leaving the 
school at any point within one year of finishing an academic year. 
                                                          
16 A trade-off exists concerning how many years of historical information to use. Adding a year can improve the 
prediction of school dropout but reduces the sample size. I decide to use three years. Information on t–2 has some, 
albeit limited, predictive power (this will be shown in the next section) and this decision allows me to pool four 
different cohorts (I give complete details on this topic in the fourth subsection). 
17 Given how I measure school dropout, the sample only includes students that finished the academic year t. 
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The Classifier and Machine Learning Algorithms 
 
I determine 𝑓 using supervised MLA. MLA have expanded their range of users, from computer 
science to social sciences, such as economics. MLA are a powerful and flexible provider of 
quality predictions (Mullainathan & Spiess, 2017) and a helpful tool for prediction policy 
problems (Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan, & Obermeyer, 2015).18 Research on topics such 
as recidivism, teachers' hiring and identification of vulnerable groups has used MLA.  
 
Mullainathan and Spiess (2017) identify three essential characteristics of MLA. Firstly, these 
algorithms find functions that predict well out of sample or that do not overfit the data. 
Secondly, MLA can discover a complex structure that is not specified in advance. Finally, a 
subset of MLA allows researchers to manage high dimensional settings, the cases where the 
number of variables is larger than the observations (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2013).  
 
MLA are suitable in my case for three reasons. Firstly, in theory, an approach that maximises 
the predictions of an outcome outside of the sample is preferred for a prediction policy problem 
(such as determining which students will drop out) relative to an approach that maximises 
predictions within the sample. Secondly, a priori I ignore the structure of the function (for 
example the number of variables to include) or the form that achieves the best prediction of 
school dropout. Using MLA expands the likelihood of finding the best model because some 
MLA consider interactions and polynomials while other MLA directly address the challenge 
of variable selection. Finally, with MLA I can better manage the number of parameters to 
include in the dataset. Although I do not face a high-dimensionality problem, reducing the 
numbers of predictors (by not directly including higher order terms) facilitates the calculations. 
 
To obtain predictions that work well out of sample, machine learning uses a training dataset 
and a test dataset. The models must be estimated in the former dataset and assessed with the 
latter. MLA aim to avoid overfitting, in other words, MLA seek to optimise their predictions 
in the test dataset (out of sample) rather than in the training dataset (in-sample). To do so, each 
                                                          
18 The machine learning literature has focused mainly on the problem of prediction and not on capturing the 
relationship between the predictors and the outcome. Initially, MLA were not designed to obtain deep structural 
parameters or for causal inference (Nichols, 2018). However, there is emerging literature that connects MLA with 
causal inference for policy (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, & Wooldridge, 2014; Athey & Imbens, 2015a, 2015b).  
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algorithm first tries to determine its optimal level of complexity in the training dataset. The 
specific indicators of model complexity vary by algorithm, but in general terms these are called 
regularisers. The less regularisation there is, the better the model will predict in-sample 
(Mullainathan & Spiess, 2017). These parameters of model complexity can be viewed as 
variables that can be tuned with the purpose of producing optimal predictions in the test dataset 
(Varian, 2014).  
 
The last process is known as empirical tuning. It consists of fitting the algorithm in one part of 
the training dataset and then determining the optimal value of the regulariser by assessing its 
prediction performance in another part of the training dataset (Mullainathan & Spiess, 2017). 
Van der Vaart, Dudoit, and Van der Laan (2006) show that the effectiveness of the procedure 
is increased if the training dataset is subdivided into multiple subsamples or folds. This is 
known as cross-validation, with 5 or 10-fold being the most adopted practices (Mullainathan 
& Spiess, 2017). In this type of cross-validation, the regulariser with the best average 
performance is chosen. 
 
Machine learning algorithms vary regarding the flexibility they can offer to find the best 𝑓. 
Shrinkage methods such as lasso and elastic nets are the most restrictive as they can only 
generate linear functions (no interactions between the predictors or other higher order terms). 
These algorithms are less flexible than ordinary least squares as there is a penalty for every 
regression coefficient that is different from zero. This penalty leads to the coefficients of the 
linear regression being shrunken towards zero relative to least squares (James et al., 2013). 
Generalised additive models (GAMs) expand the range of shapes to estimate f from linear to 
more complex approaches, for example some non-linear relationships (James et al., 2013). In 
practice, GAMs fit a non-linear function separately for each predictor and then add all these 
functions. As the model is additive, interactions between the predictors are not considered.  
 
Approaches based on trees admit interactions by stratifying the predictor space into some 
regions (McBride & Nichols, 2016). For example, if only two predictors of school dropout are 
available (age and attendance), a classification tree algorithm can be as follows: a dropout is 
predicted only if a student is older than 17 years old and has an attendance of lower than 70%. 
Methods such as random forest and boosting are the result of the combination of multiple trees. 
  
Finally, a highly flexible approach is support vector machines. In broad terms, in a 
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classification problem this algorithm aims to find a hyperplane separating the two classes. If 
this hyperplane cannot be found a kernel trick (Theodoridis & Koutroumbas, 2009) is applied. 
The feature space of the problem is expanded, and a new hyperplane is fitted in this transformed 
space. This process may produce non-linear class boundaries in the original predictors’ space.  
 
James et al. (2013) claim that no single algorithm is superior to all the others in every possible 
context. Thus, I try multiple MLA. For simplicity, the paper presents results for only six of 
them: i) elastic nets (glmnet), ii) generalised additive models (gam), iii) gradient boosting 
(gbm), iv) lasso, v) support vector machines (svm), and vi) random forest (rf). These six MLA 
use the same inputs, which are the 50 predictors I describe in Appendix A. 
 
I implement the MLA in the software R using the Caret Package. Kuhn (2008) is a precious 
source for this purpose. I utilise 10-fold cross-validation. I use two test datasets. The first test 
dataset is useful to conduct out of sample validation while I use the second test dataset to assess 
the quality of the predictions over time. I explain in detail the design of the training dataset and 
the two test datasets in the fourth subsection. In respect to the treatment of the predictors, I 
convert categorical variables into dummies and the Caret Package carries out standardisation 
on all the predictors before executing each machine learning algorithm.  
 
The Criterion to Select the Best 𝑓 
 
Statistical classification problems have only four possible outcomes for dropout prediction. A 
model either: i) correctly predicts a dropout, ii) incorrectly predicts a dropout, iii) fails to 
predict a dropout, or iv) correctly predicts a non-dropout. More generally, these processes result 
in four categories that are labelled true positives, false positives, false negatives and true 
negatives. This can be summed up in a confusion matrix like the one I present in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Confusion Matrix or Contingency Table of a Classifier of Student Dropout 
True Class Predicted Class Total Not a Dropout Dropout 
Not a Dropout True Negatives (TN) False Positives (FP) Non-Dropouts (ND) 
Dropout False Negatives (FN) True Positives (TP) Dropouts (D) 
Total Negatives (N) Positives (P) All Population (T) 
 
Multiple indicators derived from combinations of the nine shaded cells of Table 2.1 have been 
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used to report the quality of predictions. Within studies on dropout prediction there is no 
standard metric that facilitates comparisons (Bowers et al., 2013). Following these authors, I 
provide true positive rates, false positive rates and accuracy. Table 2.2 describes these three 
indicators in detail. The right-hand column of Table 2.2 uses information from six shaded cells 
of Table 2.1. An exhaustive list of this family of indicators is available in Appendix B.  
 
Table 2.2: Indicators Used in the Predictive Model of School Dropout 
Name Formula 
True Positive Rate or Sensitivity True Positives (TP) / Dropouts (D) 
False Positive Rate or 1–Specificity False Positives (FP) / Non-Dropouts (ND) 
Accuracy [True Negatives(TN)+True Positives(TP)] / Total(T) 
 
A perfect classifier would achieve a true positive rate of one, with all dropouts predicted as 
such, and a false positive rate of zero, or no incorrect predictions of dropouts. No classifier 
achieves this performance though. In practice, dropout prediction models intend to maximise 
the true positive rate (or sensitivity) and minimise the false positive rate (or 1–specificity). 
Nonetheless, there is a trade-off between these two indicators. As a predictive model classifies 
more observations as dropouts, the true positive rate increases but so does the false positive 
rate. 
 
Receiver operating characteristics curves summarise this trade-off. An ROC curve 
simultaneously displays the false positive rate and the true positive rate given by a classifier 
(James et al., 2013). While the former indicator goes on the horizontal axis, the latter is located 
on the vertical axis. All possible outputs or scenarios provided by a classifier are represented 
in an ROC curve. Given this feature, the area under the ROC curve provides a measure of the 
overall predictive performance of a classifier. The AUC scale ranges from zero to one as the 
true positive rate and the false positive rate. The better the classifier is, the closer its AUC will 
be to 1. Conversely, a classifier making predictions at random has an expected AUC of 0.5.  
 
The AUC is a useful indicator to compare the overall performance of multiple predictive 
models. Models with a higher AUC are, on average, better in statistical classification relative 
to models with a lower AUC. A model with an ROC curve that is on top of other curves all the 
way along the horizontal axis is unambiguously a better classifier in every possible scenario. 
 
I use the AUC estimates to select the best 𝑓. I calculate these in the first test dataset (for out of 
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sample validation) and for the three measures of school dropout introduced at the beginning of 
this subsection. The advantages of using the AUC are twofold. In the first instance, the 
performance of the MLA predicting school dropout can be compared graphically. Secondly, 
the AUC integrates in one value all the potential classification outputs of each algorithm. This 
feature frees me to select an arbitrary threshold to assess the performance of the classifiers 
(such as to choose the algorithm with the highest true positive rate when the false positive rate 
reaches 0.20). 
 
Additionally, I provide true positive rates, false positive rates and accuracy for two specific 
scenarios. I force the MLA to classify 10% and 30% of students as future dropouts. These 
indicators help to establish comparisons with the outputs obtained by other scholars.   
 
2.2.3 Methods: Targeting Assessment  
 
After identifying the best performing algorithm, I can use two indexes to target a hypothetical 
CCT. The first is the income-proxy means test score from the Social Protection File. I derive 
the second from the outputs of the best machine learning algorithm (𝑓). Each of these outputs 
represents the probability that the model is observing a future school dropout.  
 
This subsection describes the methods related to the targeting assessment of a hypothetical 
CCT on the poor and future school dropouts. The first part explains how I construct the poverty 
variable. The following two parts elaborate on the indicators I use to assess targeting: total 
leakage and leaked welfare. The final part discusses the policy alternatives I utilise.  
 
Poverty 
 
Poverty status is not directly available from the Social Protection File dataset. However, it is 
possible to build an estimate of poverty status by using household structure and income (in the 
Social Protection File the most relevant sources of income are labour and pensions). There are 
many approaches to constructing this variable. I use total household income over its members. 
Using income per capita is consistent with the "traditional" methodology used in Chile to 
measure poverty. I define a student as poor if he or she is part of the poorest fifth regarding 
income per capita in the sample. I choose this poverty line considering the poverty rate was 
approximately 20% for the population analysed in my paper in one year of the assessment. This 
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threshold is higher than the official poverty line because the sample in my study is not 
representative of the whole population. This is explained in more detail in the next subsection.  
 
Total Leakage 
 
The poverty targeting literature has offered multiple indicators of targeting effectiveness. For 
example, the AUC in ROC analyses are available (Baulch, 2002; Wodon, 1997). Nonetheless, 
one of the more common approaches to assessing the targeting effectiveness of transfers 
consists of providing undercoverage and leakage rates (Coady et al., 2004). The undercoverage 
rate is the proportion of poor households or individuals not receiving the programme. The 
leakage rate is the fraction of the non-poor among those who are receiving the programme. 
 
Two common limitations are associated with using these two rates (Coady & Skoufias, 2004). 
The first is that they disregard distributional information; for example giving a transfer to 
someone in the highest 1% of income counts the same as giving it to someone marginally over 
the poverty line. The second shortcoming is that the size of the transfer is irrelevant. It does not 
make a difference whether a poor household receives a minuscule transfer or an amount that 
lifts it over the poverty line. One of the preferred ways to address this limitation has been to 
assess targeting based on the impact on poverty (Grosh & Baker, 1995; Skoufias et al., 2001). 
 
On the one hand, using leakage and undercoverage rates restricts the depth of the analysis in 
the dimension of poverty. On the other hand, it facilitates establishing comparisons between 
targeting indicators of poverty and school dropout. Furthermore, it facilitates combining future 
school dropouts and the poor into one indicator. Thus, despite the limitations of leakage and 
undercoverage rates, I opt to use these types of indicators to assess the performance of targeting 
mechanisms. Five of the indicators I use in the paper are presented in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Indicators Used in the Targeting Assessment 
Name Formula 
Poor Undercoverage # poor not receiving CCT / # poor 
Non-Poor Leakage # non-poor receiving CCT / # receiving CCT 
Dropout Undercoverage # future dropouts not receiving CCT / # future dropouts 
Non-Dropout Leakage # non-dropouts receiving CCT / # receiving CCT 
Total Leakage # non-dropouts & non-poor with CCT / # receiving CCT 
 
Total leakage, defined as the proportion of non-dropouts and non-poor receiving the CCT after 
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the simulation, can be interpreted as the inclusion error. This can be better appreciated from 
Table 2.4. Students (potential recipients of a CCT) can be part of one of four classes. Either 
they are poor and will drop out of school, they are poor but will not drop out, they are not poor 
but will drop out of school, or they are not poor and will not drop out. Targeting is unsuccessful 
when a CCT is given to the fourth type of students because no target group is reached. 
 
Table 2.4: Successful Targeting and Targeting Errors in a Context of Two Target Groups 
True Class Hypothetical CCT Recipient No Yes 
Non-Poor & Non-Dropout Successful Targeting Inclusion Error 
Non-Poor & Dropout Exclusion Error Successful Targeting 
Poor & Non-Dropout Exclusion Error Successful Targeting 
Poor & Dropout Exclusion Error Successful Targeting 
 
The selection of total leakage as the first main indicator of my analysis is also justified on 
theoretical grounds. One minus leakage can be equivalent to the distributional characteristic 
(DC), a benefit-cost statistic used to compare the welfare impact of transfers with a common 
budget (Coady & Skoufias, 2004). The authors show that the DC λ for any given scheme j is: 
 
λ௝ = ∑ 𝛽௛௛ 𝜃௛,           
 
where 𝛽௛ is the social valuation (welfare weight) of extra income to household h and 𝜃௛ 
represents the share of the total programme budget received by household h. 
 
An advantage of the DC is that welfare weights are made explicit and it generalises from 
simpler to more complex cases (Coady et al., 2004). When the size of the transfer is identical 
for each household and the social valuation of extra income is equal to one for a poor household 
and zero otherwise the DC indicator is equivalent to one minus the leakage rate, as shown: 
 
λ௝ = ෍ 𝛽௛
௛
𝜃 = 𝜃 ෍ 𝛽௛
௛
=
∑ 𝛽௛௛
# 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
=  
# 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
# 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
= 1–
# 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
# 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
= 1– 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 
 
Under some additional assumptions, when the size of a CCT is identical for each individual 
and when the social valuation of income is equal to one for any CCT recipient who is either 
33 
 
poor or a future dropout and zero otherwise, the DC indicator is equivalent to one minus total 
leakage. 
 
Total leakage is the cornerstone indicator that I use in my research to compare the targeting 
performance of alternative instruments. The indicator has the major advantage of allowing for 
the integration of two important target groups for CCTs. Additionally, the logic behind this 
indicator is useful for other parts of the assessment, when I focus on social welfare and targeting 
costs. 
 
Peyre Dutrey (2007) criticises the use of leakage in targeting assessments because this indicator 
does not account for individuals who are excluded. In other words, undercoverage is not 
considered. However, leakage and undercoverage rates are related. If coverage increases (and 
undercoverage decreases), leakage is likely to increase. Therefore, rather than intending to find 
the optimal rate of undercoverage and leakage, my targeting assessment is done for different 
coverage levels of a hypothetical CCT, more precisely for three budget allocations for a CCT. 
I explain this aspect of the paper in detail at the end of this subsection. Overall, within a fixed 
budget and coverage rate, the targeting mechanism with the lowest value of total leakage is 
optimal. 
 
Leaked Welfare 
 
I also analyse whether the findings of the targeting assessment hold when I change the social 
valuation of the target groups. Up to this point, I have implicitly assumed that successfully 
targeting a student who is poor is as socially equivalent worthwhile as correctly targeting a 
student that will drop out of school. I introduce four different scenarios of social valuation 
across the two target groups. In the first two scenarios each target group is twice as important 
as the other. Furthermore, in the last two scenarios the difference in valuation increases to four 
times the other target group. The choice of these scenarios does not have any theoretical 
justification, it is merely practical. Following the logic of the DC, the welfare impact of a 
transfer scheme j, which provides an equal amount for each individual i can be measured by 
the formula: 
λ௝  = 𝜔 ∑ 𝛾௜௜  =  
ଵ
# ோ௘௖௜௣௜௘௡௧௦
∑ 𝛾௜௜  =  
∑ ఊ೔೔
# ோ௘௖௜௣௜௘௡௧௦
  , 
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where 𝜔 is the share of the total programme budget received by each adolescent who is a CCT 
recipient and 𝛾௜ is the social valuation (welfare weight) of extra income to adolescent i. 
 
In order for 𝜆௝ to have minimum and maximum values of zero and one, I choose the welfare 
weights using the following logic. A hypothetical CCT recipient i who is neither a future 
dropout nor poor receives a value of γ of zero. Conversely, each CCT recipient i who belongs 
to the highly valued target group receives a value of γ of one. The social valuations of each 
class of student in each of the four scenarios I use in the paper are presented in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Social Valuation (Welfare Weights γ) in Different Scenarios 
 
True Class 
Social Valuation Scenarios 
The Poor are 
Twice as 
Important as 
Dropouts 
The Poor are 
Four Times 
More 
Important 
than 
Dropouts 
Dropouts 
are Twice 
as 
Important 
as the Poor 
Dropouts are 
Four Times 
More 
Important than 
the Poor 
Non-Poor & Non-Dropout 0 0 0 0 
Non-Poor & Dropout 0.5 0.25 1 1 
Poor & Non-Dropout 1 1 0.5 0.25 
Poor & Dropout 1 1 1 1 
 
The targeting mechanism j that provides the highest 𝜆௝ maximises welfare. Given the weights 
I use, the last statement can be rephrased as follows: the targeting mechanism j that provides 
the lowest 1–𝜆௝ maximises welfare (for any given budget). This last indicator is the focus of 
the welfare assessment. For simplicity, I refer to it as “leaked welfare”. More formally: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 1–λ௝  =1– 
∑ ఊ೔೔
# ோ௘௖௜௣௜௘௡௧௦
 
 
Budget Available, CCT Coverage and Targeting Mechanisms 
 
CCTs are not universal schemes. Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) show the coverage of CCTs 
varied by year and country in Latin America. Consequently, I repeat my targeting assessment 
for different levels of coverage for a hypothetical CCT. Given that in my study the transfer size 
remains unchanged, an increase or decrease in the CCT programme budget only affects its 
coverage. For this reason, I repeat my targeting assessment for different budget scenarios 
available for a hypothetical CCT. I assume that there are no administrative costs in the first 
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instance. I analyse three CCT coverage or budget scenarios. In the first case, the budget allows 
for reaching only 5% of the students in the sample. In the second and third scenarios the budget 
allows for reaching 20% and 40% of the sample, respectively. These three cases aim to recreate 
real policy environments: i) a narrowly targeted CCT, ii) a CCT whose coverage is in line with 
the population living in poverty (such as in Chile), and iii) a broadly targeted CCT. 
 
I begin by looking at the targeting performance separately for each instrument. First, I only use 
the proxy means test score of the Social Protection File. Second, I use the predictions derived 
from the best 𝑓. The assessment continues with two combined mechanisms. I target a 
hypothetical CCT assigning the first 25% of the budget available using the PMT score, and 
then this percentage ascends to 75%. For example, when the budget allows for reaching 20% 
of the students in the sample with a CCT and I allocate this using a combined approach, such 
as 75% is assigned first using the SPF, the procedure works as follows. In the first place, I 
select the 15% with the lowest PMT scores among the sample and I assign them the CCT. 
Consequently, I choose the remaining 5% of the students by observing the highest likelihood 
of dropping out among those not selected in the first step. 
 
2.2.4 Sample and Dataset Structure  
 
The sample excludes students below seventh grade in year t, younger than 12 years old by June 
of year t and older than 21 years old by March of year t+1. I apply these restrictions considering 
that student dropout in Chile is a cause for concern mainly in secondary school and that 21 
years old is the maximum age to stay enrolled in traditional secondary education.19  
 
Another crucial characteristic of the sample is that it includes only adolescents that had an entry 
in the SPF. Thus, this is not a representative sample of the population, as those households with 
the highest earnings were less likely to request an SPF. These features do not favour making 
inferences about the whole student body. However, this is not problematic if the findings are 
linked to a subset of the entire population: those students with an SPF. Given that this subset 
is more likely to be recipients of social programmes, the findings of this study remain relevant. 
                                                          
19 In the Chilean educational system, students are in theory expected to graduate from secondary education at the 
age of 18. However, grade repetition and school dropout can delay graduation from secondary studies. 
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In practice, 26,3% of adolescents did not make it to my final sample due to lacking an SPF.20  
 
To undertake the machine learning algorithms and the targeting assessment I structure the 
dataset based on four year-cohorts t (t = 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), using information from t–2, 
t–1, t, t+1 and t+2 for each individual in the cohort. Hence, each cohort on its own is a panel 
dataset. I pool these four cohorts to obtain the “full dataset”. As a result, this dataset contains 
observations from eight years (from 2009 until 2016). This is explained in detail in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6: Dataset Structure 
Cohort Academic and School Information (From the Ministry of Education) 
SPF 
Info 
Dropout Information (From the 
Ministry of Education) 
2011 2009 (t–2), 2010 (t–1) & 2011 (t) 2011 (t) 2012 (t+1) and/or 2013 (t+2) 
2012 2010 (t–2), 2011 (t–1) & 2012 (t) 2012 (t) 2013 (t+1) and/or 2014 (t+2) 
2013 2011 (t–2), 2012 (t–1) & 2013 (t) 2013 (t) 2014 (t+1) and/or 2015 (t+2) 
2014 2012 (t–2), 2013 (t–1) & 2014 (t) 2014 (t) 2015 (t+1) and/or 2016 (t+2) 
 
I divide the “full dataset” into two parts. The “old” subset contains cohorts 2011, 2012 and 
2013. I partition the “old” subset using random assignment into a training dataset and a test 
dataset. Each observation in the “old” subset has a 0.75 probability of ending up in the training 
dataset. In this last dataset the MLA are trained. I test the algorithms and implement the 
targeting assessment in the test dataset. The “new” subset contains the 2014 cohort, which I 
use to assess the quality of the predictions of school dropout over time. This process is called 
out of time validation and its results are not shown in the body of the paper but in an appendix. 
 
2.3 Results: Predictive Model of School Dropout 
 
The first subsection provides summary statistics of school dropout and for multiple variables 
included in the model. The second part focuses on the results of the MLA predicting school 
dropout. I provide ROC curves, their AUC, true positive rates, false positive rates and accuracy 
for three measures of school dropout. This subsection additionally analyses which variables of 
                                                          
20 Students without a Social Protection File were more likely to attend a private non-subsidised school and less 
likely to be enrolled in a public school or secondary technical-professional education relative to their peers with 
a Social Protection File. The former group was also more likely to be enrolled in schools with higher performance 
in SIMCE (the national standardised test) and less likely to attend schools in rural areas. This information provides 
evidence that students from higher-income households are not well represented in the sample as in Chile these 
households are more likely to prefer private schools, scientific-humanistic education, enrol their children in 
schools with higher levels of academic performance (measured by SIMCE), and to live in urban areas. However, 
given that the percentage of students attending rural schools and technical-professional education is not negligible 
is also feasible that some poor households did not have access to a Social Protection File. 
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the model are the ones that mostly explain the variation in school dropout. 
   
2.3.1 Summary Statistics  
 
Table 2.7 provides summary statistics for some individual-level variables. Panel A presents the 
dropout rates in years t+1 and/or t+2. Panel B describes academic variables for years t and t–
1. Panel C introduces variables related to the schools where adolescents were enrolled in year 
t. Panel D presents the information provided by the SPF in year t. The first four columns of the 
table summarise the mean values of each variable for each cohort. The last four columns 
provide the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for cohorts 2011, 2012 
and 2013. These three cohorts comprise the “old” subset, as explained in the last subsection. 
 
The average dropout rates for years t+1 and t+2 are 0.06 and 0.09 respectively for the 2011- 
2013 period. Within this time range 11 out of 100 adolescents dropped out either in year t+1 
or t+2. All measures of dropout declined annually from 2011 to 2014: i) from 0.07 to 0.05 for 
adolescents dropping out in year t+1, ii) from 0.10 to 0.07 for adolescents dropping out in year 
t+2, and iii) from 0.12 to 0.09 for adolescents dropping out either in year t+1 or in year t+2. 
The last two rows of Panel A illustrate the dynamics of dropout. On average, for 2011, 2012 
and 2013 cohorts, 65 out of 100 adolescents who dropped out in year t+1 did not return to 
school in year t+2. Among those who were dropouts in year t+2, only 48 out of 100 adolescents 
dropped out in year t+1. Along these lines, 52 out of 100 dropped out exactly in year t+2. 
 
Regarding their academic information in year t, between 2011 and 2013: i) adolescents had an 
average grade of 5.30, ii) their attendance was 89.7%, iii) 9 out of 10 students were promoted 
to the next grade, and iv) their mobility (the rate of students switching school between t–1 and 
t) was 0.24.21 The average grade and the rate of students promoted marginally increased from 
2011 to 2014. 
 
Between 2011 and 2013, 4 out of 10 adolescents attended traditional primary education in year 
t while 35% and 21% of adolescents were enlisted in traditional secondary education, in 
scientific-humanistic (SH) and technical-professional (TP) schools respectively. Within this 
                                                          
21 Approximately three out of five cases of mobility in my sample are explained by students switching schools 
between eighth and ninth grade (the transition between primary and secondary education in Chile). The mobility 
rate among ninth graders in year t reaches 0.66 in total and is as high as 0.81 among students in public schools.  
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period, 49% and 46% of adolescents were enrolled in private subsidised and public schools. 
 
According to the information provided by the SPF, between 2011 and 2013, on average: i) 
adolescents were 15.39 years old by the end of the academic year t, ii) half of the students were 
males, and iii) 9 out of 100 were labelled as from indigenous backgrounds. Concerning the 
head of their households: i) 45% were females, ii) 59% lived with a partner, iii) 41% were 
employed and contributing to social security, and iv) their average schooling was 9.59 years. 
Between 2011 and 2013, the average number of people within each student household reached 
4.26 with these divided among 2.15 rooms. The average monthly income per capita reached 
$61,012 CLP (equivalent to $116.5 USD at the December 30th, 2013 exchange rate). 
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics 
Variables 
Year-Cohort 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011-2013 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Drop Out Information 
Dropout Year t+1 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Dropout Year t+2 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Dropout Year t+1 or t+2 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Dropout Year t+2 (if Dropout Year t+1=1) 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Dropout Year t+1 (if Dropout Year t+2=1) 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Panel B: Academic Information 
Average Grade Year t 5.27 5.31 5.32 5.36 5.30 0.68 1 7 
Attendance (%) Year t 88.1 90.9 90.3 90.4 89.7 11.6 1 100 
Promoted Year t 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.31 0 1 
Mobility Year t 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Average Grade Year t–1 5.41 5.37 5.40 5.41 5.39 0.63 1 7 
Attendance (%) Year t–1 92.8 90.1 92.1 91.5 91.7 9.3 1 100 
Promoted Year t–1 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.26 0 1 
Mobility Year t–1 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.42 0 1 
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Table 2.7 (continued): Summary Statistics 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
Variables 
Year Cohort 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011-2013 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel C: School Information (Year t) 
Primary Traditional School 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Secondary Traditional SH School 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Secondary Traditional TP School 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Public School 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Private Subsidised School 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Number of Students in the Academic Cohort 117.1 110.8 108.3 106.1 112.1 103.2 1 1324 
Rural School 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Dropout Rate in Previous Academic Cohort 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10 0 1 
School Language Score SIMCE 249.8 251.5 251.1 248.7 250.8 26.3 142 345 
School Maths Score SIMCE 248.7 249.6 253.7 255.5 250.7 32.7 138 381 
Panel D: Social Protection File Information 
Age (Years) at the End of Academic Year t 15.39 15.39 15.39 15.41 15.39 1.65 12.50 20.67 
Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Indigenous Background 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Household Number of Rooms 2.18 2.15 2.11 2.10 2.15 0.93 0 63 
Head of Household Lives with a Partner 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Head of Household (HH) is Female 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.50 0 1 
HH Years of Schooling 9.46 9.62 9.70 9.83 9.59 3.41 0 24 
HH Employed and with Social Security 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Household Size 4.30 4.24 4.24 4.21 4.26 1.45 2 34 
Household Income per Capita ($CLP) 58,095.0 61,848.8 63,169.2 70,188.6 61,011.9 53,274.3 0 5,533,636 
Social Protection File PMT Score 7,537.2 7,384.2 7,193.6 7,025.8 7,373.0 3,733.3 2,072 15,625 
Number of Observations  960,514 930,225 937,843 968,584 2,828,582  
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2.3.2 Results for Models Predicting School Dropout 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the ROC curves for six MLA predicting dropout_t12. A solid line plots the 
elastic net algorithm (glmnet). The generalised additive (gam) and boosted trees (gbm) models 
are plotted by long and short dashes, respectively. Dots and dashes plot the other shrinkage 
algorithm (lasso) and support vector machines (svm), long dashes in the former case and short 
dashes for the latter. The random forest model (rf) is plotted by dots only.  
 
Figure 2.1: ROC Curve for Models Predicting School Dropout in Year t+1 or t+2 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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According to Figure 2.1, the curves of the six models are close to each other and no single one 
is above or below the rest along the whole horizontal axis. This suggests that the six MLA have 
minor differences in terms of the area under the ROC curve. A closer look at the graph shows 
that the solid line (representing the glmnet model) has a higher degree of convexity. This curve 
tends to be above all the other curves in a broad range of false positive rates. Conversely, the 
random forest curve (comprised exclusively by dots) is below the others in some sections of 
the graph (for example where the true positive rate lies between 0.50 and 0.75). 
 
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 focus on the ROC curves predicting dropout_t1 and dropout_t2. The 
patterns of the lines follow the same logic as for Figure 2.1. On the one hand, both figures show 
that the solid curves (glmnet) are predominantly above the other curves. However, the short-
dashed curves (gbm) and the long-dashed curves (gam) closely follow and even overpass the 
solid curves along some parts of the horizontal axis. On the other hand, the svm algorithm (the 
short dashed and dotted curves) is unambiguously the worst performer in these assessments. 
 
Table 2.8 presents the area under the ROC curve for each of the six MLA. The first column of 
the table focuses on adolescents who dropped out in either of the two years after t. The last two 
columns of the table address the predictions of dropouts in years t+1 and t+2, respectively.  
 
Table 2.8: Area Under the ROC Curve for Models Predicting School Dropout 
Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
School Dropout Measures 
Dropout in Year t+1 
or t+2 
Dropout in Year 
t+1 
Dropout in Year 
t+2 
glmnet 0.866 0.893 0.857 
gam 0.865 0.892 0.854 
gbm 0.863 0.891 0.851 
lasso 0.858 0.885 0.845 
svm 0.853 0.843 0.803 
rf 0.849 0.875 0.844 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
The elastic net algorithm has the largest AUC in all three cases. In the test dataset, glmnet 
reaches 0.866 for dropout_t12, 0.893 for dropout_t1 and 0.857 for dropout_t2. Generalised 
additive models (gam) reach the second highest area under the curve in all three cases. The 
third highest AUC out of the sample is provided by the boosted trees algorithm (gbm). More 
generally, for these three algorithms the AUC is above 0.860 in the classification of dropout 
within two years, 0.890 in the classification of dropout after one year and over 0.850 in the 
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second-year dropout classification. Conversely, random forest (rf) and support vector machines 
(svm) algorithms have the two worst performances in all three measures of school dropout. 
 
Table 2.9 helps the reader to understand how the performance of these models translates into 
targeting effectiveness. The table presents the true positive rate, the false positive rate and the 
accuracy of the MLA. I need to set a common threshold to be able to compare the MLA among 
these three measures. The first three columns provide these indicators for a scenario where I 
classify as future dropouts 10% of adolescents with the highest probability of being a future 
dropout. In the last three columns the scenario considered is 30% of adolescents being 
classified as school dropouts. Appendix C shows the results of Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 in the 
second test dataset, the one that assesses the predictions over time (out of time validation).  
 
The left part of Panel A in Table 2.9 shows that the glmnet algorithm has the best performance. 
This model finds future dropouts at a rate of 477 out of 1000 in the scenario where 10% of 
adolescents are classified as dropouts. Additionally, its false positive rate is 0.053. In other 
words, non-dropouts are incorrectly classified as dropouts at a rate of 53 cases out of 1000. 
Finally, this algorithm successfully classifies 89.5% of the students. The second and third best 
performing models in the first scenario are gam and gbm, consistently with the AUC ranking. 
The true positive rates in these cases are 0.474 and 0.471, respectively. The false positive rate 
and the accuracy indicators are the same for both algorithms, reaching 0.054 and 0.894 
respectively. The two algorithms with the lower targeting performance are rf and svm. The first 
of these algorithms finds future dropouts at a rate of 438 out of 1000 and misclassifies non-
dropouts at a rate of 57 cases out of 1000. These results are consistent with the ROC curves. 
 
In the right-hand part of Panel A, where 30% of adolescents are classified as dropouts, the best 
performance belongs to the gam algorithm. In this context, dropouts are found at a rate of 810 
out of 1000. However, the false positive rate and the accuracy of the model weakens. The first 
indicator reaches 0.237 while the second reaches 0.768. The algorithm based on elastic nets 
(glmnet) has the second-best performance after gam among the true positive rate and accuracy. 
 
From the left part of Panel B, gam has the best performance in the classification of first-year 
dropouts in the scenario where 10% of adolescents are classified as dropouts. In this model, 
future dropouts are identified at a rate of 584 out of 1000, while its false positive rate is 0.066. 
For the glmnet model the true positive rate is 0.567 and the algorithm incorrectly classifies 
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non-dropouts at a rate of 67 out of 1000. The worst performing model (svm) in this exercise 
has a true positive rate of 0.494 and a false positive rate of 0.072. The last three columns of 
Panel B present the results for the second scenario, where 30% of adolescents are classified as 
dropouts after the first year. Boosted trees (gbm), glmnet and gam achieve the three highest 
values of sensitivity. These models reach the second, third and fourth lowest false positive rates 
and are among the four highest-ranked accuracies.   
 
Panel C presents the sensitivity, false positive rate and accuracy for each algorithm predicting 
dropout in year t+2. In the first scenario, the random forest, elastic net and generalised additive 
models are the highest performers. In the second scenario, the boosted trees algorithm replaces 
the random forest algorithm among the group with the highest true positive rate. 
 
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show the variable importance in the prediction of school dropout for 
glmnet and gbm. 13 variables can be found among the 20 most important in both algorithms.22  
Among the 5 most important in either of the models I find: age, average grade in years t and t–
1, attendance in year t, relative average grade and attendance in year t, the grade (seventh to 
twelfth) at which the student is in year t and the previous average rate of dropout in the school. 
Income per capita plays a minor role in helping school dropout prediction in these two models. 
 
Overall, differences in performance across the models exist but these are small in magnitude. 
In general, glmnet, gam and gbm are the top performers, while svm shows the worst results. 
The best MLA produce adequate predictions of school dropout. Regarding the true positive 
and false positive rates, my results are better or in the same region as 107 out of the 110 dropout 
flags analysed by Bowers et al. (2013). The results provided by glmnet are better than the ones 
obtained in Guatemala and Honduras (Adelman et al., 2017). The accuracy levels shown in the 
left part of Table 2.9, around 90%, are equivalent to the results obtained by the best performing 
MLA tested in North Carolina (Sorensen, 2018). My AUC findings are in line with the best-
performing models of school dropout tested in Wisconsin (Knowles, 2015), where most of the 
algorithms have an AUC of between 0.860 and 0.870. However, these results are below the 
areas under the curve of 0.948 and 0.965 observed in Denmark (Sara et al., 2015). The policy 
implications of these results are discussed in the concluding section of the paper.   
                                                          
22 In the Caret Package the maximum value of variable importance is 100. The procedure to estimate the variable 
importance varies by approach. For example, algorithms based on trees require permuting predictors to assess 
their accuracy while linear models utilise the absolute value of the t-statistic of each coefficient in the regression.  
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Figure 2.2: ROC Curve for Models Predicting School Dropout in 
Year t+1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
Figure 2.3: ROC Curve for Models Predicting School Dropout in 
Year t+2 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Table 2.9: True Positive Rate (Sensitivity), False Positive Rate (1–Specificity) and Accuracy for Models Predicting School Dropout 
Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
Scenario 1: 10% of Adolescents Classified as Dropouts Scenario 2: 30% of Adolescents Classified as Dropouts 
True Positive Rate 
(Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
Rate 
(1–Specificity) 
Accuracy True Positive Rate (Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
Rate 
(1–Specificity) 
Accuracy 
Panel A: Dropout in Year t+1 or t+2 
glmnet 0.477 0.053 0.895 0.803 0.238 0.767 
gam 0.474 0.054 0.894 0.810 0.237 0.768 
gbm 0.471 0.054 0.894 0.794 0.239 0.765 
lasso 0.461 0.055 0.891 0.789 0.239 0.764 
svm 0.449 0.057 0.889 0.801 0.238 0.766 
rf 0.438 0.057 0.887 0.770 0.236 0.765 
Panel B: Dropout in Year t+1  
glmnet 0.567 0.067 0.909 0.879 0.259 0.750 
gam 0.584 0.066 0.911 0.874 0.260 0.749 
gbm 0.561 0.068 0.908 0.881 0.259 0.750 
lasso 0.561 0.068 0.908 0.861 0.261 0.747 
svm 0.494 0.072 0.899 0.807 0.264 0.740 
rf 0.539 0.069 0.905 0.833 0.252 0.754 
Panel C: Dropout in Year t+2 
glmnet 0.483 0.064 0.897 0.800 0.252 0.752 
gam 0.486 0.063 0.898 0.800 0.252 0.752 
gbm 0.481 0.064 0.897 0.799 0.253 0.752 
lasso 0.476 0.064 0.896 0.794 0.253 0.751 
svm 0.434 0.068 0.889 0.718 0.260 0.738 
rf 0.491 0.063 0.899 0.773 0.250 0.752 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Figure 2.4: Variable Importance for glmnet Algorithm 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Variable Importance for gbm Algorithm 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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2.4 Results: Targeting Assessment 
 
This section presents the results of the targeting assessment. The first part provides summary 
statistics. These statistics describe the relationship between poverty and school dropout and 
between each targeting mechanism and the last two outcomes. The second subsection presents 
the results for total leakage. The concluding part introduces the results for leaked welfare. 
 
2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2.10 provides bivariate summary statistics between targeting mechanisms (organised in 
quintile groups) and the outcomes of the targeting assessment. The outcomes, poverty status 
and school dropout, are presented in the columns. I offer both the mean value and the relative 
frequency. As poverty status and school dropout are dichotomous variables (they are either 
zero or one), the mean value can be interpreted as the proportion of poor adolescents and school 
dropouts within each quintile group, respectively. Contrarily, the relative frequency describes 
the distribution of poor adolescents and future school dropouts among the quintile groups. 
 
Panel A describes the relationship between income quintile groups, poverty and school dropout 
in the test dataset. The rows of Panel A present the five income groups. The first group 
represents the bottom fifth of adolescents regarding household income per capita. As I define 
poverty by being in the first household income per capita quintile group of the sample, Panel 
A additionally partly reveals the relationship between the two outcomes of this assessment. 
 
Panels B and C of Table 2.10 follow a similar logic to Panel A. I present the mean value and 
the relative frequency of poor adolescents and future school dropouts by quintile groups. Panel 
B focuses on the quintile groups of PMT scores in the Social Protection File. I assign 
adolescents in the bottom fifth of SPF scores to the first quintile group. In contrast, the quintile 
groups in Panel C are related to the predictions of the best performing algorithm in the previous 
section (glmnet). I assign adolescents with the 20% highest probability of dropping out of 
school to the first quintile group. Conversely, I allocate students with the lowest probability of 
dropping out (or a higher probability of remaining at school) to the fifth quintile group.  
 
The measure of school dropout I present is dropout_12. Consistently, Panel C uses the quintile 
groups from the glmnet model predicting adolescents that leave school in years t+1 or t+2. 
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Summary statistics for the other two measures of school dropout are available in Appendix D.   
 
Panel A of Table 2.10 shows that a negative correlation exists between household income per 
capita and dropping out. The proportion of adolescents who leave school at any time within 
two years declines from the first income quintile group to the fifth. On average: i) 15 out of 
100 adolescents left school from the 20% in the lowest income group in the sample, and ii) 
only 7 out of 100 adolescents dropped out of school when they belonged to the top 20% in 
terms of income in the sample. Regarding the relative distribution of future school dropouts 
among the income per capita quintile groups, 27.97% of adolescents who dropped out belonged 
to the first income quintile group in the sample. Only 12.13% of school dropouts were from 
the 20% with the highest income in the sample. Accordingly, it is possible to learn that there is 
not a big overlap between poor adolescents and future school dropouts in my sample.  
 
Given these results, it is likely that a targeting instrument designed to find one specific group 
(such as the poor) will have a lower capacity to identify the other group (school dropouts). 
 
Table 2.10: Mean and Relative Frequency of Poor and School Dropout by Quintile Groups 
Quintile Groups 
Poor Dropout t+1 or t+2 
Mean Relative Frequency (%) Mean 
Relative 
Frequency (%) 
Panel A: By Quintile Groups of Income per Capita 
1 1 100 0.15 27.97 
2 0 0 0.13 23.05 
3 0 0 0.11 19.81 
4 0 0 0.09 17.04 
5 0 0 0.07 12.13 
Total 0.20 100 0.11 100 
Panel B: By Quintile Groups of SPF Scores 
1 0.44 44.03 0.14 25.59 
2 0.32 32.28 0.13 23.38 
3 0.16 16.29 0.12 20.94 
4 0.06 5.93 0.10 17.38 
5 0.01 1.47 0.07 12.71 
Total 0.20 100 0.11 100 
Panel C: By Quintile Groups of the Predictive Model of School Dropout (glmnet)  
1 0.29 28.81 0.38 69.63 
2 0.24 24.06 0.10 18.76 
3 0.20 20.18 0.04 7.46 
4 0.16 16.39 0.02 3.11 
5 0.11 10.56 0.01 1.05 
Total 0.20 100 0.11 100 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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As in Panel A, Panel B shows a negative correlation between SPF scores and leaving school. 
To illustrate, 14 out of 100 students in the bottom 20% of SPF scores dropped out but only 7 
out of 100 did so among those in the fifth quintile group of SPF scores. Also, there is an inverse 
relationship between PMT scores and poverty. For example, 44 out of 100 adolescents in the 
first quintile group of the SPF are poor, while only 1 out of 100 students within the 20% highest 
PMT scores belongs to the 20% with the lowest income in the sample. Regarding relative 
frequencies, 25.59% of those adolescents who dropped out belong to the first SPF quintile 
group and only 12.71% of dropouts are from the fifth quintile group of SPF scores. 
 
The SPF score is a better tool for finding poor adolescents than for finding future dropouts. 
Among the first quintile group of PMT scores 44.03% of poor adolescents can be found. Only 
25.59% of future dropouts are located in the lowest quintile group of the PMT scores. These 
findings are not explained by problems in the SPF model, but rather by the low overlap between 
poverty and school dropouts in my sample. In fact, the relative frequencies of school dropout 
by quintile groups shown in Panel B are similar in magnitude to the ones presented in Panel A.  
 
Panel C shows that the predictive model is a more effective tool to find future dropouts than 
poor adolescents. 69.63% of school dropouts can be found in the first quintile group of the 
predictive model. Conversely, only 28.81% of the poor are distributed among the 20% with the 
highest likelihood of dropping out in my sample. Regarding absolute values, there are more 
future dropouts than poor students in the first quintile group of the predictive model. The latter 
case occurs despite the population of future dropouts being smaller relative to poor adolescents. 
 
I extract two key findings from Panels B and C. Firstly, to find poor adolescents the SPF score 
is better equipped (relative to machine learning outputs). In other words, using the PMT is more 
income progressive than using the predictive model of school dropout. Within the first quintile 
group of the SPF 44 out of 100 students are poor while in the first quintile group of the 
predictive model only 29 out of 100 students are poor. Secondly, to find future dropouts the 
PMT is less effective. Among the first quintile group of SPF scores 14 out of 100 adolescents 
dropped out. In contrast, in the first quintile group of the predictive model 38 out of 100 
adolescents left school. Thus, prioritising the use of SPF scores to target a CCT increases the 
effectiveness in terms of finding the poor but decreases the capacity to find future dropouts. 
 
2.4.2 Targeting Assessment: Total Leakage 
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This subsection presents the central results of the targeting assessment. For simplicity, the 
evaluation focuses on one measure of school dropout. This is the indicator that captures 
whether an adolescent dropped out in year t+1 or year t+2 (dropout_t12). Thus, I use the outputs 
of the best machine learning algorithm predicting dropout_t12 as a targeting mechanism 
(glmnet). The results for the other two measures of school dropout are available in an appendix.  
 
Table 2.11 shows the results for the first two (out of four) targeting mechanisms. The left side 
of the table represents a mechanism based solely on the proxy means test score of the Social 
Protection File. Conversely, the right-hand side of the table reproduces the results for a 
mechanism based exclusively on the outputs of the machine learning algorithm. 
 
Table 2.11: Targeting Indicators by Independent Approach and Budget Available 
Targeting Based 100% in SPF Score Targeting Based 100% in Predictive Model 
Panel A: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 5% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.867 Poor Undercoverage 0.922 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.470 Non-Poor Leakage 0.689 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.934 Dropout Undercoverage 0.696 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.855 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.329 
Total Leakage 0.412 Total Leakage 0.232 
Panel B: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 20% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.560 Poor Undercoverage 0.712 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.560 Non-Poor Leakage 0.712 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.744 Dropout Undercoverage 0.304 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.859 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.615 
Total Leakage 0.493 Total Leakage 0.444 
Panel C: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 40% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.237 Poor Undercoverage 0.471 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.618 Non-Poor Leakage 0.736 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.510 Dropout Undercoverage 0.116 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.865 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.756 
Total Leakage 0.544 Total Leakage 0.563 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Table 2.11 shows that a trade-off exists between finding the poor and future dropouts. Under 
any budget scenario, poor undercoverage and non-poor leakage increase when switching from 
SPF scores to the predictive model. For example, when the budget allows for providing the 
CCT to 5% of adolescents in the sample, poor undercoverage is 0.867 while non-poor leakage 
is 0.470 if I only use the SPF for targeting. If I use the predictive model, these indicators 
increase to 0.922 and 0.689, respectively. Conversely, undercoverage of dropouts and leakage 
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of non-dropouts decrease when the output of glmnet replaces the PMT. To illustrate, when the 
budget allows for providing the CCT to 20% of students in the sample, dropout undercoverage 
is 0.744 and non-dropout leakage is 0.859 when targeting is based on the SPF. If I use the 
predictive model for targeting these indicators drop to 0.304 and 0.615, respectively. 
 
An additional trade-off is related to expenditure. The more of the budget that is spent, the lower 
undercoverage becomes among both target groups. However, leakage rates also increase. 
Another interesting finding is that the optimal targeting mechanism depends on the budget 
available. In the first two budget scenarios (in Panel A and B) total leakage is higher if the SPF 
score is used (relative to the predictive model) for targeting. However, when the budget allows 
the CCT to reach 40% of adolescents in the sample, total leakage is lower if the PMT is used. 
 
Table 2.12 switches from independent to combined mechanisms for targeting. As explained in 
subsection 2.2.3, I test the targeting performance of two mechanisms that use information from 
both sources. The left side of the table presents the results for the mechanism where I first 
allocate 25% of the budget based upon the PMT score (and the remaining 75% is given based 
on the machine learning algorithm). Conversely, the right-hand side of the table presents the 
setting where I apportion the first 75% of the budget through the SPF. 
 
Table 2.12: Targeting Indicators by Combined Approach and Budget Available 
Targeting Based 25% in SPF Score Targeting Based 75% in SPF Score 
Panel A: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 5% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.882 Poor Undercoverage 0.852 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.530 Non-Poor Leakage 0.408 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.740 Dropout Undercoverage 0.854 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.426 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.679 
Total Leakage 0.158 Total Leakage 0.232 
Panel B: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 20% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.665 Poor Undercoverage 0.609 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.665 Non-Poor Leakage 0.609 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.349 Dropout Undercoverage 0.524 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.640 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.737 
Total Leakage 0.419 Total Leakage 0.442 
Panel C: The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach 40% of Adolescents 
Poor Undercoverage 0.441 Poor Undercoverage 0.298 
Non-Poor Leakage 0.720 Non-Poor Leakage 0.649 
Dropout Undercoverage 0.138 Dropout Undercoverage 0.243 
Non-Dropout Leakage 0.762 Non-Dropout Leakage 0.791 
Total Leakage 0.553 Total Leakage 0.508 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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Similar conclusions can be obtained from Table 2.12 as from Table 2.11. In the first instance, 
there is a trade-off associated with the selection of the mechanisms. To assign a higher fraction 
of the budget based on the SPF translates into lower undercoverage for the poor and non-poor 
leakage but a greater lack of coverage for future dropouts and non-dropout leakage. Secondly, 
when the budget increases, so do all the leakage rates, yet undercoverage for both target groups 
decreases. Thirdly, the mechanism with the lowest total leakage depends on the budget at 
disposal. 
 
The last two tables facilitate the comparisons within each targeting approach, but not across 
them. Table 2.13 summarises the total leakage indicator for the two independent mechanisms 
and the two combined mechanisms (from Table 2.11 and Table 2.12). Within a fixed budget, 
Table 2.13 helps the reader to identify the targeting mechanism with the lowest total leakage.  
 
Table 2.13: Total Leakage by Targeting Mechanism and Budget Available 
Targeting Mechanisms The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.232 0.444 0.563 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.158 0.419 0.553 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.232 0.442 0.508 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.412 0.493 0.544 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
A combined approach is more effective in finding the poor or future dropouts relative to an 
independent approach. For example, in the context where the budget allows for reaching 5% 
of the sample, the mechanism that uses 25% of the SPF and 75% of the predictive model 
provides the lowest level of total leakage. In this example, only 15.8% of students who are 
assigned the hypothetical CCT are neither poor nor dropouts. In the other two budget scenarios, 
a mechanism that uses both sources of information also provides the optimal solution. In the 
second case, each combined mechanism performs better in the simulations than the 
independent mechanisms. When the budget increases to 40%, the optimal mechanism within 
the alternatives I analyse is to allocate the first 75% of the resources using the PMT score. 
 
Appendix E discusses the robustness of the results in Table 2.13. I use multiple alternative 
specifications. First, I change the definitions of the poverty line and income. Second, I modify 
the measure of school dropout. Third, I use an alternative combined approach. This consists of 
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a single composite score derived from weighting both instruments (the SPF and the predictive 
model) and assigning the hypothetical CCT using this new index. Finally, I replace the best 
machine learning algorithm (glmnet) with two others: boosted trees (gbm) and lasso. 
 
Overall, Appendix E shows that my findings are robust to alternative specifications. A targeting 
mechanism that uses the PMT score in conjunction with the predictive model minimises total 
leakage (relative to independent mechanisms) in every scenario. This finding does not change 
depending on the budget, poverty line, income definition, dropout measure or algorithm I 
select.  
 
In practice, changing the targeting mechanism of a CCT from a PMT to a mechanism that 
additionally requires using a predictive model of school dropout implies new targeting costs. 
Appendix F explores in detail whether the conclusions of this part of the assessment hold after 
adding administrative costs. A targeting approach that relies on both sources of information 
remains more effective than an independent approach. This holds for all combinations of fixed 
and variables costs added to targeting mechanisms that incorporate the predictive model. 
 
2.4.3 Targeting Assessment: Leaked Welfare 
 
Table 2.14 presents the results of the targeting assessment when the social valuation of the 
target groups differs. Panel A describes two cases where society places greater value on 
targeting a CCT at a poor adolescent rather than at a future dropout. Panel B does the opposite, 
in this case finding a future school dropout is twice or four times more important than finding 
a poor student.  
 
The measure in Table 2.14 is not comparable to the indicator I provide in Table 2.13. Unlike 
total leakage, leaked welfare is affected by differences in the social valuation of target groups. 
For example, where the poor are twice more important than future dropouts, leaked welfare is: 
i) zero if all hypothetical recipients of a CCT are poor, ii) one if all beneficiaries are non-poor 
and non-future dropouts, and iii) 0.5 if all potential recipients are future dropouts but non-poor. 
Where finding future school dropouts is four times more important than finding the poor, 
leaked welfare is: i) zero if all recipients are future school dropouts, ii) one if they are neither 
poor nor future dropouts, and iii) 0.75 if they are all poor but not future school dropouts. 
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Table 2.14: Leaked Welfare by Social Valuation of Target Groups 
Panel A: Higher Social Valuation of the Poor Relative to Dropouts 
Targeting Mechanisms 
The Poor are Twice More 
Important than Dropouts 
The Poor are Four Times More 
Important than Dropouts 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.460 0.578 0.649 0.575 0.645 0.692 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.344 0.542 0.637 0.437 0.603 0.678 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.320 0.525 0.578 0.364 0.567 0.614 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.441 0.526 0.581 0.456 0.543 0.600 
Panel B: Higher Social Valuation of Dropouts Relative to the Poor 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Dropouts are Twice More 
Important than the Poor 
Dropouts are Four Times More 
Important than the Poor 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.280 0.529 0.659 0.304 0.572 0.707 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.292 0.529 0.657 0.359 0.585 0.709 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.456 0.589 0.649 0.567 0.663 0.720 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.633 0.676 0.704 0.744 0.767 0.784 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Panel A of Table 2.14 shows that when the poor are valued more highly than future dropouts 
it is beneficial to make extended use of the Social Protection File to select beneficiaries. The 
left side of the Panel shows that the combined mechanism that assigns the first 75% of the 
budget using the SPF provides the lowest leaked welfare. On the right-hand side of Panel A, 
where the poor are four times more important, the optimal mechanism in two out of three 
scenarios is to use the PMT score exclusively. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.14 demonstrates that relying exclusively on the predictive model is mostly 
the optimal mechanism when future dropouts are valued more highly than the poor. On the 
right-hand side of Panel B, where dropouts are four times more important than the poor, not 
using the SPF minimises leaked welfare in all three budget scenarios. According to the left side 
of Panel B, a combined mechanism is only superior in the context of a large budget available 
for a CCT. 
 
Overall, the leaked welfare measure I provide in this subsection improves our understanding 
of the targeting performance of different mechanisms. When the social valuation of the target 
groups differs to a large extent, the preferred mechanism is the one designed to find the target 
group that is most socially valued. When the welfare weight γ assigned to a future dropout is 
much higher than that of a poor student, using solely the predictive model is the optimal 
56 
 
mechanism to maximise welfare. Conversely, when finding a poor adolescent has a much 
higher social valuation γ than finding a future dropout, prioritising the PMT mostly provides 
higher levels of welfare.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed whether a PMT and alternative targeting mechanisms based on a 
predictive model of school dropout built with MLA are effective tools to reach the poor and 
future school dropouts. Its primary motivation has been the improvement of the targeting 
design and evaluations of CCTs. Overall, the paper provides novel contributions to the social 
policy targeting field. Its findings are not only relevant for Chile but for all developing countries 
that have CCTs, wish to develop predictive models of school dropout using administrative 
records, or wish to strengthen the targeting effectiveness of their social policies.  
 
A first distinctive contribution of my paper is the predictive model of school dropout. The 
literature is extensive on the topic of determinants but less so on predictions. The core of this 
research comes from developed countries, especially the United States. My paper is one of the 
first, along with Adelman et al. (2017), to use large administrative datasets outside a developed 
nation to study this topic. Furthermore, there are not many applications of MLA for school 
dropout. The most effective MLA produce results that are in line with the related literature 
(Adelman et al., 2017; Knowles, 2015; Sorensen, 2018) and that are better than most of the 
dropout flags analysed in Bowers et al.’s (2013) summary. The best model in predicting school 
dropout at any point within two years reaches an area under the ROC curve of 0.866 in my test 
dataset. 
 
These results show that appropriate predictive models of school dropout using administrative 
datasets are at hand for public officials. Naturally, the selection of variables is restricted by the 
availability of administrative records, as the models I implement rely solely on information that 
is currently available from the Chilean government. No variables are provided by costly 
surveys. This finding has policy implications beyond CCTs, more generally, for every policy 
that defines students at risk of dropping out of school as their target group. For example, Early 
Warning Systems can improve their impact by strengthening their ability to find those more 
likely to drop out of school. In contexts where countries improve their administrative records 
these lessons deserve attention. 
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Future research could complement what has been advanced in this paper. For example, 
longitudinal and multilevel models could be tested for the predictive part. In fact, my approach 
to find 𝑓 does not precisely match that of Lamote et al. (2013), which is in the category of 
longitudinal multilevel modelling. Longitudinal growth models have provided the most 
accurate predictions on school dropout (Bowers et al., 2013). Additionally, future research 
projects could consider the case of bringing back to school those who are outside of it when a 
CCT is implemented. 
 
Another potential direction for further research would be to improve the capabilities of any 
predictive model by adding new variables. For example, in Chile it is well documented that 
pregnancy and motherhood are relevant drivers of school dropout (Opazo et al., 2015). Young 
mothers can be identified through the Civil Register administrative datasets and added to the 
predictive model. Additionally, the frequency of some predictors I use in my model could be 
enhanced. For example, the Chilean Ministry of Education has monthly attendance records at 
the individual level. This information could be useful if attendance levels in the last months of 
an academic year are a stronger predictor of future dropout than attendance when an academic 
year starts. The variable absences in the last month is one of the features used by the top-
performing algorithm in predicting high school dropout in the literature (Sara et al., 2015).  
 
Another distinctive contribution of my paper is the emphasis on a double vision. Despite having 
multiple target groups, CCTs have been primarily targeted towards low-income households or 
individuals. In my targeting assessment, both the poor and future dropouts count. In the paper 
I offer targeting indicators that combine information on these two key target groups of CCTs. 
Few papers, beyond Azevedo and Robles (2013), have analysed the quality of CCT targeting 
by considering more dimensions than just income. My paper and theirs are alike in the sense 
that both offer a multidimensional targeting approach that fosters the notion that more than one 
target group and more than one targeting criterion should exist for CCT design and assessment. 
 
The results of the assessment show that a trade-off exists between using the PMT relative to 
the predictive model. Using the PMT for targeting, instead of the predictive model, is more 
income progressive, as poor undercoverage and non-poor leakage are reduced. However, future 
dropout undercoverage and non-dropout leakage increase. This trade-off is explained by the 
low level of overlap between poverty and future school dropout in Chile. Generally, it is more 
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effective to use these two mechanisms in conjunction rather to use them independently. For 
different fixed budgets, the proportion receiving the CCT who are neither poor nor a future 
dropout is minimised with a combined approach. These results hold after considering 
administrative costs. 
 
These results are partly in line with the findings of Azevedo and Robles (2013). These authors 
find that their multidimensional targeting approach is better suited to identifying beneficiaries 
with higher rates of school non-attendance and child labour. This is comparable to my results. 
Using a combined approach reduces future dropout undercoverage relative to using only a 
PMT. However, the authors also find that their model identifies the income monetary poor as 
well as the mechanism used by the CCT. Therefore, in their case no trade-off exists between 
the two targeting mechanisms assessed. Using multidimensional targeting is always superior. 
 
Another key finding of my paper is that the use of a combined approach is not necessarily more 
effective when the social valuation of the two target groups differs to a large extent. In the 
cases where allocating a CCT to a poor adolescent is four times more valuable relative to a 
future dropout, and vice-versa, it is common to observe that using only one instrument is the 
optimum.  
 
Regarding policy implications, my paper advances the idea that the targeting of CCTs can be 
improved when other dimensions beyond income are considered. This finding invites 
policymakers to broaden the targeting design of CCTs by adding the human capital 
accumulation dimension. Achieving a better balance among target groups in CCT allocation 
could also help to enrich and diversify the targeting assessment of these schemes, where a 
unidimensional outlook has prevailed (Maluccio, 2009; Robles et al., 2015; Skoufias et al., 
2001; Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012). An essential and implicit takeaway from the paper is that 
effective targeting depends on consistency. Targeting design must follow the goals of the 
policy and its consequential definition of the target groups. If a cash transfer has multiple 
purposes and target groups, then unidimensional targeting may not be the most effective design 
for this programme. 
 
The latter conclusion does not necessarily hold if public officials strongly prioritise finding the 
poor over future dropouts. In this case maintaining the status quo, which is targeting CCTs on 
the basis of income, is appropriate. Alternatively, policy designers should evaluate the cost-
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effectiveness of adopting a new targeting mechanism for CCTs. A first step in this sense would 
be to: i) estimate the costs of developing and implementing a new targeting mechanism, ii) 
estimate the gains in targeting effectiveness, and iii) compare these with the default scenario.  
 
A potential innovation for CCTs can be to opt for flexible designs, adapting itself to the 
characteristics of their households and adolescents. After the PMT, or another related targeting 
mechanism, identifies the poor and after the predictive model classifies every student who is 
likely to drop out, a tailored CCT design could follow to maximise the likelihood of an impact. 
 
For example, households who are poor and have adolescents that are likely to drop out of school 
can receive an increased monthly amount for each adolescent who has a high risk of dropping 
out as informed by the predictive model. This design would be appropriate if economic needs 
within the household are one of the primary causes explaining the risk of a future dropout. The 
current design of CCTs can be maintained for poor households without adolescents at risk of 
dropping out of school. Finally, an alternative CCT design can be implemented for adolescents 
that are highly likely to drop out of school but are not poor. In this case a direct transfer to these 
adolescents (not their parents), given in few but large instalments conditional on progressing 
each grade or graduating (not small monthly payments) might have an increased positive effect.  
 
The results of the paper also contribute to enriching the theoretical literature that seeks to 
minimise poverty or maximise social welfare (Coady & Skoufias, 2004; De Wachter & Galiani, 
2006; Glewwe, 1992; Ravallion & Chao, 1989) when these models are applied to CCTs. As in 
the case of CCT allocation design and evaluation, moving from considering only one 
dimension in these theoretical models towards multiple dimensions seems desirable. For 
example, in welfare maximisation models it might be necessary to consider not only the utility 
provided by the transfer through the income dimension but also by preventing future dropout. 
In other cases, it might be necessary to include the elasticity of school dropout to extra income. 
Finally, regarding poverty minimisation problems it may be useful to incorporate future 
poverty alleviation explained by increased schooling in addition to current poverty alleviation 
due to the transfer. 
 
Using the framework of social welfare models can enrich the discussion of what effective 
targeting is. In theory, CCTs should be prioritised towards the groups that would be most 
impacted. These are the poorest among the poor and adolescents that would drop out of school 
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but would not because of the CCT. For example, a CCT might have an increased impact for an 
adolescent whose household needs money relative to a peer with little motivation to continue 
studying because of low school quality. In practice though, targeting CCTs using these criteria 
requires not only a flawless measurement of the degrees of poverty but also a perfect 
understanding of the causes of potential school dropout for each adolescent.   
 
Building upon this paper, future research could strengthen my social welfare analysis. One 
limitation of my targeting assessment is that I use only undercoverage and leakage rates. For 
example, I make no distinction between those at the bottom of the distribution and those who 
are marginally poor. I have assumed that the social valuation of finding any poor is the same. 
A similar shortcoming exists in the case of dropouts. This analysis could also be enriched if 
the size of the transfers differs, as higher transfers increase the likelihood of obtaining the 
desired effects. 
 
Additional angles for future research related to this paper are to: i) include more dimensions 
than education (such as health: include children who are not attending preventive check-ups as 
a target group), ii) consider other stages in the educational cycle (such as entry to pre-school), 
iii) model take-up, not everyone that is eligible for the CCT would end up accessing it, and iv) 
use new predictive models or means tests instead of the PMT used in this paper. 
 
CCTs continue to be a relevant social policy across the globe. Their goals of poverty alleviation 
and human capital accumulation remain valid in multiple countries. This paper has intended to 
collaborate in their improved design and assessment concerning targeting. In Chile, a country 
where administrative datasets are large and rich, using a PMT in conjunction with a predictive 
model of school dropout allows for finding more adolescents who are either poor or future 
school dropouts. Public officials that value these two target groups equally, may find 
opportunities for increased targeting effectiveness by modifying the allocation rules of CCTs. 
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Appendix A. Predictors Included in Machine Learning Algorithms 
 
Table 2.15: Predictors of School Dropout Included in Machine Learning Algorithms 
Average Grade Year t Urban/Rural 
Attendance (%) Year t Same Gender School 
Relative Grade Year t Age (Years) at the End of Academic Year t 
Relative Attendance Year t Male 
Promoted Year t Indigenous Background 
Mobility Year t Household Number of Rooms 
Average Grade Year t–1 Head of Household (HH) is Female 
Attendance (%) Year t–1 Head of Household Lives with a Partner 
Relative Grade Year t–1 HH Years of Schooling 
Relative Attendance Year t–1 HH Employed and with Social Security 
Promoted Year t–1 Relationship with HH 
Mobility Year t–1 Household Ownership 
Average Grade Year t–2 Number of Less Than Six Years Olds 
Attendance (%) Year t–2 Household Income per Capita ($CLP) 
Relative Grade Year t–2 
Average HH Years of Schooling in the 
Academic Cohort Year t 
Relative Attendance Year t–2 
Average HH Years of Schooling in the 
Academic Cohort Year t–1 
Promoted Year t–2 
Average HH Years of Schooling in the 
Academic Cohort Year t–2 
Number of Students in the Cohort Year t Index 1 Management of Schools 
School Size Year t Index 2 Management of Schools 
School Dropout Rate Year t Index 3 Management of Schools 
School Dropout Rate Year t–1 Index 4 Management of Schools 
School Type Index 5 Management of Schools 
Grade Index 6 Management of Schools 
School Administrative Dependency School SIMCE in Mathematics 
School Region School SIMCE in Language 
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Appendix B. Indicators Derived from a Classifier of School Dropout 
 
Table 2.16: Examples of Indicators Derived from a Classifier of School Dropout 
Formula Names 
FN / D False Negative Rate, Miss Rate, Type II Error Rate 
TP / D True Positive Rate, Sensitivity, Recall, Power, 1–Type II Error Rate 
TN / ND True Negative Rate, Specificity 
FP / ND False Positive Rate, 1–Specificity, Type I Error Rate, False Alarm Rate 
FP / P False Discovery Rate 
TP / P Positive Predicted Value, Precision, 1–False Discovery Rate 
FN / N False Omission Rate 
TN / N Negative Predicted Value 
(TN+TP) / T Accuracy 
 
Table 2.16 shows examples of indicators for a classifier of school dropout. These indicators, 
which are derived from the nine shaded cells in Table 2.1, have various names depending on 
the discipline. Some can be compared to the ones commonly found in the social policy targeting 
literature. In the context of poor targeting, undercoverage is the proportion of poor households 
or individuals who do not receive an intervention targeted at the poor (Coady et al., 2004). This 
indicator is comparable to the false negative rate. In Table 2.16 this rate is equivalent to the 
proportion of future dropouts who are not predicted as such. In the context of poor targeting, 
the false negative rate can be calculated using the number of the poor who are incorrectly 
predicted as non-poor in the numerator and the total number of the poor in the denominator. 
 
Leakage is defined as the proportion of non-poor households or individuals that receive a 
programme among all its beneficiaries (Coady et al., 2004). This indicator can be compared to 
the false discovery rate. In Table 2.16 this indicator is equivalent to the proportion of 
adolescents incorrectly classified as future dropouts among all those predicted as future 
dropouts. In the context of poor targeting, the false discovery rate would be estimated using 
the number of non-poor who access the programme (those who are incorrectly predicted as 
poor) in the numerator and all the recipients (all those predicted as poor) in the denominator.  
 
Undercoverage and leakage are usually referred to in the social policy targeting literature as 
the exclusion and inclusion errors, respectively. However, these last two terms have also been 
used to explain conceptually false negatives and false positives. Given the potential 
misunderstanding that could arise from using such a range of different names, I mostly use the 
terms undercoverage and leakage in the targeting assessment. 
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Appendix C. Out of Time Validation for the Predictive Model 
 
This appendix contains the results of the predictive model of school dropout in the second test 
dataset (year-cohort 2014). I use this dataset to assess the quality of the predictions over time. 
Table 2.17 shows the AUC for six MLA (similarly than Table 2.8). Table 2.18 presents the true 
positive rate, false positive rate and accuracy for two different scenarios (as in Table 2.9). 
 
Table 2.17: Area Under the ROC Curve for Models Predicting School Dropout 
Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
School Dropout Measures 
Dropout in Year 
t+1 or t+2 
Dropout in Year 
t+1 
Dropout in Year t+2 
glmnet 0.878 0.906 0.876 
gam 0.875 0.904 0.873 
gbm 0.870 0.901 0.870 
lasso 0.872 0.899 0.868 
svm 0.866 0.862 0.832 
rf 0.860 0.886 0.861 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
The elastic net algorithm (glmnet) also prevails in this dataset. The AUC in the second test 
dataset reaches 0.878 for dropout_t12 and 0.906 for dropout_t1. The generalised additive 
models (gam) reach the second highest area under the curve in all three measures. The third 
highest AUC is provided by the boosted trees algorithm (gbm) or lasso. Conversely, the random 
forest (rf) and support vector machines (svm) algorithms have the worst performances in all 
measures.  
 
From Table 2.18 we can distinguish a similar pattern to the results in Table 2.17. For example, 
in the case of dropout_t12, the glmnet algorithm repeats the best performance, finding future 
dropouts at a rate of 531 out of 1000 in the setting where 10% of adolescents are classified as 
future school dropouts. In this context, the elastic net algorithm incorrectly classifies non-
dropouts at a rate of 56 cases out of 1000 and correctly classifies 90.6% of adolescents. Like 
in Table 2.17, gam is among the best performers (in many cases the highest), while svm and rf 
are the worst performing algorithms in respect to the true positive rate and accuracy. 
 
Overall, the results in this appendix show similar tendencies as in the body of the paper. The 
relative performance of the MLA does not vary between the two test datasets. Hence, the results 
in the body of the paper are not sensitive to using information only from the most recent cohort.  
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Table 2.18: True Positive Rate (Sensitivity), False Positive Rate (1–Specificity) and Accuracy for Models Predicting School Dropout 
Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
Scenario 1: 10% of Adolescents Classified as Dropouts Scenario 2: 30% of Adolescents Classified as Dropouts 
True Positive Rate 
(Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
Rate 
(1–Specificity) 
Accuracy True Positive Rate (Sensitivity) 
False Positive 
Rate 
(1–Specificity) 
Accuracy 
Panel A: Dropout in Year t+1 or t+2 
glmnet 0.531 0.056 0.906 0.829 0.246 0.761 
gam 0.530 0.056 0.906 0.834 0.246 0.762 
gbm 0.521 0.057 0.904 0.824 0.247 0.760 
lasso 0.512 0.058 0.902 0.832 0.246 0.761 
svm 0.512 0.058 0.902 0.818 0.247 0.759 
rf 0.506 0.058 0.902 0.806 0.245 0.760 
Panel B: Dropout in Year t+1  
glmnet 0.648 0.067 0.917 0.904 0.264 0.745 
gam 0.662 0.066 0.918 0.899 0.264 0.745 
gbm 0.635 0.068 0.915 0.882 0.265 0.743 
lasso 0.635 0.068 0.915 0.887 0.265 0.744 
svm 0.568 0.072 0.908 0.808 0.270 0.735 
rf 0.622 0.069 0.914 0.871 0.262 0.746 
Panel C: Dropout in Year t+2 
glmnet 0.556 0.063 0.908 0.845 0.256 0.751 
gam 0.546 0.064 0.907 0.849 0.256 0.752 
gbm 0.541 0.065 0.906 0.842 0.256 0.751 
lasso 0.532 0.065 0.905 0.837 0.257 0.750 
svm 0.510 0.067 0.902 0.757 0.263 0.738 
rf 0.531 0.065 0.905 0.811 0.250 0.754 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Appendix D. Summary Statistics for Other Measures of School Dropout 
 
Table 2.19 provides bivariate summary statistics. Its structure is like Table 2.10. The rows 
contain the different quintile groups of the targeting mechanisms. While Panel A focuses on 
the quintile groups of household income per capita, Panel B and Panel C concentrate on SPF 
scores and the predictive model of school dropout, respectively. The columns show the mean 
value and relative frequency of school dropout for two measures (dropout_t1 and dropout_t2). 
 
Table 2.19: Mean Values and Relative Frequency for School Dropout in Years t+1 and t+2 
Quintile Groups Dropout t+1 Dropout  t+2 Mean Rel. Freq. (%) Mean Rel. Freq. (%) 
Panel A: By Quintile Groups of Income per Capita 
1 0.09 27.74 0.13 28.84 
2 0.07 22.89 0.10 23.46 
3 0.07 19.98 0.09 19.63 
4 0.06 17.16 0.07 16.61 
5 0.04 12.23 0.05 11.45 
Total 0.07 100 0.09 100 
Panel B: By Quintile Groups of SPF Scores 
1 0.08 25.39 0.11 25.94 
2 0.08 23.30 0.10 23.79 
3 0.07 20.91 0.09 20.97 
4 0.06 17.57 0.08 17.21 
5 0.04 12.83 0.05 12.09 
Total 0.07 100 0.09 100 
Panel C: By Quintile Groups of the Predictive Model of School Dropout (glmnet) 
1 0.25 77.92 0.31 71.78 
2 0.05 14.59 0.08 17.49 
3 0.02 4.96 0.03 6.84 
4 0.01 1.87 0.01 2.86 
5 0.00 0.66 0.00 1.03 
Total 0.06 100 0.09 100 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Similar patterns as in Table 2.10 are observed in Table 2.19. Among them, there is a negative 
correlation between income per capita or SPF scores and school dropout. Table 2.19 also 
confirms that the predictive model outperforms the SPF in terms of identifying future school 
dropouts. There are minor differences in the relative frequency of school dropouts in Panels A 
and B. However, there are substantive differences in the relative frequency of school dropouts 
in Panel C. Other new findings emerge from Table 2.19. A higher relative frequency of school 
dropouts can be found in the first quintile group of the predictive model when the measure of 
school dropout considered in the analysis is dropout_t1 instead of dropout_t2. 
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Appendix E. Sensitivity Analysis for Total Leakage Targeting Assessment 
 
I present four distinct types of sensitivity analyses in this appendix. In the first type, I change 
the methodological approach to measure poverty. On the left side of Table 2.20 I use a higher 
poverty line. Applying a higher poverty line has the effect of reducing leakage (as more 
adolescents are classified as poor, it is more likely that poor students will be found among the 
recipients). In all cases at least one combined mechanism is more effective than the best 
independent mechanism.  
 
The right-hand part of Table 2.20 presents the results for an alternative definition of income. 
In this case I replace income per capita with household income over an index of needs. This 
index considers economies of scale of households with multiple members. The outcomes of 
the targeting assessment are almost unresponsive to these modifications. I observe minor 
changes in total leakage for the mechanisms that rely primarily on the Social Protection File.   
 
Table 2.20: Total Leakage: Sensitivity Analysis by Poverty Line and Income Definition 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Using a Higher Poverty Line Using a Needs Index 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.166 0.321 0.418 0.232 0.444 0.563 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.113 0.272 0.406 0.158 0.417 0.552 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.059 0.295 0.338 0.224 0.440 0.507 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.159 0.312 0.347 0.403 0.490 0.543 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
The targeting assessment in the body of the paper considers dropout_t12. The next sensitivity 
analysis assesses whether the results vary when I use dropout_t1 and dropout_t2 in the 
prediction of the MLA and as an outcome in the assessment. Table 2.21 presents these results. 
 
Table 2.21: Total Leakage: Sensitivity Analysis by Measure of School Dropout 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Dropout in Year t+1 Dropout in Year t+2 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.344 0.542 0.635 0.295 0.486 0.592 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.240 0.504 0.621 0.209 0.457 0.583 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.272 0.494 0.560 0.257 0.471 0.534 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.439 0.523 0.575 0.427 0.510 0.561 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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Compared to Table 2.13 total leakage increases in every case. This is an expected result because 
dropout_t12 corresponds to a higher population relative to dropout_t1 and dropout_t2. 
Accordingly, each targeting mechanism has higher difficulties in finding future dropouts. 
Despite these changes, a combined approach remains more effective relative to an independent 
approach. For example, as shown in the first column, assigning 75% of the resources through 
the predictive model reduces total leakage to 0.240. Conversely, if only the predictive model 
had been used total leakage would have reached 0.344 while using only the SPF would have 
made this indicator 0.439. 
 
In the third type of sensitivity analysis I test a new version of the combined approach. Table 
2.22 focuses on these modifications. The new mechanism uses a composite score that I create 
through the combination of the PMT and the predictions of the glmnet algorithm. I assign 
different weights to each instrument. The left side of the table presents results that are 
comparable to Table 2.13. For example, the fourth row in Table 2.22 is the same as in Table 
2.13. This can be explained by the fact that using a composite score relying 100% upon the 
SPF is equivalent to distributing the budget using the SPF exclusively. In the second and third 
rows total leakage increases relative to Table 2.13. Moreover, composite scores are not always 
more effective than an independent mechanism. In the scenario with the lowest budget using 
only the predictive model produces a total leakage of 0.232. Total leakage for the two 
composite indexes I test reaches 0.234 and 0.329, respectively. 
 
The right-hand side of Table 2.22 shows the results with an additional change. In this case, 
total leakage corresponds to the proportion of students who are not simultaneously poor and 
future school dropouts. Under this definition the composite scores I present are more effective 
than the independent approach. This result illustrates the relevance of using a targeting 
mechanism that is consistent with the definition of the target group(s) of a CCT. When finding 
the poor or school dropouts matters, using a mechanism that takes the best information 
available from both sources produces better results than allocation through a composite index. 
When the target group is adolescents who are both poor and future dropouts, a composite index 
is better suited.  
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Table 2.22: Total Leakage: Sensitivity Analysis Using a Composite Score 
Targeting Mechanisms 
(% of Weight in 
Composite Index) 
Target: Poor or Dropout Target: Poor and Dropouts 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.232 0.444 0.563 0.786 0.883 0.929 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.234 0.400 0.533 0.733 0.874 0.927 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.329 0.443 0.523 0.825 0.900 0.932 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.412 0.493 0.544 0.914 0.926 0.939 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
In the last type of sensitivity analysis, I exchange glmnet for two other MLA. The left side of 
Table 2.23 focuses on one of the best performing models: boosted trees (gbm). The right-hand 
side gives the results for lasso, a model that is never the better or the worst predictor in the 
previous section. The results from gbm are like the ones in Table 2.13. This is consistent with 
the equivalent performances of glmnet and gbm as predictors of school dropout. In the case of 
lasso, total leakage is slightly higher in all contexts relative to glmnet. Despite the latter, the 
two combined mechanisms are generally more effective than every independent mechanism. 
 
Table 2.23: Total Leakage: Sensitivity Analysis by Machine Learning Algorithm 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Boosted Trees Lasso 
The Budget Allows a CCT to Reach x% of Adolescents 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.233 0.450 0.566 0.259 0.467 0.574 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.156 0.424 0.555 0.176 0.437 0.563 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.230 0.443 0.509 0.236 0.449 0.513 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.412 0.493 0.544 0.412 0.493 0.544 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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Appendix F. Targeting Assessment Including Administrative Costs 
 
The paper has relied on an unrealistic assumption, the inexistence of targeting costs. The social 
policy targeting literature has identified different families of costs for targeted programmes, 
among them administrative, incentive, private, social and political (Besley & Kanbur, 1990). 
Accounting for all these costs is beyond the scope of this paper; however I do consider 
administrative costs. Within the context of implementing targeted transfers, Coady et al. (2004) 
associate administrative costs with expenses related to collecting information or building a 
poverty map.  
 
Given three fixed budgets, this appendix assesses what proportion of the budget goes to 
students that are non-poor and non-dropouts or is spent on administrative costs. I consider two 
types of administrative costs. These are a fixed cost of using the predictive model and a variable 
cost per student selected through the predictive model. The logic behind this design is that 
using the model is associated with fixed costs such as organising the administrative information 
and running the model (which is independent of the number of students selected with the 
instrument) and variable costs (such as outreach through channels other than the ones used by 
the PMT). No costs are associated with using the PMT score. This assumption is justified on 
the basis that generally these PMTs are country-level instruments that would not see their cost-
structure affected when one programme, out of many, changes its targeting design. 
 
Most formally, for each targeting mechanism I estimate the “leaked budget” as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑁𝑜𝑛˗𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 & 𝑁𝑜𝑛˗𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 + 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛. 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐶𝑇 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡
  
 
The leaked budget indicator can range between zero and one. The targeting mechanism with 
the lowest value is preferred in this exercise. Table 2.24 presents the results for the leaked 
budget indicator. Panel A and Panel B differ by the fixed cost related to implementing a 
targeting mechanism that includes the predictive model. The left and right-hand sides of each 
Panel are differentiated from each other by the variable cost of reaching each student with the 
information from the predictive model. I analyse all these scenarios for the usual three 
hypothetical budgets. 
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Table 2.24: Leaked Budget by Administrative (Fixed and Variable) Costs 
Panel A: Fixed Cost of Implementing the Model is 0.5% of the Cost of Universal Coverage 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Variable Cost is 2% Variable Cost is 4% 
Budget Allows to Reach x% of Adolescents (if no adm. costs) 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.310 0.461 0.571 0.322 0.469 0.577 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.237 0.435 0.560 0.246 0.441 0.564 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.319 0.459 0.514 0.321 0.462 0.515 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.412 0.493 0.544 0.412 0.493 0.544 
Panel B: Fixed Cost of Implementing the Model is 1.0% of the Cost of Universal Coverage 
Targeting Mechanisms 
Variable Cost is 2% Variable Cost is 4% 
Budget Allows to Reach x% of Adolescents (if no adm. costs) 
x=5% x=20% x=40% x=5% x=20% x=40% 
0% SPF; 100% Model 0.377 0.470 0.575 0.388 0.478 0.580 
25% SPF; 75% Model 0.307 0.445 0.564 0.315 0.451 0.568 
75% SPF; 25% Model 0.406 0.474 0.518 0.406 0.476 0.519 
100% SPF; 0% Model 0.412 0.493 0.544 0.412 0.493 0.544 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
When no administrative costs exist and when the transfers are equal for every recipient the 
leaked budget is equivalent to the total leakage. In fact, the results for the rows in Table 2.24 
where I only use the SPF are the same as in Table 2.13 (because no fixed and variable costs are 
associated with this option). However, for all the rest of the rows the results are higher relative 
to Table 2.13. The addition of administrative costs explains this. These costs reduce the amount 
of resources that can be directed towards the beneficiaries. Logically, the higher these 
administrative costs are, the higher the proportion of leaked budget is. 
 
Table 2.24 provides one key finding. A combined approach remains predominant relative to an 
independent approach. This is true despite the addition of administrative costs when using the 
predictive model. When the budget of the programme allows for reaching 5% or 20% of the 
sample, assigning 25% of the budget with the SPF and 75% with the predictive model is the 
optimal mechanism. This holds for all the combinations of fixed and variable costs that I 
consider. In the case where the budget allows for reaching 40% of students in the sample, 
selecting 75% of the recipients first with the SPF and the rest with the predictive model 
minimises the leaked budget. 
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Chapter 3 Cash for Grades or Money for Nothing? Evidence from 
Regression Discontinuity Designs 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of a Chilean cash for grades programme, the Bono por Logro 
Escolar (BLE) in 2013, on future educational outcomes. The cash transfer was targeted using 
two scores from 2012, an income index and academic performance. I implement a sharp 
regression discontinuity design along these two running variables. I show that students 
marginally at each side of the two thresholds used only differed in receiving the BLE in 2013. 
The main causal estimates for the outcomes are not statistically significantly different from 
zero. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Should we pay children to learn? Few people are indifferent in regard to this controversial 
question. Finding a response to this question is particularly relevant for the United States 
where, by 2008, at least twelve states had adopted schemes where primary and secondary 
school students were rewarded with money for obtaining good grades or test scores or passing 
exams (Toppo, 2008). 
 
Over the last eleven years, the public debate around this issue has been noticeable. Several 
articles have been published in the United States’ mainstream newspapers (Calefati, 2008; 
Guttenplan, 2011; Higgins, 2015; Roberts, Becker, & Ibanga, 2008). The discussion seemed to 
reach its peak in 2010. During that spring the question: should schools bribe kids? and the 
corresponding reply “it can work, if it is done right” made it to the cover of Time Magazine 
(Ripley, 2010), while in the autumn of the same year, the Annual Poll of the Public’s Attitudes 
Toward the Public Schools revealed that 76% of United States’ adults opposed the idea of 
school districts paying small amounts of money to students to read books or get good grades 
(Bushaw & Lopez, 2010).23 
                                                          
23 Educational philosophers have not been able to agree on this topic either. To illustrate, Sidorkin (2007, 2009) 
argues that moral reasons exist for paying students. He suggests that, at least for low-income students, most of the 
economic value of their education is received by the society, not themselves. Accordingly, for these students, 
schooling does not represent a consumer good but a form of labour that deserves fair compensation. Conversely, 
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How cash for grades programmes work is also a matter of active deliberation. Kremer et al. 
(2009), Gneezy et al. (2011) and Fryer (2011) offer syntheses about how these policies operate. 
On the one hand, incentives provide a price effect that makes specific behaviours more 
attractive. These economic effects are expected to increase individuals’ effort and performance. 
On the other hand, a psychological effect potentially exists. This could undermine intrinsic 
motivation, negatively affecting the desired behaviours, especially after the reward is 
removed.24  
 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of cash for grades schemes is mixed. In Ohio, an effect 
of 0.15𝜎 is estimated for maths but no impact is observed in three other subjects (Bettinger, 
2012). In Kenya, an effect of 0.19𝜎 in test scores and other positive externalities have been found 
(Kremer et al., 2009). In Israel, the results are positive and statistically significant only for girls 
(Angrist & Lavy, 2009). In New York, mostly no effects have been observed (Fryer, 2011; 
Riccio et al., 2013). In Mexico, effects from 0.17𝜎 to 0.30𝜎 in maths test scores have been 
estimated but these are partly explained by students’ cheating (Behrman et al., 2015). In lab 
experiments, characterised by immediate but lower rewards, some positive effects have been 
found in Chicago (Levitt, List, Neckermann, & Sadoff, 2012) and India (Hirshleifer, 2017).25  
 
My paper adds to this body of knowledge. Specifically, I assess the effect of a cash for grades 
intervention in Chile on subsequent educational outcomes. The Bono por Logro Escolar consists 
of a one-off cash transfer of up to $50,000 CLP ($100 USD approximately) given to high 
achieving students from fifth to twelfth grade. The programme intends to provide an incentive or 
reward for students’ effort and overall academic achievement. My assessment is mostly done for 
the first version of the BLE, which was implemented in the middle of the 2013 academic year 
(and used information from 2012 to determine eligibility). Using large and rich administrative 
datasets, the outcomes I analyse are attendance and average grade for the academic years 2013 
                                                          
Warnick (2017) questions cash for grades programmes on ethical grounds. His main argument is that cash 
incentives are uniquely corruptive of key educational aims and values. Specifically, he claims that these schemes 
hinder the development of students’ self-control, promote advancing private versus public ends and additionally 
reinforce a perception of students as market actors. 
24 This last argument is quite contested in psychology. After conducting a meta-analysis, a group of authors 
conclude that, generally, extrinsic rewards are not harmful to motivation (Cameron, 2001; Cameron, Banko, & 
Pierce, 2001; Cameron & Pierce, 1994). However, Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999; 2001) and Kohn (1999) have 
claimed for substantial weakening effects after reassessing evidence on this topic. 
25 I provide more information about the design and results of all these interventions in Appendix G. All these 
evaluations are randomised control trials. In all cases, randomisation did not occur at the individual level. 
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and 2014.  
 
I use a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design to recover the causal estimates. To be eligible 
for the BLE, students needed to belong to the poorest 30% of the population and be in the top 
30% in terms of performance within their cohort. I compare students just below and above each 
of these two thresholds. Students at one side or the other of each threshold only differ in whether 
they receive the BLE. Thus, any differences in outcomes can be attributed to the programme. 
This empirical strategy is suitable as the BLE was implemented retrospectively. Students did not 
know that information from 2012 would determine whether they would be a recipient in 2013.   
 
Each main causal estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero for both types of 
outcomes. Additionally, the main causal estimates are centred around zero and their standard 
errors are small. As a result, each 95% confidence interval contains values of a small magnitude 
exclusively. To illustrate, the highest upper bound I find for any 95% confidence interval is 
0.035 (0.056𝜎) for average grade and 0.49% (0.052𝜎) for attendance. In practical terms, these 
estimates are near a third of the minimum distance between reported grades in the country’s 
educational system and are equivalent to a day of school attendance within an academic year.  
 
If a local average effect of the BLE in 2013 exists this is at best modest in magnitude. Therefore, 
I am unable to detect it with statistical certainty. Additionally, the analysis by subgroups does 
not consistently show estimates that are statistically significantly different from zero. These 
results cannot be generalised for the entire population who received the BLE in 2013 given that 
the RD estimates are only valid for students near the two thresholds used to target the BLE. 
Among these students, any potential impact of the BLE in 2013 would have been at least smaller 
than those found in developing countries, where effects of at least 0.17𝜎 on test scores have been 
observed. 
 
A possible reason for these results is that the programme was not very salient for the population. 
If children and adolescents were unaware of the implementation of the BLE then it would not be 
expected to observe changes in their behaviour. An alternative explanation is that students and 
their families were aware of the cash transfer but unresponsive to its size. Another potential cause 
of these results is that the BLE provided two types of effects that cancelled each other out overall.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section briefly describes the design and 
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implementation of the Bono por Logro Escolar. The third section introduces the data sources, 
provides summary statistics and explains the empirical strategy. The fourth section presents the 
results of the impact assessment. The last section discusses the results and main implications. 
 
3.2 Programme Description 
 
The design of the Bono por Logro Escolar attempted to provide a cash transfer for high 
achieving students in primary and secondary schools belonging to the poorest segments of the 
population. Only students enrolled between the fifth and twelfth grades and not older than 24 
years old in year t–1 were eligible to receive the cash transfer in year t. According to the Chilean 
educational system this meant that, conditional on age, only students in the last four years of 
primary school (fifth through eighth grade) and all students in secondary education were 
eligible in principle.26 
 
In addition, to be eligible for the programme in year t students needed to belong to the poorest 
30% of the population. The PFSE index measured this in year t–1.27 In practice, the threshold 
used in this relative income index was 98 points. Accordingly, to be eligible for the BLE in 
2013, students needed to have a PFSE score in the year 2012 equal to or lower than 98 points.  
 
The academic performance requisite needed to receive the BLE in year t depended on students’ 
average grade in year t–1. Students needed to be in the top 30% of their cohort to be eligible 
for the BLE.28 Within each cohort the students were ranked. The number one was assigned to 
the student with the highest average grade. The average grade in Chile ranges from a minimum 
of one to a maximum of seven, is generated within each school, and is reported to the central 
level using only one decimal place. Ties were allowed in the ranking. For example, if two 
students had the same average grade and this grade was the highest in their cohort both received 
                                                          
26 The Decree number 24 of the Chilean Ministry of Social Development, published in June 2013, regulates 
general aspects of the cash transfer (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013).  
27 The PFSE index score was the result of the combination of a proxy means test and a means test. The former 
variable was the Social Protection File score. This proxy means test score provided the relative position of Chilean 
households regarding income by needs. Not having a Social Protection File score translated automatically in not 
being eligible for the BLE. The other variable in the PFSE formula was income per capita. The Ministry of Social 
Development built this variable from multiple administrative datasets.   
28 Three variables define an academic cohort: i) the school, ii) the type of education provided by that school (for 
example traditional or adult education, scientific-humanistic or technical-professional), and iii) the grade in which 
the students were enrolled. Students belonging to the same cohort have these three characteristics in common. 
Most schools have a specific orientation. However, some schools offer more than one type of education in a given 
grade (especially in secondary education). Students can also change streams from one academic year to the other. 
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a value of one in the rankings. Also, in this scenario, the student or students with the second 
highest average grade received the third position. To be eligible for the BLE in year t the 
proportion between the student ranking and his or her cohort size in year t–1, the relative 
ranking, had to be no higher than 0.3. 
 
In 2013, the BLE provided a lump sum of $50,000 CLP ($100 USD approximately) for students 
in the top 15% of highest performance and $30,000 CLP (nearly $60 USD) for students within 
the 15% and 30% range. The size of the cohort needed to be at least seven students for this last 
rule to hold. If the cohort size was between two and six, only the first-ranked student in the 
cohort was eligible. 
 
The Ministry of Social Development first delivered the cash transfer in July 2013. Given that 
the Chilean academic year starts in March and ends in December, the BLE in 2013 was 
implemented in the middle of the academic year. Thereafter, the BLE has been given once per 
year with payments occurring between September and November. When it first started in 2013, 
the programme was implemented retrospectively. The rules regarding eligibility were 
established after December 2012, which marked the conclusion of the 2012 academic year.  
  
Until 2014, the BLE was paid in cash. Beneficiaries needed to collect their payments in person 
from local government agencies. From 2015, the BLE progressively adopted bank transfers. 
The BLE is paid to the student if they are at least 18 years old. Otherwise, a member of the 
student’s household, most likely the mother, receives the payment. In the Chilean educational 
system, students are, in theory, expected to graduate from their secondary studies at the age of 
18. Hence, the majority of BLE payments are not received by the students but by another 
household member. 
 
The conception of the BLE is related to the Seguridades y Oportunidades law approved in May 
2012. Within this large piece of legislation, the Bono por Esfuerzo (Cash Payment for Effort) 
was created. This law establishes that the State can provide conditional cash transfers in diverse 
areas of social policies to foster social achievements. The Bono por Logro Escolar (Cash 
Payment for Student Achievement) was created in 2013 following this logic. Consequently, 
the public discourse from politicians and public managers about the goals of the BLE has been 
that the programme is a tool to appreciate, incentivise or reward students' achievement and 
effort. This logic has been unaltered despite successive changes of coalitions in government.  
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I assess whether receiving the BLE in 2013 impacted attendance and academic performance in 
2013 and 2014. I analyse the programme in 2013 because I can guarantee that students were 
not aware that their academic performance in 2012 would have an impact on whether they 
received the BLE in 2013. This is not necessarily true for the programme in 2014 (which was 
implemented using information from the academic year 2013) and for its later versions.  
 
The research questions respond to the design, implementation and goals of the BLE but also 
the literature on cash for grades. Students who received the BLE in 2013 were expected to 
increase their effort (which, in this paper, is measured through attendance) and future academic 
performance to receive it again in the future. Additionally, the cash transfers could have had 
an effect through investments leading to better educational outcomes. For a household with 
one student and one adult member earning the minimum wage (which reached $210,000 CLP 
or nearly $410 USD in August 2013), the $50,000 or $30,000 CLP BLE cash transfer could 
have accounted for 23,8% or 14,3% of the household income of a given month, respectively.   
 
From the psychological standpoint, a common concern related to these types of programmes is 
that they could have an adverse effect through decreased motivation after the incentive is 
withdrawn. Accordingly, if BLE in 2013 had been only a one off-payment it would have been 
improbable to observe positive effects on future attendance and average grade in 2013 or 2014. 
Any positive impact related to the use of the cash transfer would have been neutralised by 
weakened student’s motivation associated with perceiving BLE as an extrinsic reward. Given 
that the BLE has remained through the years there is less support for an argument of this kind. 
 
3.3 Data and Methods 
 
This section describes the data and methods. The first subsection introduces the data. The 
second part of the section explains how I structure the dataset for the analysis. The third 
subsection provides descriptive statistics. Finally, the fourth part discusses the methodological 
approach I use to recover the causal estimates of the BLE, the regression discontinuity design. 
 
3.3.1 Data  
 
The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) provided most of the datasets I use in this paper. 
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I combine the datasets using the individual ID number provided by the Chilean State. For 
privacy purposes the ID numbers were changed by the MSD using an algorithm that is 
unknown to me. The three primary sources of information for this research are as follows: 
 
Bono por Logro Escolar Dataset 
 
Created since 2013 and replicated annually by the MSD, this dataset contains information for 
all students between the fifth and twelfth grades in year t–1. The dataset excludes students in 
flexible adult and differential education. Each dataset has approximately 1,900,000 students. I 
requested two versions of this dataset (the years 2013 and 2014) for this paper. Some variables 
available in this dataset are: i) school ID, ii) type of school (with categories such as traditional 
primary education, scientific-humanistic or technical-professional secondary education), iii) 
grade, iv) average grade, v) attendance, vi) student ID, vii) age, viii) student ranking in the 
cohort, ix) cohort size, and x) PFSE score. All these variables refer to year t–1. Another key 
variable in this dataset denotes whether the student was a recipient of the BLE in year t.   
 
Ministry of Education (ME) Performance Dataset 
 
This dataset is created each year by the Ministry of Education, which later shares it with the 
MSD. The dataset contains information for all students who finish the academic year from the 
first through to the twelfth grade (except for flexible adult and differential education). Each 
version of this dataset has approximately 2,950,000 students. I have at my disposal eight 
datasets (from 2009 until 2016). The variables available in this dataset are the same as in points 
i) to vi) of the BLE Dataset.29 More educational information at the school level is available 
from public sources. Using the variable school ID, as a key to merge, I obtain the schools’: i) 
administrative dependency (such as public or private subsidised), ii) geographic location, and 
iii) urban or rural status.  
 
Social Protection File (SPF) Dataset 
 
This dataset contains information for Chilean households and all their members. Each 
                                                          
29 All these variables are from year t. For example, the 2013 ME Performance Dataset provides the average grade 
for the academic year 2013. The 2013 BLE Dataset provides the average grade for the academic year 2012. 
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observation represents an individual (adult or child) who lives in a household. Each household 
has a unique ID number that allows for the identification of all the individuals who belong to 
it. Households voluntarily requested the SPF at the local government level. The SPF 
information was essential to be eligible for multiple social policies. From January 2010, the 
dataset had 10,782,270 individuals (Comité de Expertos Ficha de Protección Social, 2010), 
approximately 63.5% of Chile’s population. I use two versions of this dataset (years 2012 and 
2013) in this research. The MSD administers the dataset. Some of its variables are household 
structure, gender and schooling. With this information I can generate variables such as 
household size, female head of household and years of schooling of the head of the household. 
 
3.3.2 Dataset Structure and Sample 
 
To carry out the assessment, I structure the dataset by cohorts (years t: 2013 and 2014). Each 
year-cohort uses information from years t–1, t and t+1. The BLE Dataset of year t provides the 
programme recipients in year t and, among other variables, the academic performance and 
PFSE scores from year t–1. These last two variables are useful to assess eligibility for the cash 
transfer. I use the information from the SPF of year t–1, the same year as the PFSE score, for 
characterisation. Finally, future average grade and attendance come from the ME Performance 
Datasets of years t and/or t+1. This organisation is presented in detail in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Dataset Structure by BLE Year-Cohorts 
BLE 
Cohorts 
Previous Academic 
Performance and  
PFSE Score 
SPF 
Information 
BLE 
Recipient 
Future Average Grade 
and Attendance 
Year 2013 2012  2012  2013  2013 & 2014  
Year 2014  2013  2013  2014  2015  
 
The body of the paper presents the results for the 2013 cohort. This cohort is more likely to 
provide valid causal estimates as students were not aware that their academic performance in 
2012 would affect whether they received the BLE in 2013. I show the results for the 2014 
cohort in an appendix.   
 
The sample excludes students in the eleventh and twelfth grades in year t–1. This restriction 
limits the sample to students that would not (or were unlikely to) graduate from secondary 
education in years t–1 or t. Therefore, these students were more likely to have been enrolled in 
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primary or secondary education in years t and t+1, which reduces sample attrition. 
Additionally, I exclude from the analysis those students whose cohort size in year t–1 was 
lower than seven. 
 
I also exclude students who were at least 18 years old in the month of year t in which the BLE 
was paid. This action intends to restrict the sample to students that were unable to collect their 
payments personally. Hence, the estimates are only valid for those students whose cash transfer 
was collected by a household member. The effect for students aged 18 years or older, who 
could collect their payments on their own, could not be estimated due to low statistical power.  
 
Another essential characteristic of the sample is that it is comprised exclusively of students that 
had a PFSE score, and accordingly a valid SPF score. 76.9% of the students in the BLE 2013 
Dataset had a valid PFSE score. This is not a representative sample of the population of Chilean 
students, as households with higher earnings were less likely to request a Social Protection File.  
 
These characteristics of the sample do not favour making inferences about the whole student 
body. However, this is not problematic if the main findings of this study are linked only to 
students from the fifth to the tenth grades with a Social Protection File in 2012 who were 
younger than 18 years old in 2013. Given that this subset of students is more likely to be 
recipients of cash for grades programmes, the relevance of the findings of this study holds.30 
 
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the BLE in 2013. The first four columns of the table 
display the mean values for four subsets of students. I obtain these subsets after splitting the 
sample by PFSE score (below or equal to 98 points and above this threshold) and by relative 
ranking (equal to or lower than 0.3 and values higher than this threshold). Thus, the first column 
only contains students who were eligible for the BLE in 2013. The last four columns of the 
table give the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the entire sample.  
                                                          
30 Students without a PFSE score were less likely to attend a public school and to be enrolled in secondary 
technical-professional education relative to their peers with a PFSE score. The former group was also more likely 
to reside in the metropolitan region and urban areas. This information provides evidence that students from higher-
income households are not well represented in the sample as in Chile these households are more likely to prefer 
private schools, scientific-humanistic education, to live in the metropolitan region, and choose schools in urban 
areas. However, given that the percentage of students attending rural schools and technical-professional education 
is not negligible is also feasible that some poor households did not have access to a PFSE score. 
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Panel A shows the mean for the variable BLE recipient in 2013. The mean is one in the first 
column and zero in the second, third and fourth columns. Every student in the sample who was 
eligible for the cash transfer was provided with it (if the cash transfer was collected by an adult 
member of his or her household).31 Conversely, students who were ineligible for the BLE in 
2013 did not have any access to the cash transfer that year. The fifth column of the table shows 
that approximately 14% of the students in the sample were provided with the BLE in 2013.32 
 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variables influencing eligibility for the BLE in 
2013. The mean PFSE score in the sample is 113 points with a minimum of 24 and a maximum 
of 769. Among the BLE recipients, the mean PFSE score is 58.6 points. The mean value for 
average grade in 2012 is 5.48. For students in the highest 30% of academic performance the 
mean is higher than 6.00, while for students who are not in this group the mean is around 5.20. 
The average cohort size is 86.2 students while the average student ranking is 41.1. 
 
Panel C shows that students in the highest 30% in terms of academic performance had a higher 
percentage of attendance relative to students outside of this group. Regarding the type of school 
attended, the poorest 30% were more likely to attend public schools and approximately seven 
out of ten students were enrolled in a traditional primary school. Three out of ten students 
attended traditional secondary schools. Among this group of students, enrolment in scientific-
humanistic (SH) schools was nearly twice that in technical-professional (TP) schools. Students 
with a PFSE score higher than 98 points were slightly more likely to be enrolled in a secondary 
SH school relative to their peers with a PFSE score lower than or equal to 98 points. 
 
From Panel D, we see that the sample mean age in 2012 is 12.53 years and that boys were less 
likely to be part of the highest academically achieving group than girls. Additionally, students 
in the poorest 30% of the population had a head of household with fewer years of schooling 
and who was more likely to be female compared to students who were not among the poorest 
30%. In relative terms, students with a PFSE score no higher than 98 were also more likely to 
attend a rural school and to live outside the metropolitan (or capital) region.  
                                                          
31 The take-up in 2013 did not reach 100% though. By August 2014, nearly 5% of payments were still pending. 
32 The sample contains students that finished the academic year 2012. A tiny fraction did not enrol or enrolled but 
withdrew in the academic year 2013 (or 2014). For example, only 1.1% of BLE recipients were in this condition 
in 2013. Given these low levels of school dropout among BLE recipients, I decided against analysing this outcome. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for the BLE in 2013 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
Variables 
Relative Ranking ≤ 0.3 Relative Ranking > 0.3 Total PFSE ≤ 98 PFSE > 98 PFSE ≤ 98 PFSE > 98 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: BLE Recipient in 2013 
BLE Recipient in 2013 1 0 0 0 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Panel B: BLE Eligibility Variables in 2012 
PFSE Score 58.6 165.4 57.9 161.9 113.0 67.3 24 769 
Average Grade 6.04 6.09 5.18 5.23 5.48 0.55 4.0 7.0 
SR: Student Ranking 12.6 13.5 51.0 57.4 41.1 50.1 1 786 
CS: Cohort Size 82.9 91.6 79.5 91.2 86.2 79.3 7 786 
SR/CS: Relative Ranking 0.156 0.149 0.646 0.630 0.483 0.284 0.001 1 
Panel C: Attendance and School Information in 2012 
Attendance (%) 93.9 94.4 91.3 92.2 92.5 7.0 1 100 
Public School 0.521 0.425 0.520 0.409 0.465 0.499 0 1 
Primary Traditional Education 0.685 0.682 0.717 0.678 0.693 0.461 0 1 
Secondary SH Traditional Education 0.197 0.223 0.177 0.227 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Secondary TP Traditional Education 0.112 0.091 0.096 0.088 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Panel D: Demographic Information 
Age in 2012 (Years) 12.44 12.39 12.58 12.60 12.53 1.82 8 16 
Male 0.418 0.438 0.525 0.538 0.499 0.500 0 1 
Head of Household Schooling (Years) 9.23 10.77 8.78 10.34 9.74 3.37 0 24 
Household Monthly Income ($CLP) 112,418.9 272,970.4 108,020.8 256,265.9 189,150.7 194,888.1 0 15,276,972 
Metropolitan Region 0.329 0.365 0.324 0.374 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Rural School 0.116 0.070 0.121 0.067 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Head of Household is Female 0.582 0.294 0.601 0.331 0.450 0.498 0 1 
Head of Household is Employed 0.710 0.818 0.704 0.804 0.760 0.427 0 1 
Household Size 4.18 4.19 4.28 4.24 4.24 1.45 1 33 
Household Number of Rooms 1.95 2.23 1.93 2.20 2.08 0.93 0 63 
Number of Observations 149,834 188,959 357,416 368,451 1,064,660  
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3.3.4 Methodological Approach 
 
Regression Discontinuity Designs: Sharp vs Fuzzy, One vs Multiple Running Variables 
 
A researcher interested in identifying the causal relationship between receiving the BLE and 
future attendance or academic performance needs a suitable strategy for doing so. For example, 
a simple comparison of outcomes among those who receive the cash transfer and those who do 
not is likely to provide biased estimates. Restricting the comparisons to subsets of the 
population is not likely to work either. Within students in the highest 30% of student 
achievement, BLE recipients differ relative to non-recipients regarding key observable 
characteristics such as the type of school they attend or the schooling of their household’s 
heads. An analogous situation happens within the poorest 30%. In this case, BLE recipients 
and non-recipients are not comparable regarding their previous attendance and gender, among 
other variables.  
 
An alternative approach is a regression discontinuity design. In all RD designs some exogenous 
variation in treatment occurs around a threshold of a running variable or rating score. Two 
types of RD designs exist: sharp and fuzzy. In fuzzy RD designs the running variable is a 
relevant factor, but not the only one, in explaining treatment status. In sharp RD designs 
treatment is fully explained by the running variable. In the context of RD designs to evaluate 
the impact of cash transfers, a sharp RD design is suitable for causal inference only if all units 
that meet the eligibility criteria (generally those having a score below a threshold) receive the 
cash transfer and if all units that do not meet the criteria never receive the cash transfer. 
 
A sharp RD design is a suitable approach in this paper. In the simplest sharp RD design only 
one running variable and threshold exists. Here there are two running variables. Regardless, I 
can use two different sharp RD designs depending on how I restrict the sample. For example, 
if I utilise the subset of students in the highest 30% of academic performance, I can implement 
a sharp RD design using the PFSE scores as a running variable as the treatment changes from 
zero to one at the 98-point threshold (as shown in the first two columns of Panel A in Table 
3.2). Similarly, I can execute another sharp RD design if I restrict the sample to the poorest 
30%.  
 
I employ these two alternatives in the paper. Their details are explained later in this subsection. 
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This type of approach, with more than one running variable and where a restricted sample is 
used to implement an RD design, has been labelled a frontier RD estimation (Reardon & 
Robinson, 2012) and provides frontier-specific estimates (Wong, Steiner, & Cook, 2013). 
Consequently, I report two frontier-specific estimates in this paper. The first type of estimate 
informs us about the effect of the BLE in 2013 solely for students around the 30% of lowest 
income. The second type of estimate does so only for students near the 30% of highest 
achievement.  
 
To obtain causal estimates, RD designs compare outcomes for units just above and below a 
threshold in a running variable. In a context of two running variables, the alternative to 
estimating two frontier-specific effects is to estimate a unique frontier-average treatment effect 
directly. This can be done either by estimating the discontinuity in the outcome along both 
thresholds simultaneously using bivariate regressions or by collapsing the two running 
variables into a single one (Wong et al., 2013). Either of these two approaches will imply using 
more complex methods and assumptions. Given that the frontier-average treatment estimate is 
the result of a weighted average of frontier-specific estimates (Wong et al., 2013) I opt to 
provide only the latter type of estimate and use standard (univariate) RD estimation strategies 
and assumptions.  
 
Local Randomisation vs Continuity-Based Framework in RD Designs 
 
In RD designs, causal inference relies on the assumption that the average outcome for units 
marginally at one side of the threshold must represent a valid counterfactual for the group just 
at the other side of the threshold (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 2001; Lee, 2008). Despite 
this common theoretical understanding, there are disparities in, and a lack of consensus about 
how RD designs are interpreted and implemented in practice (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 
2018a). Two frameworks exist for RD analysis: local randomisation and continuity-based. 
These two frameworks rely on different identification assumptions and, consequently, differ in 
their strategies for estimation and the tests they use to assess the internal validity of their 
estimates (Cattaneo, Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2017b; Sekhon & Titiunik, 2017). In practice, 
the continuity-based framework is most commonly employed (Cattaneo et al., 2018a). 
 
Researchers who adopt the local randomisation framework use the logic of experimental 
designs to recover causal estimates. They take the simple average of the outcome in a small 
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window on either side of the index’ threshold. Hence, the impact estimate is equivalent to the 
difference in means across the cutoff point. The same approach is used to assess the quality of 
the randomisation. The underlying assumption of this framework is that the average potential 
outcomes are uncorrelated with the running variable within a small neighbourhood close to the 
threshold (Cattaneo, Idrobo, & Titiunik, 2018b).33 For this assumption to hold, the treatment 
needs to be at least as good as randomly assigned for units within a distance w from the cutoff 
C. 
 
Researchers relying on the continuity-based framework use regression at each side of the 
threshold to predict the limiting value of the outcome precisely at the threshold. In this 
framework the running variable can be associated with average potential outcomes, but this 
association is assumed to be smooth at the threshold. Therefore, this continuity assumption 
allows us to interpret any discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the outcome (as a 
function of the running variable) at the threshold as causal evidence of the treatment (Imbens 
& Lemieux, 2008). To assess the internal validity of the causal estimates, it is necessary to 
check whether the distributions of the pre-treatment variables show discontinuities. Repeated 
discontinuities in these distributions at the threshold cast doubt on the plausibility of the 
continuity assumption. 
 
Within the continuity-based framework, when the estimation uses only observations near the 
threshold the approach is known as local polynomial or non-parametric (or a combination of 
these two terms). Conversely, a global or flexible parametric model uses all or most of the 
running variable's support. The former approach has been recommended over the latter in the 
recent literature (Cattaneo et al., 2018a; Cattaneo et al., 2017b) due to its increased capacity to 
predict boundary points, the estimate of interest in the continuity-based RD framework.   
 
The local randomisation framework requires a stronger assumption relative to the continuity-
based framework (Cattaneo et al., 2018b). For the causal estimates to be unbiased in the local 
randomisation framework, the average potential outcomes need to be uncorrelated with the 
running variable along the whole interval [C–w, C+w]. If this assumption holds, then the 
                                                          
33 Each observation i has two potential outcomes. 𝑌௜(1) is the hypothetical outcome that would be observed if 
assigned to treatment while 𝑌௜(0) would be observed in case of being assigned to the control group. In a sharp RD 
context, we can only observe 𝑌௜(1) for units at one side of the threshold (while 𝑌௜(0) remains unobserved for this 
group) and 𝑌௜(0) for units at the other side of the threshold (with 𝑌௜(1) being unobserved for this group). 
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continuity assumption on which the other RD framework relies holds. However, continuity 
does not assure local independence between the average potential outcomes and the running 
variable.  
 
A priori, I am not able to guarantee that the local randomization RD framework central 
assumption holds. For example, by design PFSE scores are highly correlated with income per 
capita, a variable that in turn may be correlated with future academic performance and 
attendance within the neighbourhood around the 98-point threshold. Similarly, previous 
academic performance is likely to be a strong predictor of future academic performance within 
the interval [C–w, C+w]. In any of these cases, RD estimates equivalent to differences in means 
will most likely be biased.  
 
In contrast, the continuity assumption holds more plausibly in the two sharp RD applications I 
propose. Accordingly, the body of the paper focuses on the continuity-based RD framework. 
Regardless, I discuss the local randomisation RD framework and its results in an appendix. 
 
RD Application #1: Sharp RD Design Using PFSE Score in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
In the first RD application, I use the PFSE score as a running variable. I implement a sharp RD 
design after restricting the sample to students in the highest 30% of academic performance.  
 
Because I use a continuity-based RD framework, first I need to choose the size h of the 
bandwidth. The size of the bandwidth determines which observations of the income index 
(around the 98-point PFSE threshold) are used in the local regression. Hence this design relies 
only upon units within the interval [98–h, 98+h]. I choose h in a data-driven way to avoid 
selecting it arbitrarily. More precisely, I choose the h that minimises the mean squared error of 
the local polynomial estimator. This is the most popular approach for bandwidth selection in 
RD designs (Cattaneo et al., 2018a). I obtain the causal estimates from the following regression: 
 
𝑌௜ =  𝛼ଵ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼ଵ௜ + 𝜃ଵ𝑓(∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸௜) + 𝛾ଵ𝑓(∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸௜)𝐼ଵ௜ + 𝜀ଵ௜, 
 
where 𝑌௜  is average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1.  ∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸௜ is the 98–PFSE 
score in t–1 for student i (distance to the 98-point PFSE threshold). 𝐼ଵ௜ is a binary variable that 
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takes a value of zero if ∆𝑃𝐹𝑆𝐸௜ is negative. Otherwise, 𝐼ଵ௜  is one. 𝑓(𝑥) is a local polynomial of 
x of order p. 𝜀ଵ௜ is the error term, the difference between the observed and predicted values. 
 
In this approach 𝛽ଵ corresponds to the causal effect. Cattaneo et al. (2018a) recommend using 
a triangular kernel in the regression. Additionally, they recommend that the order p of the local 
polynomial for use in the estimations should be one or two. For inference, I assume that the 
observations are clustered by schools. To assess the internal validity, I use the same local 
regression but I replace 𝑌௜ with each variable of 𝑋௜ᇱ, a vector of pre-treatment variables. After 
running the regression for each pre-treatment variable, I perform a test of joint significance. If 
the hypothesis of no joint significance is rejected the continuity assumption is unlikely to hold. 
 
RD Application #2: Sharp RD Design Using Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
A second candidate for running variable is the relative ranking in 2012. Although students did 
not know that their relative academic performance in 2012 was being used for the BLE 
assignment in 2013, this is not a suitable running variable. The relative ranking is a result of a 
two-step administrative procedure that transforms the average grade of each student. The first 
step transforms the average grade into a ranking. The second step transforms the latter value 
into a relative ranking by dividing the student ranking by the number of students in the cohort. 
This two-step procedure non-randomly affects the position of students near the 0.3 threshold 
and causes them not to be comparable around it. Accordingly, there is no valid counterfactual 
as potential outcomes are likely to differ for units across the 0.3 threshold in the relative 
ranking.34 
 
In my second RD application I use the average grade in 2012 as a running variable. I implement 
a sharp RD design after restricting the sample to the poorest 30% of the students. The average 
grade in 2012 is a suitable candidate for a running variable in a sharp RD design. This variable 
changed the eligibility for the BLE in 2013 deterministically. Among the 30% poorest students, 
those whose average grade in 2012 was equal to or higher than T received the BLE in 2013, 
while those whose average grade was lower than T did not receive it. T represents the average 
                                                          
34 Appendix H provides empirical support for this argument. First, I present differences in means in a small 
window around the 0.3 threshold in the relative ranking for key pre-treatment variables. I find multiple, large and 
statistically significant differences. Then, I provide estimates for the continuity-based framework. I find 
comparable results relative to the local randomisation framework. Finally, the appendix explains how the 
procedure affects the position of different types of students near the 0.3 relative ranking threshold systematically.   
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grade that determined which students were in the top 30% in terms of highest achievement in 
each academic cohort. Thus, various thresholds exist between cohorts. Unlike the relative 
ranking, the average grade is free from administrative sorting.35 Students that differ in their 
average grade by a tiny fraction are not expected to differ in terms of potential outcomes and 
pre-treatment variables. 
 
As there are different thresholds for multiple subgroups I implement a multi-cutoff RD design. 
The approach generally consists of normalising the running variable, for example assigning the 
value of zero to all units with a score of T, and then pooling all the observations (Cattaneo, 
Keele, Titiunik, & Vazquez-Bare, 2016a). This strategy has been used in multiple RD papers 
in topics such as education, poverty and health (Carneiro et al., forthcoming; De la Mata, 2012; 
Lindo, Sanders, & Oreopoulos, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Urquiola, 2013). Accordingly, in my 
second RD application I fit the following local regression (where 𝛽ଶ is the causal estimate): 
 
𝑌௜ =  𝛼ଶ  +  𝛽ଶ 𝐼ଶ௜ + 𝜃ଶ𝑓(∆𝐴𝐺௜) + 𝛾ଶ𝑓(∆𝐴𝐺௜)𝐼ଶ௜ +𝜀ଶ௜, 
 
where 𝑌௜  is the average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1. ∆𝐴𝐺௜ is the average 
grade of student i in t–1 minus T (distance of average grade to the threshold). 𝐼ଶ௜ is a binary 
variable that takes a value of one if ∆𝐴𝐺௜ is non-negative. Otherwise, the variable takes a value 
of zero. 𝑓(𝑥) is a local polynomial of x of order p. Finally, 𝜀ଶ௜ corresponds to the error term. 
 
I could not select the bandwidth h driven by the data on this occasion. There are not enough 
unique values in the running variable to implement the algorithm that estimates the optimal 
bandwidth. This is explained by the average grade in Chile being rounded and reported only 
with one decimal place (the average grade is mostly the result of a simple average of multiple 
courses).36 Instead, I opt for two values of h (h=0.2 and h=0.3). Given the average grade scale, 
these are the minimum bandwidths from which I can fit a local regression of order p one and 
                                                          
35 In the fourth chapter I elaborate in detail the concept of administrative sorting. Administrative sorting relates to 
procedures, beyond the control and knowledge of individuals, that affect the position of these individuals non-
randomly near the threshold. Administrative sorting threatens the continuity assumption on which RD designs 
rely. 
36 Given that my second running variable is rounded, there is a potential risk of a rounding error in the RD 
estimations. One way to account for this is to follow Lee and Card (2008) and assume random deviations between 
the true regression function and the approximating function and estimate confidence intervals based on standard 
errors that are clustered by the running variable. However, Kolesár and Rothe (2018) recommend against this 
practice. Another approach is to follow Dong (2015), but this implies modelling the curvature of the outcomes by 
the running variable within the discrete values used, adding complex and untestable assumptions to the estimates.  
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two, respectively. The other technical aspects of the estimation (such as the type of kernel, the 
internal validity tests and clusterisation) are the same as in my first RD application. 
 
RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test  
 
A key component of RD papers are graphs. I provide multiple types of figures to help the reader 
to assess the robustness of the key assumption, continuity, on which these designs rely. 
 
The first type shows the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes. In this 
case a clear discontinuity at the threshold is suggestive of a treatment effect. The second type 
presents the relationship between the running variable and pre-treatment variables. Repeated 
discontinuities at the threshold cast doubt on the plausibility of the continuity assumption. 
 
I build these two types of RD graphs following Cattaneo et al. (2018a). The running variable 
is shown on the horizontal axis while the outcome or pre-treatment variable is represented by 
the vertical axis. I calculate the average value of the vertical axis variable for a limited number 
of non-overlapping bins of the running variable. These values are shown by dots. I add a fourth-
degree polynomial, fitted in the original data, at each side of the threshold. The polynomial 
represents the association between the variables in the horizontal and vertical axes. The dashed 
lines surrounding each polynomial represent the 95% confidence interval of the fitted function. 
 
The third type of RD figures I provide in the paper are histograms of the running variable. A 
discontinuous density around the threshold usually indicates manipulation or sorting, which 
makes the continuity assumption on which the RD design mostly relies less likely to hold. I 
provide these graphs along with the results of a manipulation test for discrete running variables 
(Frandsen, 2017). I use this method instead of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) because the 
latter tool performs poorly when the running variable is not continuous (Frandsen, 2017).  
 
Frandsen’s test is based on smooth approximations of the running variable density close to the 
threshold of interest. Accordingly, the test detects deviations in the running variable density. 
Therefore, if the test is rejected this is interpreted as a sign of manipulation or sorting. In this 
sense this test is like McCrary’s but Frandsen’s test uses only points immediately adjacent to 
the threshold. If I assume that the density of the running variable is linear near the threshold 
(k=0) the test will detect small deviations from linearity at the threshold. This is the most 
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rigorous criterion. If I allow any degree of curvature for the density of the running variable 
(k>0) the test is less likely to be rejected. I run the test using three values of k (k = 0, 0.1 and 
0.2), which allows me to assess the sensitivity of the estimates to the curvature of the running 
variable. 
 
3.4 Results 
 
This section presents the results of the impact assessment. The first subsection focuses on the 
use of PFSE scores in 2012 as a running variable. The second part is centred around the use of 
average grade in 2012 as a running variable. Only continuity-based RD estimates are shown in 
these subsections. The third part incorporates the findings of the previous two subsections and 
synthesises the results of the local randomisation RD framework, the impact of the BLE in 
2014 and the BLE in 2013 on subgroups (available in Appendixes I, J, and K, respectively).   
 
3.4.1 PFSE Score in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
RD Estimates 
 
Table 3.3 presents the RD estimates (𝛽ଵ) for each outcome. The first four columns show the 
results for average grade in 2013 and 2014 while the last four columns do so for attendance. 
For each outcome, I present two estimates. Within each outcome, the first estimate uses a local 
quadratic regression (p = 2) while the second estimate uses a local linear regression (p = 1).  
 
The estimates for future average grade are all close to zero and statistically insignificant. The 
estimates range from –0.010 to –0.003 points. Concerning the standard deviation of average 
grade, these local regression outputs range from –0.015 to –0.005. The estimates for attendance 
in 2013 and 2014 are also close to zero and not statistically significant at any level of 
confidence. The estimates are negative for 2013 and positive for 2014. Overall, the range goes 
from –0.098% to 0.108% where these results translate approximately into a fifth of a school 
day. On the scale of the standard deviation of attendance the estimates range from –0.011 to 
0.012. Among the estimates, the lowest standard error is 0.013𝜎 while the highest is 0.021𝜎. 
Therefore, if any RD estimate would have had an absolute value higher than 0.042𝜎 this would 
have been statistically different from zero with a 95% level of confidence. Depending on the 
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estimate I analyse, this could have been statistically significant with an absolute value as low 
as 0.026𝜎.  
 
RD estimates are more sensitive to bandwidth selection than any other component (Cattaneo 
et al., 2018a). For this reason, these estimates are expected to be robust to different bandwidth 
sizes. Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 present again the results of the continuity-based framework for 
future average grade and attendance. On this occasion, I test two alternative bandwidths for 
each specification (column) of Table 3.3. I change the size of bandwidth h by 1.5 times and by 
half. Modifying the size of the bandwidth reveals few changes relative to the estimates in Table 
3.3. Table 3.4 shows that the estimates for average grade in 2013 and 2014 remain near zero, 
are all statistically insignificant and mostly negative. Table 3.5 focuses on attendance. The 
estimates are close to zero, negative in 2013 and positive in 2014, and they all lack statistical 
significance. 
 
Table 3.6 presents RD estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. None of these variables could 
have been affected by the BLE in 2013. Consequently, this exercise helps to assess the 
plausibility of the continuity assumption. I show two estimates per variable. While Panel A 
uses a local quadratic regression, Panel B uses a local linear regression. Overall, the conditional 
distributions of these variables do not show discontinuous behaviour at the threshold. I find no 
statistically significant coefficients for previous academic performance and attendance, age, 
enrolment in public or rural schools, household income and size, or the schooling and gender 
of the head of the household. Gender is the only variable for which I obtain a 95% statistically 
significant estimate. The differences in the estimated proportion of males at the threshold are 
0.027 and 0.022 points. For both Panel A and Panel B, the joint tests of statistical significance 
of these ten variables are not rejected.  
 
To sum up, the main causal estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. If 
an effect of the BLE in 2013 exists (for students near the 30% relative income threshold), its 
size is likely to be no larger than a small fraction of a standard deviation and cannot be 
statistically detected. There is a small discontinuity in the distribution of gender, but no other 
pre-treatment variable shows this behaviour. In my sample, being male is not correlated with 
attendance; thus it is improbable that this outcome is affected. Being male is weakly negatively 
correlated with future average grade. This correlation may explain the negative coefficients for 
average grade. If this is the case the causal estimates could be slightly downwardly biased. 
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However, the effects are most likely small in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
 
RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the density of the PFSE scores among the subgroup of students in the 
highest 30% of academic achievement and the results of the manipulation test proposed by 
Frandsen (2017). No abrupt changes in the density are observed along this figure or close to 
the BLE threshold (vertical line). The test fails to reject the hypothesis of no difference in the 
expected density at each side of the threshold. The most rigorous application, with no degree 
of curvature allowed, has a p-value of 0.187. The p-value increases when I partly relax this 
restriction. 
 
Figure 3.1: PFSE Score Density and Frandsen Manipulation Test 
(Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
 
Manipulation test (k=0) p-value=0.187 
Manipulation test (k=0.1) p-value=0.221 
Manipulation test (k=0.2) p-value=0.293 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
 
Figure 3.2 presents a series of graphs that depict the relationship between the running variable 
and the outcomes of the assessment. Future average grade graphs can be found in the upper 
panel of the figure, while future attendance graphs are in the lower panel. In general terms, the 
figure shows a positive but weak association between the PFSE scores and both types of 
outcomes. More importantly, no graph shows a relevant discontinuity between the polynomial 
fitted functions at each side of the vertical line. Any detected discontinuity is small and not 
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statistically significant as the confidence intervals of the fitted functions noticeably overlap at 
the threshold. This evidence is consistent with the RD estimates of Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows eight graphs that illustrate the relationship between the PFSE scores in 2012 
and the variables that could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013. Some variables, such 
as income and head of household’s schooling, have an evident degree of association with the 
PFSE scores. Conversely, other variables have a weaker correlation with the PFSE index. From 
any of the eight graphs I present in Figure 3.3 it is possible to claim that discontinuous 
behaviour exists for a pre-treatment variable at the threshold. In all cases where a difference in 
the polynomial fit is observed, this is small in magnitude. Additionally, the 95% confidence 
intervals of the polynomial fits mostly overlap in each of these eight graphs. Although not 
strictly comparable with the estimates in Table 3.6, Figure 3.3 provides similar insights to this 
source. 
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Table 3.3: RD Estimates for Outcomes (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
Outcomes average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 -0.098 0.108 0.106 
Original Outcome (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.146) (0.107) (0.159) (0.143) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 0.012 0.011 
In Standard Deviations (0.019) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) 
         
Number of Observations 91,832 95,380 87,263 87,263 109,231 105,768 125,075 73,092 
Bandwidth Size (h) 25.73 27.50 24.96 24.87 31.14 30.45 35.58 21.12 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Table 3.4: RD Estimates for Future Average Grade (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
Table 3.5: RD Estimates for Future Attendance (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
Outcomes average_grade2013 average_grade2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.010 -0.016 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011 0.001 -0.011 
Original Outcome (0.010) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013) 
         
Number of Observations 136,909 45,760 144,061 49,285 128,471 41,880 128,471 41,880 
Bandwidth Size (h)  38.59 12.86 41.25 13.75 37.43 12.48 37.31 12.44 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Outcomes attendance2013 attendance2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.090 -0.166 -0.090 -0.028 0.122 0.034 0.080 0.005 
Original Outcome (0.122) (0.200) (0.093) (0.143) (0.134) (0.219) (0.121) (0.196) 
         
Number of Observations 166,185 56,237 162,448 52,798 185,597 62,667 111,405 38,417 
Bandwidth Size (h) 46.71 15.57 45.68 15.23 53.37 17.79 31.69 10.56 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
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Table 3.6: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
Pre-Treatment 
Variables 
(Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Order p of Local Polynomial =2 (Local Quadratic Regression) 
RD Estimate: -0.007 -0.086 0.014 0.027** -0.007 -0.004 -1,024.1 0.014 -0.102 0.001 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.130) (0.043) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (2,743.5) (0.029) (0.080) (0.010) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
120,566 96,218 117,115 100,039 106,700 103,351 100,039 106,652 79,028 110,005 
Bandwidth 
Size (h) 
34.09 26.94 32.68 28.77 29.84 28.66 28.50 31.37 22.87 32.40 
           
Panel B: Order p of Local Polynomial =1 (Local Linear Regression) 
RD Estimate: -0.006 -0.135 0.012 0.022** -0.004 -0.002 -1,070.2 0.011 -0.085 -0.000 
Original Var. (0.007) (0.099) (0.038) (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (2,364.1) (0.025) (0.064) (0.008) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
85,347 92,635 85,347 65,158 74,553 81,678 61,849 72,109 61,849 79,028 
Bandwidth 
Size (h) 
24.20 25.86 23.84 18.58 20.98 22.84 17.81 20.55 17.95 22.77 
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Figure 3.2: Future Outcomes by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Figure 3.3: Pre-Treatment Variables by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
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Figure 3.3 (continued): Pre-Treatment Variables by PFSE Score in 2012 (Students in the Highest 30% of Academic Performance in 2012) 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
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3.4.2 Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable 
 
RD Estimates 
 
Table 3.7 presents the results for future average grade and attendance. The first four columns 
focus on the former type of outcome, while the last four focus on the latter. The first type of 
RD estimate per outcome (𝛽ଶ) uses a bandwidth h of 0.3 and a local quadratic regression. The 
second type of estimate comes from a local linear regression that uses a bandwidth h of 0.2. 
 
All the main estimates for future average grade are small and not statistically different from 
zero at a 95% level of confidence. The estimates fluctuate from a minimum of –0.003 points 
(–0.004𝜎) to a maximum of 0.017 points (0.027𝜎). This last value is close to achieving a 95% 
level of statistical significance given that its standard error is 0.015𝜎. The range for the 
estimates of attendance goes from –0.043% to 0.147% (–0.005 to 0.016 of a standard 
deviation). Given that the highest standard error is 0.020𝜎, the approach would have detected 
statistical significance for any estimate higher than 0.040𝜎. Overall, these results are similar to 
the estimates in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 summarise the sensitivity analysis by bandwidth choice. Overall, 
between the outputs of each of these tables and the estimates from Table 3.7, the differences in 
magnitude are positive but small. The estimates for future average grade in Table 3.8 are all 
close to zero (ranging from 0.002 to 0.023 points). Some estimates are statistically significant 
at a 95% level of confidence but overall these are not robust to alternative specifications. The 
estimates for attendance in 2013 and 2014 are small and lack any statistical significance. The 
estimates for 2013 range from 0.012% to 0.053%, and in 2014 from 0.138% to 0.189%. 
 
Table 3.10 presents the estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. The specifications I use per 
variable follow a similar pattern to Table 3.7. The Panel A estimates are the result of a local 
quadratic regression run in a bandwidth of size 0.3. Panel B provides the results for a local 
linear regression run in a bandwidth of size 0.2. This approach helps to assess the likelihood of 
the continuity assumption to hold, as the BLE could have impacted none of these variables.   
 
Overall, no clear discontinuities emerge in the distribution of any of these variables at the 
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threshold. I find no significant differences from zero at a 95% level of confidence. The only 
estimate at a 90% level of confidence is average grade in 2012 for a local linear regression 
(p=1). Given that this coefficient is small and positive, if the average grade linear causal 
estimates in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 are not free of bias, these estimates would be slightly inflated. 
Accordingly, the potential unbiased estimates would be lower and less likely to be statistically 
significant. 
 
The main causal estimates for both outcomes are not statistically significantly different from 
zero at a 95% level of confidence. I observe statistically significant coefficients for some 
alternative specifications of average grade, but these are not robust. The main estimates for 
both outcomes are near zero and have standard errors no larger than 0.020 of a standard 
deviation. Hence, for students around the 30% of highest achievement, the BLE in 2013 is 
unlikely to have caused a substantial effect.   
 
RD Graphs and Running Variable Density Test 
 
Figure 3.4 presents the density of the normalised average grade variable among the poorest 
30% of students. Overall, the distribution of the distance of average grade to the cohort 
threshold T is smooth. The density decreases when approaching the zero threshold (the vertical 
line) from the left and increases when reaching this cutoff point from the right. The Frandsen 
test is not able to detect significant deviations in the expected density of the running variable. 
The minimum p-value of the test, for the most rigorous version of it, is 0.678.  
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Figure 3.4: Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold Density and Frandsen Manipulation 
Test (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
Manipulation test (k=0) p-value=0.678 
Manipulation test (k=0.1) p-value=0.862 
Manipulation test (k=0.2) p-value=0.989 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes. The upper 
panel shows the graphs for average grade while the lower panel focuses on attendance. The 
figure displays a positive association between the running variable and the outcomes. This 
association is strong as the confidence intervals of the fits are narrow. If the polynomial fits at 
each side of the vertical line were to be extended to the threshold it would not be possible to 
distinguish a clear discontinuity. In other words, any estimated discontinuity in the 
extrapolation would most likely be small. However, it does not seem possible to discard 
statistically significant differences only by looking at this figure. Although it is not strictly 
comparable, this graphic evidence is concordant with the results in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9.  
 
Figure 3.6 shows eight graphs that illustrate the relationship between the running variable and 
other variables that could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013. The relationship between 
the running variable and each of these eight pre-treatment variables differs notoriously. The 
graphs help to determine the plausibility of the continuity assumption to hold. No discontinuous 
relationships at the threshold are noticeable from the figure. No graph suggests an abrupt 
change in the projected distributions of the pre-treatment variables at the threshold. The results 
from Table 3.10 are consistent with Figure 3.6. Both findings provide support for the suitability 
of this RD approach to identify the causal effects of the Bono por Logro Escolar in 2013.
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 Table 3.7: RD Estimates for Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
  
Outcomes average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.003 0.006 0.010 0.017* -0.043 0.009 0.119 0.147 
Original Outcome (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.169) (0.126) (0.188) (0.141) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.004 0.010 0.016 0.027* -0.005 0.001 0.013 0.016 
In Standard Deviations (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) 
         
Number of Observations 166,638 112,023 163,219 109,783 166,638 112,023 163,219 109,783 
Bandwidth Size (h)  0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
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Table 3.8: RD Estimates for Future Average Grade (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
 
Table 3.9: RD Estimates for Future Attendance (Sensitivity Analysis to Bandwidth) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
Outcomes average_grade2013 average_grade2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: 0.004 0.002 0.016** 0.011 0.016* 0.014 0.023*** 0.021** 
Original Outcome (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
         
Number of Observations 269,585 219,355 219,355 166,638 263,547 214,693 214,693 163,219 
Bandwidth Size (h) 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
Outcomes attendance2013 attendance2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: 0.020 0.012 0.053 0.043 0.189 0.183 0.138 0.160 
Original Outcome (0.124) (0.138) (0.101) (0.110) (0.139) (0.155) (0.113) (0.123) 
         
Number of Observations 269,585 219,355 219,355 166,638 263,547 214,693 214,693 163,219 
Bandwidth Size (h) 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 
Order p of Local Polynomial 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 
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Table 3.10: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
Pre-Treatment 
Variables 
(Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Bandwidth h=0.3 & Local Quadratic Regression (p=2) 
RD Estimate:  0.002 -0.152 0.070 0.017 0.012 0.004 827.5 0.022 -0.047 -0.007 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.146) (0.045) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (2,175.9) (0.031) (0.070) (0.010) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
169,944 169,944 169,943 164,310 169,944 169,944 164,310 164,310 164,310 164,310 
           
Panel B: Bandwidth h=0.2 & Local Linear Regression (p=1) 
RD Estimate: 0.012* -0.064 0.044 0.013 0.008 0.002 1,028.4 0.010 -0.000 -0.005 
Original Var. (0.007) (0.113) (0.037) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (1,525.1) (0.022) (0.052) (0.008) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
114,153 114,153 114,152 110,369 114,153 114,153 110,369 110,369 110,369 110,369 
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Figure 3.5: Future Outcomes by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
 
 Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
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Figure 3.6: Pre-Treatment Variables by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students With PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
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Figure 3.6 (continued): Pre-Treatment Variables by Distance of Average Grade to the Threshold in 2012 (Students with PFSE ≤ 98 in 2012) 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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3.4.3 Summary 
 
I analyse different effects of receiving the BLE in 2013 over two groups of students, those 
around the 30% threshold of lower income and around the 30% threshold of highest academic 
achievement. Despite using different approaches, the value of zero is part of the 95% 
confidence interval in every main causal estimate. Additionally, the standard errors range from 
0.013𝜎 to 0.021𝜎.  
 
Figure 3.7 summarises the main estimates for average grade. The left panel of the figure uses 
the outcome original scale. The right-hand panel shows the estimates in standard deviations. 
The main estimates vary by the year of the outcome (2013 or 2014), the running variable used 
(PFSE score or distance of average grade), and the order p of the local polynomial (one or two). 
 
Figure 3.7: Summary of RD Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Average Grade 
 
(1): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is PFSE score and p is two 
(2): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is PFSE score and p is one 
(3): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is distance of average grade and p is two 
(4): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is distance of average grade and p is one 
(5): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is PFSE score and p is two 
(6): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is PFSE score and p is one 
(7): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is distance of average grade and p is two 
(8): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is distance of average grade and p is one 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
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The most negative estimate of the 95% confidence interval lower bound is –0.034 (–0.053𝜎) 
while the highest estimate of the upper bound is 0.035 (0.056𝜎). These values represent nearly 
one third of the shortest distance between two grades in the country’s educational system. 
 
Figure 3.8 summarises the main estimates for attendance. The left and right-hand panels of the 
figure present the estimates using the outcome original scale and in standard deviations, 
respectively. The smallest estimate of the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is –
0.37% (–0.044𝜎), while the largest estimate of the upper bound is 0.49% (0.052𝜎). In practice, 
the latter value is equivalent to one day of attendance at school within an academic year.  
 
Figure 3.8: Summary of RD Point Estimates and Confidence Intervals for Attendance 
 
(1): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is PFSE score and p is two 
(2): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is PFSE score and p is one 
(3): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is distance of average grade and p is two 
(4): Year of outcome is 2013, running variable is distance of average grade and p is one 
(5): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is PFSE score and p is two 
(6): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is PFSE score and p is one 
(7): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is distance of average grade and p is two 
(8): Year of outcome is 2014, running variable is distance of average grade and p is one 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Given these estimates, if frontier-specific average effects of the BLE in 2013 exist these are most 
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likely to be modest in magnitude. Thus, I am unable to detect them with statistical certainty. 
These findings also hold after I apply the local randomisation RD framework (in Appendix I) 
and calculate the effect of the BLE in 2014 (in Appendix J). The RD design provides average 
estimates that may miss causal effects on some population subgroups. Additionally, the RD 
estimates are only valid for observations near the threshold, which are not the poorest of the 
population in this paper. Appendix K analyses the impact of the BLE in 2013 over some 
population subgroups. This analysis does not consistently show estimates that are statistically 
different from zero. Therefore, any effects of this kind are unlikely to be large and could not 
be captured with statistical certainty. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on cash for grades impact assessments. I 
estimate the effect of a Chilean cash for grades programme on subsequent attendance and 
academic performance. Specifically, I evaluate the impact of the Bono por Logro Escolar in 
2013. As the cash transfer in 2013 was targeted using two scores from 2012, a relative income 
index and average grades, it is possible to implement a sharp RD design along these two 
running variables. The differences in students’ outcomes at the two thresholds used have a 
causal interpretation.  
 
The main causal estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero for both types 
of outcomes. If anything, the BLE local or frontier-specific average effects are modest and as 
a result I am unable to detect them with statistical certainty. The size of these potential effects 
is smaller than those statistically significant effects of near 0.20𝜎 found for interventions of this 
kind in developing countries (Behrman et al., 2015; Kremer et al., 2009). The results by 
subgroups do not consistently show estimates that are statistically significantly different from 
zero. 
 
RD estimates are informative for the population around the thresholds but not necessarily away 
from them. By design my BLE impact estimates only provide information for students around 
the poorest 30% threshold and around the top 30% in terms of highest academic achievement. 
As RD estimates provide average effects for the population near the thresholds, the features of 
the design do not facilitate observing effects for entire subgroups. For example, we cannot learn 
about the effects of the BLE for those at the lower end of the income distribution who are at 
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the median or the bottom end in terms of academic achievement. These subgroups of the 
population may be the ones who are more susceptible and would benefit the most from cash 
for grades programmes.  
 
Given these caveats it is not possible to generalise my results for the entire population who 
received the BLE in 2013. Future research could overcome these limitations by introducing 
some degree of randomisation, allowing for obtaining estimates for the entire population that 
are expected to be eligible for the cash for grades intervention or entire subgroups of interest.  
 
A possible explanation for the results is that the programme was not very salient for the targeted 
students. The sample I analyse were not able to collect payments on their own. These were 
received by an adult member of their household. Moreover, students may not have learnt about 
the existence of the programme when it was first implemented in 2013. If students were unaware 
of the implementation of the BLE then it would not be expected to observe changes in their 
behaviour. If this is still the case, then programme managers could implement actions that 
increase students’ awareness of the benefits (for example, by also giving a diploma to students).  
 
An alternative reason is that students were aware of the cash transfer but unresponsive to its $100 
USD maximum size. The monthly minimum wage was $210,000 CLP (approximately $410 
USD) in August 2013. If this is a likely scenario then raising the amount of the cash transfer 
could lead to increased effects. However, whether this is a cost-effective initiative compared to 
others available deserves more analysis. Another potential explanation for my results is that the 
BLE provided two types of effects that cancelled each other out overall. The price effect may 
have incentivised effort (measured by attendance) while a psychological factor could have 
reduced it.  
 
All these different hypotheses deserve further exploration in future research. Unlike my paper 
(which addresses the question of whether the BLE worked), this research will need to focus on a 
different question: why is the BLE producing little effect on educational outcomes? Interviewing 
parents and students to find out how aware they are of the BLE implementation could prove 
useful. Additionally, these interviews could help to understand the causal mechanisms (or lack 
of them) between providing this cash transfer and subsequent improvements in effort and 
academic performance. Given the nature of this inquiry, this research should probably be 
qualitative. 
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Unlike the other programmes analysed in the literature, the BLE treatment assignment was not 
randomised at a higher level than students. Other schemes had a group of courses or schools 
that were part of a treatment group while the rest belonged to a control group. Conversely, in 
Chile within the same course it is possible to observe BLE eligible and ineligible students. 
Hence, in this context students may compete for access to the BLE. Students that did not receive 
the programme in 2013 may have observed classmates or other students accessing the cash 
transfer. This could have influenced awareness about the BLE and future academic 
performance in terms of accessing the cash transfer in the future (for example in 2014 and 
2015). If this hypothesis is correct, then we would expect to observe higher estimates using the 
PFSE index as a running variable than for average grade (as eligibility by PFSE score is harder 
to modify by the student relative to academic performance). However, this is not the case and 
this hypothesis is unlikely to hold. 
 
This paper provides multiple other contributions to the cash for grades evaluation literature. 
Beyond analysing the effect of a cash for grades intervention in a context of competition, I 
study the impact on an overall measure of academic performance, the average grade. This 
contrasts with the subject-specific criteria (for example test scores in maths, reading or writing) 
commonly found in the previous literature. Then, an additional potential explanation for the 
lack of results for the BLE is that for students it implies too much effort, or it is too hard to 
improve in all subjects (or to improve largely in a few subjects) to increase their average grade. 
 
Whether to reward children according to their academic performance remains a hotly debated 
and unresolved topic. I observe no significant effects on educational outcomes for the first 
Chilean cash for grades programme. Further research and an enhanced BLE design may be 
needed to deliver grades for cash. Otherwise, the country risks little return on its money.
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Appendix G. Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations in Schools 
 
Table 3.11: Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations (Randomised Control Trials) in Primary and Secondary Education 
 
                                                          
37 The currency of all the cash transfers described in Table 3.11 is United States Dollars.  
Author(s) Country/State Programme Description37 Main Results 
Kremer et al. (2009) Kenya 
Girls who performed well in academic exams had their 
school fees paid for two years (7th and 8th grade) and received 
a grant of $19.20 per year. The scholarship schools were 
randomly selected from two Kenyan districts. The 
scholarship was awarded to the highest scoring 15% of 6th 
grade girls in the programme schools within each district. 
An overall effect of 0.19𝜎 is found on 
academic exams. The results are 
statistically significant in one out of 
two districts. Positive externalities are 
observed among girls with low pre-
test scores and for some boys. 
Angrist and Lavy 
(2009) Israel 
Treatment assigned at the school level (among very low 
performing schools). The programme lasted for three years. 
The awards were given to high school students. A student 
who passed all achievement milestones (mainly exams 
related to obtaining a high school matriculation certificate) 
could obtain just under $2,400. 
Positive results in certification rates 
for girls (on the order of 0.10 
percentage points). The results are 
mainly driven by the group for whom 
the certification is "within reach". No 
effects on boys.  
Fryer (2011) Chicago and New York 
The experiment had two cash for grades arms. In Chicago, 9th 
graders were paid every five weeks upon performance in five 
core courses. The maximum a student could have won in a 
year was $2,000. In New York City, 4th and 7th grade 
students were rewarded based on internal assessments. The 
maximum amount students could have made in a school-year 
was $250 and $500, respectively. School-based randomised 
control trials determined treatment. 
In both states, no effects are found in 
maths or reading achievement tests. 
In Chicago, marginally significant 
effects (0.10 of a standard deviation) 
are observed for grades in the five 
core subjects. In New York, the 
effects on the interim assessments 
are, if anything, negative.   
Bettinger (2012) Ohio 
Cash payments (as much as $100 per student) were given to 
students in the 3rd through to the 6th grade for scoring 
"proficient" or "advanced" in their (state level) standardised 
testing. Eligibility by randomisation at the school-grade 
level.  
Positive effects (0.15 of a standard 
deviation) for maths but no impacts 
are observed in reading, social science 
and science test scores. 
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Table 3.11 (continued): Summary of Cash for Grades Evaluations (Randomised Control Trials) in Primary and Secondary Education 
 
Author(s) Country/State Programme Description Main Results 
Levitt et al. (2012) Chicago 
Low-income children and adolescents were offered cash 
($10 or $20) for an improvement in a computer test score. 
These tests lasted between 15 to 60 minutes. Randomisation 
occurred at the class or school-grade level. 
An effect of approximately a tenth of a 
standard deviation is observed for the 
$20 incentive. No effects for the $10 
transfer. Secondary students are more 
responsive to the size of the transfer 
relative to elementary students.  
Riccio et al. (2013) New York 
Payments, available for three years, were awarded when 
low-income households met specific education-based 
conditions of children. Among these conditions were 
superior attendance at school and certain performance 
levels in standardised tests. Each child was rewarded with 
between $600 and $700 per year for scoring proficient or 
above. The selection of families or households into the 
programme was made randomly. 
The intervention does not improve 
outcomes for elementary and middle 
school students but shows effects 
among high school students who are 
more academically prepared than their 
peers (who entered high school as 
proficient readers). 
Behrman et al. 
(2015) Mexico 
Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students were 
assigned to three treatment groups and a control group at 
random. In one of the treatment groups the payments 
depended on student performance in mathematics tests in 
10th to 12th grade. Payments ranged from $227 up to $1,363 
(depending on the level of progress in the tests). 
Effects ranging between 0.17 and 0.30 
of a standard deviation on maths test 
scores. All the estimates are 
statistically significant, but these 
results are partly explained by students 
copying. 
Hirshleifer (2017) India 
The intervention was carried out among school children (4th 
through 6th grade) as an experiment (randomisation at the 
classroom-level). Two tests were implemented. The cash 
transfer, up to $3, depended on the result of the first test. A 
second test was only used to measure students’ learning. 
A positive result (0.24 of a standard 
deviation relative to the control group) 
is found but this is not statistically 
significant due to low statistical power. 
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Appendix H. Using Relative Ranking in a Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
If I use a local randomisation RD framework, then I should expect not to observe statistically 
significant differences in the pre-treatment variables across the 0.3 threshold in relative 
ranking. This logic follows what is commonly shown in experimental designs. I choose two 
tiny windows of relative ranking (w=0.002 and w=0.005) to implement this RD framework. 
Therefore, this approach only uses observations whose relative ranking lies within the interval 
[0.3–w, 0.3+w]. I obtain the RD estimates in this framework from the following regression: 
 
𝑋௜ =  𝛼ଷ  +  𝛽ଷ 𝐼ଷ௜ + 𝜀ଷ௜,  
 
where 𝑋௜ is a pre-treatment variable for student i in year t–1, 𝐼ଷ௜ is a binary variable that takes 
a value of one if the relative ranking for student i in year t–1 is equal to or lower than 0.3. 
Otherwise, this variable takes a value of zero. 𝜀ଷ௜ represents the error term of the regression. 
 
Table 3.12 shows 𝛽ଷ. Each estimate is equivalent to the difference in means across the 
threshold. Panel A shows that students with a relative ranking in the [0.298,0.3] interval notably 
differ compared to those in the ]0.3,0.302] interval. The first group, relative to the second, had 
higher average grades and attendance levels in 2012. These differences are statistically 
significant at a 99% level of confidence. Additionally, students in the first group were younger, 
and most likely to be enrolled in primary education, in a rural school and to belong to smaller 
cohorts relative to their peers. Panel B shows that the differences become smaller as the window 
w increases, but many estimates remain statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. 
 
In a continuity-based framework, a discontinuous relationship between the relative ranking and 
each pre-treatment variable will cast doubt on the plausibility of the continuity assumption. 
The estimates for the pre-treatment variables in this framework are provided by the regression: 
 
𝑋௜ =  𝛼ସ  +  𝛽ସ 𝐼ସ௜ +  𝜃ସ𝑓(∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜) + 𝛾ସ𝑓(∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜)𝐼ସ௜ + 𝜀ସ௜,  
 
where ∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜is 0.3-relative ranking in t–1 for student i, 𝐼ସ௜ is a binary variable that takes 
a value of one if ∆𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘௜ is non-negative. Otherwise, the variable takes a value of zero. 
Additionally, 𝑓(𝑥) is a local polynomial function of x of order p and 𝜀ସ௜ models the error term. 
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Table 3.13 shows 𝛽ସ. I present two estimates per variable, both using an ad-hoc data-driven 
bandwidth and small order polynomials. Multiple statistically significant estimates are 
observed, for example average grade and attendance in 2012, cohort size and rural school.  
 
The evidence I present in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 suggests that the variation in BLE treatment 
cannot be considered as good as random near the 0.3 relative ranking threshold. There are 
systematic differences between students in the neighbourhood of this cutoff. These differences 
are very likely to affect potential outcomes and will bias the RD estimates in both frameworks.  
 
The relative ranking is the result of a two-step transformation. In the first step the average grade 
is transformed into a ranking. In the second step the ranking is divided by the cohort size. This 
procedure defines some characteristics for observations around a relative ranking value of 0.3. 
Table 3.14 summarises possible values for academic cohort size in relative ranking intervals. 
 
Observations with a relative ranking of 0.3 can only come from a cohort whose size is a 
multiple of ten. Observations in the [0.298, 0.3[ or the ]0.3, 0.302] intervals necessarily come 
from cohorts of at least 57 and 53 students. Expanding the observations to the [0.295, 0.3[ and 
]0.3, 0.305] intervals reduces the minimum cohort sizes to 27 and 23. Therefore, students 
whose relative ranking is 0.3 come from cohorts with distinctive characteristics relative to those 
who are very close to this threshold. Table 3.15 provides summary statistics to prove this point. 
 
Students whose relative ranking is 0.3 belong to cohorts whose average size is 43.63. The 
average cohort size near this threshold increases sharply. Moreover, other characteristics of the 
schools and students are substantially different. Students with a relative ranking of 0.3 are more 
likely to be enrolled in a primary school, to be younger and to attend a rural school. 
Additionally, these students had a higher academic performance and attendance in 2012. 
 
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 provide evidence against comparability between students whose relative 
ranking is 0.3 and their peers just above and below this threshold. In an RD design for the BLE, 
students with a relative ranking of 0.3 will be pooled together with those who are slightly below 
this value. This will attenuate the problems but will not solve them. Overall, there are no 
comparable observations for students whose relative ranking is 0.3. An additional challenge is 
that students at each side of the threshold are almost certain to come from different cohorts. 
Given all this evidence, the relative ranking is not a suitable running variable for an RD design. 
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Table 3.12: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework 
Pre-Treatment 
Variables 
(Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
av_grade2012 attendance2012 age schoolprimary schoolrural cohort_size hmonthincome hhschooling hhfemale 
          
Panel A: Size of Window w=0.002 
RD Estimate: 0.094*** 1.040*** -0.396*** 0.142*** 0.206*** -48.89*** -10,488.7* -0.380** -0.021 
Original Var. (0.023) (0.359) (0.134) (0.039) (0.016) (4.07) (5,494.6) (0.160) (0.025) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,348 2,271 2,271 2,271 
          
Panel B: Size of Window w=0.005 
RD Estimate 0.046*** 0.434** -0.084 0.033 0.098*** -13.03*** -4,222.5 -0.119 -0.012 
Original Var. (0.014) (0.213) (0.076) (0.020) (0.012) (2.40) (3,374.4) (0.100) (0.015) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 5,082 4,917 4,917 4,917 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
  
118 
 
Table 3.13: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Continuity-Based Framework (Using Mean Squared Error Optimal Bandwidth) 
Pre-Treatment 
Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
av_grade2012 attendance2012 age schoolprimary schoolrural cohort_size hmonthincome hhschooling hhfemale 
          
Panel A: Order p of Local Polynomial =2 (Local Quadratic Regression) 
RD Estimate: 0.025*** 0.282** -0.085* 0.031** 0.084*** -16.79*** -1,374.0 -0.126** -0.025*** 
Original Var. (0.010) (0.134) (0.051) (0.015) (0.011) (2.18) (1,987.0) (0.064) (0.010) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
97,336 143,886 109,592 97,240 78,797 61,704 126,062 127,140 117,446 
Bandwidth Size 0.094 0.139 0.106 0.093 0.075 0.060 0.126 0.127 0.117 
          
Panel B: Order p of Local Polynomial =1 (Local Linear Regression) 
RD Estimate: 0.020** 0.232* -0.037 0.016 0.081*** -14.29*** -739.5 -0.111* -0.020*** 
Original Var. (0.008) (0.120) (0.036) (0.011) (0.010) (1.82) (1,449.6) (0.057) (0.007) 
          
Number of 
Observations 
70,027 87,241 101,376 87,304 48,226 42,843 110,176 76,554 102,748 
Bandwidth Size 0.068 0.084 0.099 0.084 0.047 0.041 0.110 0.076 0.100 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
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Table 3.14: Theoretical Academic Cohort Size by Intervals of Relative Ranking 
Interval of 
Relative Ranking  
Minimum Academic  
Cohort Sizes Comments 
0.3 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 Only academic cohorts whose size is a multiple of 10 can have observations whose relative ranking equals 0.3. 
[0.298, 0.3[ 57, 67, 77, 87, 97 First academic cohort size where it is theoretically possible to have observations in 
each of these two intervals of relative ranking is 255. ]0.3, 0.302] 53, 63, 73, 83, 93 
[0.295, 0.3[ 27, 37, 44, 47, 54, 57 First academic cohort size where it is theoretically possible to have observations in 
each of these two intervals of relative ranking is 105. ]0.3, 0.305] 23, 33, 43, 46, 53, 56 
 
 
Table 3.15: Summary Statistics (Mean Values) by Intervals of Relative Ranking 
Variables (Year 2012) Interval of Relative Ranking 0.3 [0.298, 0.3[ ]0.3, 0.302] [0.295, 0.3[ ]0.3, 0.305] 
Cohort Size 43.63 123.35 115.79 96.01 88.12 
Average Grade 5.75 5.64 5.63 5.68 5.66 
Attendance (%) 93.81 92.48 92.38 92.76 92.74 
Primary School 0.808 0.566 0.595 0.655 0.683 
Age (Years) 12.16 12.84 12.76 12.58 12.50 
Rural School 0.278 0.060 0.008 0.081 0.062 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD
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Appendix I. Local Randomisation Regression Discontinuity Framework  
 
Using PFSE Scores as a Running Variable 
 
To implement a local randomisation RD framework, first I need to choose the size w of the 
window. The size of this window determines which observations of the running variable I use 
in the estimation. Hence, this RD design relies only on observations within the interval ]98–w, 
98+w] of PFSE scores. I choose two values of w (w=1 and w=2). The justification behind this 
selection is twofold. Firstly, these values are the two minimum w available (no decimal places 
are available for the PFSE scores in my dataset). Secondly, these values are still likely to be 
small enough for the assumption on which the local experiment RD framework relies to hold. 
I obtain the RD impact estimates (𝛽ହ) in this framework from the following regression:38 
 
𝑌௜ =  𝛼ହ  +  𝛽ହ 𝐼ହ௜ + 𝜀ହ௜,  
 
where 𝑌௜  is the average grade or attendance for student i in year t or t+1. 𝐼ହ௜ is a binary variable 
that takes a value of one if the PFSE score for student i in year t–1 is equal to or lower than 98. 
Otherwise, this variable takes a value of zero. The error term corresponds to 𝜀ହ௜. 
 
The first four columns of Table 3.16 show the results for average grade in 2013 and 2014 while 
the last four columns show the estimates for future attendance. The estimates for future average 
grade are all negative and statistically insignificant. The estimates range from –0.023 (–0.037σ) 
to –0.003 points (–0.005σ). The estimates for attendance in 2013 and 2014 are all close to zero 
and not statistically significant at any level of confidence. The estimates range from –0.244% 
(–0.026σ) to 0.071% (0.008σ). Overall, all these findings are similar to the ones observed in 
Table 3.3. For both types of outcomes, the estimates are closer to zero when w=2. In standard 
deviations, any estimate higher than 0.06σ will be statistically significant.  
 
Table 3.17 presents the local randomisation estimates for ten pre-treatment variables. To assess 
the internal validity of the estimates, I use the same regression but replace 𝑌௜ for each pre-
treatment variable within 𝑋௜ᇱ. These variables could not have been affected by the BLE in 2013.  
This step assesses the quality of the randomisation and, by extension, the internal validity of 
                                                          
38 This coefficient equals the difference in means in the threshold's neighbourhood. 𝛽ହ = 𝑌ത]ଽ଼ି୵,ଽ଼]. − 𝑌ത]ଽ଼,ଽ଼ା୵]. 
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the causal estimates. The first two columns show the average grade and attendance in 2012. 
The third to the tenth columns present characteristics of the students, and their schools and 
households. Overall, the students at each side of the threshold tend not to differ in terms of 
these ten variables. For both Panels, the joint test of statistical significance of these ten variables 
is not rejected. 
 
Why can a Local Randomisation RD Framework not be used for Average Grade? 
 
In its original format the average grade is a continuous variable. A local experiment RD 
framework could be implemented using this variable in a neighbourhood around the threshold. 
However, previous academic performance is highly correlated with future average grades and 
attendance. Consequently, the critical assumption of an RD local experiment framework is only 
likely to hold in a very small window around the threshold. Students who differ only by a very 
tiny fraction in their average grade in 2012 are more likely to be comparable. Unfortunately, 
the average grade in Chile is rounded at the schools and only one decimal place is reported to 
the central level. The smallest interval of units available is the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ neighbourhood. 
 
Table 3.18 presents the local randomisation RD estimates. These are equivalent to differences 
in means between units in the [T, T+0.1[ and [T–0.1, T[ intervals of average grade in 2012. 
Among the poorest 30%, all students in the first group received the BLE in 2013 while the 
second group did not. Every estimate is statistically significant at a 99% level. These 
coefficients range from 0.102 to 0.106 points for average grade, and between 0.399% and 
0.476% for attendance. These results cannot be interpreted as evidence of treatment effects 
from the BLE. The variation in treatment is not as good as random within the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ 
neighbourhood. Table 3.19 shows that students at each side of the threshold within this 
neighbourhood significantly differ regarding key pre-treatment variables such as their 
percentage of attendance in 2012 and the years of schooling of the head of their household. By 
construction, the students differ in their average grade in 2012. 
 
 
Potential outcomes are likely to be correlated with the running variable in the [T–0.1, T+0.1[ 
neighbourhood. Given the characteristics of my dataset, it not advisable to implement a local 
randomisation framework using average grades as a running variable. The estimates from this 
framework will not be useful, as they will encompass both treatment effects and selection bias. 
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Table 3.16: RD Estimates for Outcomes in Local Randomisation Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development 
  
Outcomes average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.023 -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.222 -0.146 -0.244 0.071 
Original Outcome (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.233) (0.170) (0.279) (0.195) 
         
RD Estimate: -0.037 -0.020 -0.020 -0.005 -0.026 -0.017 -0.026 0.008 
In Standard Deviations (0.028) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.030) (0.021) 
         
Number of Observations 3,539 6,901 3,515 6,840 3,539 6,901 3,515 6,840 
Size of Window w  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
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Table 3.17: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Development
Pre-Treatment 
Variables (Var.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
avg_grade2012 attendance2012 age male schoolpub schoolrural hmonthincome hsize  hhschooling hhfemale 
           
Panel A: Size of Window w=1 
RD Estimate: -0.019 -0.244 0.098* 0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -1,532.4 -0.014 -0.095 -0.004 
Original Var. (0.013) (0.192) (0.058) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (4,759.5) (0.048) (0.113) (0.017) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
3,567 3,567 3,567 3,430 3,567 3,567 3,430 3,430 3,430 3,430 
           
Panel B: Size of Window w=2 
RD Estimate: -0.009 -0.033 0.064 0.024** -0.003 -0.002 -1,915.9 0.002 -0.078 0.002 
Original Var. (0.009) (0.139) (0.043) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (3,227.2) (0.034) (0.082) (0.012) 
           
Number of 
Observations 
6,959 6,959 6,959 6,722 6,959 6,959 6,722 6,722 6,722 6,722 
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Table 3.18: RD Estimates for Outcomes in Local Randomisation Framework (w=0.1) 
Outcomes (1) (2) (3) (4) average_grade2013 average_grade2014 attendance2013 attendance2014 
     
RD Estimates: Original Outcome 0.106*** 
(0.004) 
0.102*** 
(0.004) 
0.399*** 
(0.067) 
0.476*** 
(0.076) 
Number of Observations 56,775 55,659 56,775 55,659 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Table 3.19: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework (w=0.1) 
Pre-Treatment Variables (Var.) (1) (2) (3) (4) average_grade2012 attendance2012 hmonthincome hhschooling 
     
RD Estimates: Original Var. 0.126*** 0.291*** 1,716.8* 0.085*** 
 (0.003) (0.055) (899.4) (0.027) 
Number of Observations 57,806 57,806 55,969 55,969 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD
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Appendix J. Effects of Receiving the BLE in 2014 on Educational Outcomes of 2015 
 
The body of the paper shows no statistically significant results for the BLE in 2013. A 
potential explanation for these results is that students were not aware enough about the 
implementation of the BLE in 2013. This was less likely to be the case after one year. 
Students who received the BLE in 2014 could have increased their effort and performance 
in 2015. This appendix explores the effects of receiving the BLE in 2014. In 2014 the BLE 
was implemented during September, three months before the end of the academic year. 
Given this late implementation, I only consider outcomes in 2015 in this assessment. 
 
In practice, the estimates for the BLE in 2014 remain not statistically different than zero. For 
average grade, Panel A in Table 3.20 shows that the estimates range from –0.016 to 0.004 
points. The standard errors of these estimates range from 0.010 to 0.020 points. Panel B in 
Table 3.20 presents the results for attendance. The estimates range from –0.042% to 0.041% 
while the standard errors are between 0.132% and 0.279%. The findings for the BLE in 2014 
are like those in 2013. I find no statistically significant effects. Consequently, if an effect 
exists for the BLE, it is likely to be small in magnitude and cannot be detected statistically. 
 
Table 3.20: RD Estimates for Outcomes in 2015 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
RD Framework and  
Running Variable (RV) 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Panel A: Estimates for Average Grade in 2015 
RD Estimates: -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 -0.013 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Number of Observations 3,094 6,023 103,352 67,235 133,102 89,748 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 33.84 21.77 0.300 0.200 
       
Panel B: Estimates for Attendance in 2015 
RD Estimates -0.009 -0.025 0.039 0.041 -0.042 0.021 
 (0.279) (0.197) (0.185) (0.132) (0.205) (0.152) 
Number of Observations 3,094 6,023 82,467 82,467 133,102 89,748 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 27.40 27.14 0.300 0.200 
       
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
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Appendix K. Effects of Receiving the BLE in 2013 for Population Subgroups 
 
I analyse the effect of receiving the BLE in 2013 on educational outcomes in 2014 for 
multiple subgroups. I divide the first two groups by income. The hypothesis to test in this 
case is that the BLE is most likely to have an impact at the lower end of the income 
distribution. There is limited information on this question for cash for grades programmes, 
though Galiani and McEwan (2013) and Maluccio and Flores (2005) find in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, respectively, that conditional cash transfers have a stronger impact on school 
enrolment among children living in the poorest households.  
 
Analysis by Income (PFSE Scores) 
 
Table 3.21 shows RD estimates for average grade and attendance in 2014 using average 
grade in 2012 as a running variable. The first row of Table 3.21 presents the results without 
using income subgroups. These results are equivalent to those shown in Table 3.7. Among 
those with a PFSE score equal to or lower than 98 points, I divide the sample into two. The 
first half is meant to include the poorest (approximately the bottom 15% in terms of income) 
while the other represents the second most deprived group (approximately between the 
bottom 15% to 30% in the income distribution).  
 
Table 3.21: RD Estimates for Outcomes in 2014 by Halves of Lowest PFSE Scores in 
Continuity-Based Framework (Using Average Grade in 2012 as a Running Variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME and MSD 
Subgroup Outcomes Average Grade in 2014 Attendance in 2014 
     
Total 0.010 0.017* 0.119 0.147 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.188) (0.141) 
1st Poorest Half 0.020 0.023** 0.234 0.277 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.257) (0.185) 
2nd Poorest Half -0.000 0.010 -0.008 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.256) (0.185) 
Bandwidth h 0.300 0.200 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial 2 1 2 1 
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Table 3.21 shows that the first group has more positive estimates than the second group. The 
impact estimates for average grade in 2014 are 0.020 and 0.023 for the poorest. Only one 
estimate is statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. Therefore, the significance 
is not robust to alternative specifications. The impact estimates for attendance in 2014 are 
0.234% and 0.277% for the poorest, neither of which is statistically significant. Conversely, 
the RD estimates for the second poorest half are close to zero for both types of outcomes. 
 
There is not enough evidence to claim that the BLE in 2013 had a statistically significant 
effect in 2014 on the poorest of the population. Given the standard errors shown, 0.012 and 
0.016 for average grade and 0.185% and 0.257% for attendance, if an effect of the BLE 
exists on the poorest then it is at most modest in size and could not be captured consistently 
with statistical certainty. 
 
Analysis by Gender and Educational Level 
 
The next two groups are boys and girls. The final two groups of students are those who were 
either in the fifth or sixth grade and between seventh and tenth grade in 2012, respectively. 
In 2014 the former group was most likely to be enrolled in primary education while the latter 
group was most likely to be enrolled in secondary education. These two pairs of groups are 
justified in terms of the cash for grades literature, where heterogeneous results have been 
observed.     
 
Table 3.22 and Table 3.23 present RD estimates for average grade and attendance in 2014, 
respectively. The first four columns in each table provide estimates that use PFSE scores as 
a running variable. The first and second columns focus on the local randomisation 
framework, while the third and fourth rely on the continuity-based framework. The last two 
columns of each table provide estimates for the continuity-based framework using the 
distance of average grade in 2012 as a running variable. The first row of each table provides 
the estimates without using subgroups. These estimates are equal to those presented in 
Tables 3.3, 3.7 and 3.16. 
 
From Table 3.22 it can be seen that girls have less negative estimates than boys in all the 
specifications and frameworks I use and that students between the seventh and tenth grades 
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have mostly lower estimates relative to younger students. Only the local linear regressions 
using average grade as a running variable provide some statistically significant estimates. 
The estimates by subgroup mostly remain close to zero and are statistically insignificant. 
Overall, these estimates are not very different from those of the entire sample. 
 
There is less consistent behaviour by subgroup for attendance in 2014. Table 3.23 shows that 
the RD estimates for boys are lower when I use the PFSE as a running variable but higher 
when the estimations rely upon previous academic performance. I observe a similar case for 
students in the fifth and sixth grades in 2012 relative to their peers in higher grades. Two 
estimates for the former subgroup show some degree of statistical significance in one type 
of RD framework.  
 
Overall, the estimates by gender and educational level remain close to zero and are 
statistically insignificant for both outcomes. Naturally, the analysis by subgroup has wider 
confidence intervals given the smaller samples. The standard errors for average grade vary 
from a maximum of 0.029 points to a minimum of 0.012 points. Thus, the analysis by the 
subgroups of gender and educational level could have identified any estimate higher than 
0.057 and as low as 0.024 points in average grade as statistically significant. Concerning 
attendance, the standard errors of the estimates range from 0.181% to 0.406%. Differences 
at the threshold higher than 0.800% and as low as 0.355% could have been statistically 
significant then. 
 
For both types of outcomes, in the few cases where I observe statistically significant 
estimates, the significance is sensitive to the RD framework I use. Additionally, within each 
RD framework, the significance is also sensitive to the specification I utilise. Given my 
results and analysis, if an effect of the BLE exists by gender and educational level it is highly 
unlikely to be large. Any potential effect of this kind could not be captured with statistical 
certainty in this assessment.   
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Table 3.22: RD Estimates for Average Grade in 2014 (by Subgroups) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Table 3.23: RD Estimates for Attendance in 2014 (by Subgroups) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean ME & MSD 
 
Subgroups 
RD Framework and Running Variable 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total -0.012 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 0.010 0.017* 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Boys -0.030 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 0.010 0.017 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
Girls -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.024** 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
5th to 6th Grade in 2012 0.008 -0.002 -0.000 0.007 0.023 0.028** 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) 
7th to 10th Grade in 2012 -0.017 -0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.008 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 24.96 24.87 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
Subgroups 
RD Framework and Running Variable 
Local Randomisation 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: PFSE 
Continuity-Based 
RV: Average Grade 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Total -0.244 0.071 0.108 0.106 0.119 0.147 
 (0.279) (0.195) (0.159) (0.143) (0.188) (0.141) 
Boys -0.359 -0.049 -0.053 -0.060 0.268 0.142 
 (0.391) (0.279) (0.236) (0.214) (0.270) (0.205) 
Girls -0.164 0.101 0.178 0.177 -0.044 0.114 
 (0.406) (0.272) (0.210) (0.187) (0.257) (0.184) 
5th to 6th Grade in 2012 -0.197 0.022 -0.012 -0.008 0.438* 0.388** 
 (0.382) (0.284) (0.215) (0.192) (0.254) (0.181) 
7th to 10th Grade in 2012 -0.201 0.130 0.164 0.160 0.021 0.067 
 (0.362) (0.249) (0.208) (0.187) (0.246) (0.185) 
Window w / Bandwidth h  1.00 2.00 35.58 21.12 0.300 0.200 
Order p of Polynomial NA NA 2 1 2 1 
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Chapter 4 (Don’t) Call me by Your Name: Reassessing Threats to 
Internal Validity in Regression Discontinuity Designs 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper elaborates on threats to internal validity, administrative sorting and intermediate 
contamination, which have been overlooked in the regression discontinuity (RD) literature. 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) claim that if individuals are unable to precisely manipulate the 
running variable then variation in treatment near the threshold is as good as random. The 
paper shows that variation in treatment assignment is not always as good as random even 
without manipulation. This can be the case when administrative procedures, beyond 
individuals’ control and knowledge, affect their position near the threshold non-randomly. 
If administrative sorting is not recognised it can be mistaken as manipulation. Timing also 
matters in RD designs. Intermediate contamination can emerge if a substantial time lag exists 
between the realisation of the running variable and its use in treatment. In this case, the paper 
highlights the value of checking variables related to this time lapse in RD falsification tests.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In all RD designs some exogenous variation in treatment assignment occurs around a 
threshold of a running variable. Two types of RD designs exist: sharp and fuzzy. In sharp 
RD designs, treatment is entirely explained by the running variable. In fuzzy RD designs, 
the running variable is a relevant factor, but not the only one, in explaining treatment status. 
 
In the context of RD designs to evaluate the impact of cash transfers, the running variable 
generally corresponds to an index and the threshold is a specific index score. The index score 
of each household (or individual) corresponds to their value in the running variable. The 
index is used as the eligibility criteria for the cash transfer. A sharp RD design is suitable for 
causal inference only if all households that meet the eligibility criteria (generally having a 
score below the threshold) receive the cash transfer and if the households that do not meet 
the criteria (those with a score above the threshold) never receive the cash transfer. 
 
In RD designs, causal inference relies on the assumption that the average outcome for units 
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marginally at one side of the threshold represents a valid counterfactual for the group just at 
the other side of threshold (Hahn et al., 2001; Lee, 2008). This rationale allows us to interpret 
any discontinuity in the conditional expectation of the outcome (as a function of the running 
variable) at the threshold as causal evidence of the treatment (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).  
 
RD designs are a popular approach for causal inference. Consequently, the methodological 
literature in RD designs has been developing quickly over the last decade.39 Despite its 
extensive use for causal inference, practical applications of RD are partly determined by 
researchers’ interpretation of the methodology (Sekhon & Titiunik, 2017). Researchers 
follow different steps in RD applications although there is a common understanding that 
treatment assignment is as good as random in a neighbourhood close to the threshold. 
 
As Cattaneo et al. (2018a) explain, applied practitioners of RD designs choose between a 
local randomisation or a continuity-based framework. Researchers who adopt the former 
framework use the logic of experimental designs to recover causal estimates. They take the 
simple average of the outcome in a small window on either side of the index’ threshold. 
Hence, the impact estimate is equivalent to the difference in means across the cutoff point. 
Conversely, researchers relying on the continuity-based framework use regression at each 
side of the threshold to predict the limiting value of the outcome precisely at the threshold.   
 
Further elaboration about the relative merits, required assumptions and practical applications 
of these two frameworks is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I introduce these 
frameworks to support the idea that central aspects of RD designs are still subject to debate. 
Further developments and clarifications of the RD design represent a valuable contribution.  
 
This paper highlights two threats to internal validity that have been relatively overlooked in 
the RD literature. By doing so, the paper contributes to further conceptual clarification of 
RD designs. The first threat, administrative sorting, has received little attention and therefore 
represents the most novel part of the paper. The second, intermediate contamination, 
reinforces a threat that has been broadly identified but can still be overlooked in RD 
falsification tests. I introduce these two threats empirically. I select this approach, relative to 
simulations, to illustrate RD design challenges in real-world contexts. In this paper, these 
                                                          
39 For a detailed summary see Cattaneo and Escanciano (2017). 
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are three evaluations of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) on adolescents’ school enrolment 
in Chile. The paper’s findings are useful for empirical applications in both RD frameworks. 
 
Manipulation of the running variable is one of the two main conceptual concerns in the 
application of RD designs (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The issue is that individuals with a 
stake might try to manipulate the running variable close to the threshold (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009; Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; McCrary, 2008; Skovron & Titiunik, 2015) and sort 
themselves around it (Cattaneo, Jansson, & Ma, 2017; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Manipulation 
threatens the plausibility of the continuity assumption on which RD designs rely.40 Thus, the 
analysis of individuals’ ability to precisely manipulate the running variable becomes central. 
This rationale explains why the running variable density test proposed by McCrary (2008) 
has been interpreted, as the title of his article suggests, as a test of manipulation of the 
running variable. Furthermore, Imbens and Lemieux (2008) later stated that: “a discontinuity 
(in the density) is suggestive of violations of the non-manipulation assumption” (p.27). 
 
One point that is highlighted in Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) influential paper in RD designs 
is that “if individuals are unable to precisely manipulate the running variable, then variation 
in treatment (assignment) near the threshold is as good as random” (p.283). However, my 
paper shows that variation in treatment assignment is not always as good as random in the 
absence of manipulation and that a McCrary test can fail for different reasons than 
individuals’ induced sorting. This can be the case when administrative procedures, beyond 
the control and knowledge of individuals, affect their position near the threshold non-
randomly, and by doing so, these actions threaten the continuity assumption of RD designs.  
 
Sorting is not a new concept in the RD methods literature. However, the concept has been 
intrinsically tied to individuals’ manipulation (McCrary, 2008), optimising behaviour in 
response to rules (Lee & Lemieux, 2010), and self-selection (Cattaneo et al., 2017). In other 
words, manipulation and sorting have been used as synonyms of deliberate human action to 
                                                          
40 In the continuity-based RD framework, the running variable can be associated with average potential 
outcomes, but this association is assumed to be smooth or continuous at the threshold (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008). This is the continuity assumption. Meanwhile, the underlying assumption on which the local 
randomisation RD framework relies is that the average potential outcomes are uncorrelated with the running 
variable within a small neighbourhood close to the threshold (Cattaneo et al., 2018b). The continuity-based 
framework is most commonly employed in practice (Cattaneo et al., 2018a). Given this, I will use the continuity 
assumption concept generically throughout this document. Unless I state otherwise, the concept will refer to 
the vital assumption needed for any RD framework to provide unbiased causal estimates. 
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locate themselves across the threshold. In this sense, administrative sorting is different from 
the threat of manipulation.41 Both represent a threat to the continuity assumption in RD 
designs. However, manipulation is deliberate while administrative sorting is not intentional.  
 
I define then administrative sorting by three features. The first is being the result of 
administrative procedures that affect the position of individuals near the threshold non-
randomly. The second is that these actions are beyond the control and knowledge of 
individuals and do not deliberately intend to locate individuals across the threshold. The 
third is that these procedures threaten the continuity assumption on which RD designs rely. 
 
Administrative sorting is not the only threat preventing variation in treatment being as good 
as random in the absence of individuals' manipulation. Timing also matters in RD designs. 
If a substantial time lag exists between the realisation of the running variable and its actual 
use to assign the treatment of interest, then intermediate contamination could emerge. In this 
scenario, units near the threshold are no longer comparable before the treatment of interest 
occurs, and consequently, RD designs risk providing biased estimates. 
 
The second main conceptual concern in RD designs highlighted by Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008) is “the possibility of other changes at the same threshold of the running variable” (p. 
631). The example that Imbens and Lemieux (2008) give concerns individuals who become 
eligible for discounts at cultural institutions at the age of 65. In this case, using age as a 
running variable in an RD design to estimate the effects of discounts is problematic. Changes 
in attendance at cultural institutions at one side of the threshold might be explained by other 
factors, such as free transport, which also affect individuals who have just turned 65.   
 
The most common guidelines given about how to conduct falsification tests in RD designs 
are to observe placebo (Skovron & Titiunik, 2015) or pseudo outcomes (Imbens & Lemieux, 
2008), variables determined after treatment but known not to be affected by the treatment, 
and to test the quality of the random assignment for variables determined before treatment.42  
                                                          
41 Camacho and Conover (2011) discuss potential cases of manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare 
programmes. The authors argue that the index in which the system relies on, in theory, can be manipulated in 
alternative ways to make individuals eligible for social benefits. Among these are respondents lying in answers 
that affect their index score or people in positions of power changing the answers of respondents or their final 
index scores. All these examples represent deliberate human actions to locate individuals across the threshold.  
42 The falsification tests of each RD framework are run in the same way as for the outcomes of interest.  
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For the latter group of variables, multiple definitions exist. Some authors use the concept of 
pre-treatment (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Cattaneo & Escanciano, 2017) or pre-determined 
variables/covariates (Cattaneo et al., 2018a; Skovron & Titiunik, 2015). Other authors use 
the term baseline characteristics (Lee, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010; McCrary, 2008), 
variables determined before the realisation of the running variable or randomisation.  
 
These guidelines make sense when the realisation of the running variable and treatment 
occur close together (for example elections and politicians taking office or test scores and 
scholarship decisions). In this context the definition of baseline characteristics is equivalent 
to pre-treatment variables. In these cases, observing variables determined before treatment 
will adequately assess the quality of randomisation near the threshold. As well, assessing 
placebo outcomes can help to determine whether other changes at the same threshold took 
place during or after treatment. 
 
However, these guidelines are less appropriate when the running variable was in place well 
before treatment assignment and proper treatment took place. In this case, it might be 
preferable to classify pre-treatment or pre-determined variables between: i) baseline 
characteristics, and ii) intermediate variables, those that could have been affected by the 
running variable, especially around the threshold of interest, before the treatment occurred. 
 
This classification is not aimless. The first group of variables, unless any type of sorting 
occurred, should have a continuous or smooth distribution at the threshold at the moment of 
the realisation of the running variable. However, only the second group of variables could 
have been affected by intermediate contamination, changes happening at one side of the 
threshold between the realisation of the running variable and treatment. These changes are 
caused by the usage of the running variable and threshold within the described time frame.  
 
Going back to the previous example, let us assume that no other changes happen when 
individuals turn 65 years old apart from becoming eligible for discounts at cultural 
institutions. In the RD falsification tests we use diverse demographics (such as education 
and race) as pre-treatment variables and time spent in health-related activities as a placebo 
outcome. This approach may miss other changes that happened in the past, for example a 
one-off incentive to retire given precisely one year ago, which affected only individuals aged 
64 or older. In this new example, the RD estimates of discounts on attendance at cultural 
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events are likely to be contaminated by the one-off incentive to retire given in the past. 
 
Intermediate contamination poses a threat to RD designs that use age as a running variable 
at a later life stage, for example those evaluating the effect of the legal minimum drinking 
age. Age depends on the date of birth, which affects the timing of entry into education 
(Blanden, Del Bono, Hansen, & Rabe, 2017; Crawford, Dearden, & Meghir, 2010; Elder, 
2010; Fredriksson & Ockert, 2005). Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda (2007) explain intuitively 
and mathematically how intermediate contamination may affect length of school estimates. 
Despite some researchers’ awareness of this threat, the current RD falsification test 
guidelines may overlook it. This highlights the importance of strengthening RD designs that 
rely on running variables determined long before treatment by providing evidence that 
observations at one side of the threshold are not affected by intermediate contamination. 
 
The three main conceptual contributions of this paper are as follows: i) administrative sorting 
and intermediate contamination are overlooked threats to internal validity in RD designs, ii) 
lack of individuals’ manipulation does not translate automatically into variation in treatment 
assignment being as good as random, and iii) distinguishing among pre-treatment variables 
(between baseline characteristics and intermediate variables) in falsification tests is 
beneficial to assess whether intermediate contamination is affecting the internal validity of 
the RD design.  
 
An additional contribution of this paper is that it raises issues that applied RD practitioners 
can encounter. Administrative sorting and intermediate contamination may invalidate RD 
designs in contexts where indexes such as proxy means tests (PMTs) are used as running 
variables.43 In Colombia, Barrientos and Villa (2015) use a running variable and threshold 
previously used by a school fee reduction programme (Barrera-Osorio, Linden, & Urquiola, 
2007) to assess the impact of the CCT Familias en Acción. In Ecuador, Ponce and Bedi 
(2010) do not consider whether administrative sorting explains why more individuals are 
found above the threshold of a CCT. The authors only claim that this difference could not 
be attributed to manipulation. Centro de Microdatos (2012) faces a related situation in Chile. 
At least 20 developing countries use PMTs for targeting (Australian Aid, 2011; Brown et 
                                                          
43 A proxy means test refers to a system or situation where information correlated with income is used in a 
formula to proxy income. The formula (parameters and weights) is obtained through statistical analysis and 
tends to use data that is easily observable by public officials (Coady et al., 2004; Grosh & Baker, 1995). 
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al., 2016; Coady et al., 2004). Hence, this paper could also prove useful for designing new 
social policies using PMTs that are expected to be evaluated with RD designs. 
 
My findings highlight the importance of fully understanding the data generation process of 
a running variable. If administrative rules, not individual manipulation, explain the shape of 
an index density near the threshold then useful variation for identification may still exist. 
Potential solutions can arise then from an appropriate diagnostic. For example, the causes 
behind administrative sorting can potentially be fixed for future versions of the index and 
facilitate the implementation of an RD design. In other cases, when treatment probabilities 
are not affected, administrative sorting may not invalidate a retrospective RD design entirely. 
If administrative sorting is not recognised correctly, it can be mistaken as manipulation, 
which could potentially lead to viable present or future research RD designs being discarded.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second and third sections present the cases 
studied. Both sections have a similar aim, which is to introduce one example each of 
administrative sorting and intermediate contamination when implementing an RD design. 
The second section focuses on a CCT called BARE, which used the IVSE index for targeting. 
The third section builds on two CCTs (SUF and AS) that used the SPF index, although with 
different thresholds, to allocate the transfers. Both sections have a similar structure. The last 
section of the paper integrates the discussion of the previous three sections and concludes. 
 
4.2 Case 1: Beca de Apoyo a la Retención Escolar  
 
This section presents the case of Beca de Apoyo a la Retención Escolar (BARE). The first 
subsection describes the rollout of the CCT and the IVSE index used for targeting. The 
second part presents the data sources and provides summary statistics. The third subsection 
develops a case of administrative sorting. In this case, administrative sorting invalidates the 
RD design as individuals near the IVSE threshold used by BARE are not similar. The fourth 
subsection uses a factor of the IVSE index, day of birth, in an RD design.44 This subsection 
elaborates on a threat to identification associated with intermediate contamination.  
 
                                                          
44 I use the concepts date of birth and day of birth in this chapter. The date of birth refers to the exact date in 
which an individual is born, including the year. The day of birth or birthday only considers the day and month. 
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4.2.1 Programme and Targeting Description45 
 
BARE Overview and Rollout 
 
BARE is the smallest CCT in Chile; it reached only 18,000 students in 2014. This cash 
transfer is focused exclusively on secondary school students. The goal of BARE is to 
encourage these students to stay in school. In 2014, it consisted of an annual total monetary 
contribution of $178,000 CLP (approximately $280 USD on June 30th 2015).  
 
The target population of BARE is secondary school students at risk of dropping out. This 
concept is operationalised through the IVSE index. Each year those enrolled secondary 
school students with the highest IVSE scores become eligible to be BARE new entrants. 
Eligible students are identified at the national level at the beginning of the academic year. 
Soon after the year starts, the people in charge of BARE in the field have to actively locate 
these students in their schools and encourage them to apply. There is no perfect match 
between eligible students and BARE recipients, as not all eligible students are encouraged 
to apply and a small fraction of non-eligible students end up accessing BARE. 
 
Due to BARE’s limited budget, new entrants only come from “targeted schools”. These have 
been derived from a list of schools with high school dropout rates. Only public and private 
subsidised schools in the traditional education system are targeted. No student from the adult 
education system or private schools can be a new BARE entrant. Additionally, by design, 
students in their last grade of secondary education cannot be a BARE new entrant.  
 
The IVSE Index 
 
In 2014 and 2015 BARE’s targeting index, the IVSE, was derived from six variables that 
are highly correlated with observing a future drop out. I present these variables in Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 The information in this subsection comes from an official report (Opazo et al., 2015). 
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Table 4.1: IVSE Variables 
Variables Description 
Attendance Attendance rate (%) in the previous academic year 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋46 Difference between age and expected age for the grade (months) 
Welfare Recipient Student’s household in Chile Solidario or Ingreso Ético Familiar 
Paternity Student is a father or a mother 
Pregnancy Student is pregnant 
Mother Schooling Mother’s years of schooling 
Source: author’s compilation based on official documents, Ministry of Education 
 
Each of the variables of the index was transformed into a score using a function 𝑓௞(∙). After 
applying 𝑓௞(∙), IVSE scores for each student i were calculated using the following formula: 
 
𝐼𝑉𝑆𝐸௜ = 0.165𝑓ଵ(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒௜) + 0.135𝑓ଶ(⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒௜⌋) + 0.21𝑓ଷ(𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡௜)  
+  0.21𝑓ଷ(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦௜) + 0.21𝑓ଷ(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦௜)
+  0.07𝑓ସ(𝑀𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔௜) 
 
The maximum possible IVSE score was 182.650 and the minimum score was 30.775. The 
threshold used to determine eligibility changed between 2014 and 2015. In 2014 those with 
a score equal to or above 84.625 were eligible to be a new entrant for BARE, while in 2015 
only those students with a score no lower than 84.150 became eligible for BARE. 
 
4.2.2 Data, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data and Sample 
 
My analysis focuses on the subgroup of potential BARE new entrants in 2014 and 2015. The 
sample contains only students who were: i) not BARE renewals, ii) enrolled in one of the 
first three grades of secondary education, and iii) enrolled in a “targeted school”. 
 
My analysis relies on administrative data provided by Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y 
Becas (JUNAEB). At my request JUNAEB created two datasets (2014 and 2015 cohorts), 
which contain for each student from the ninth to eleventh grades: i) personal information 
(such as gender, date of birth, and previous academic performance), ii) each variable of the 
IVSE index, iii) their IVSE score, iv) whether the student became a BARE recipient during 
the year, and, v) future academic performance and enrolment in secondary education. 
                                                          
46 ⌊𝑋⌋ represents the floor function. This function returns the integer part of a number. For example, ⌊2.9⌋=2. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics by cohort and by IVSE scores. Panel A shows that 
adolescents scoring above the IVSE score used to determine eligibility were more likely to 
receive BARE afterwards. In 2014, 49.2% of adolescents scoring no less than 84.625 in the 
IVSE were recipients of the CCT later in the year. Conversely, less than 1% of adolescents 
scoring below this threshold ended up being beneficiaries. In 2015 (with a threshold of 
84.150) these percentages are 40.1% and 1.8%, respectively. 
 
Panel B shows that students scoring above the thresholds had lower levels of attendance, 
were more likely to be lagging in their pathway to graduation, were more likely to belong to 
a household whose members were welfare recipients, were more likely to be parents or 
pregnant, and had mothers with fewer years of schooling. These facts are unsurprising as 
these six variables are part of the IVSE formula.  
 
Panels C and D show that adolescents above the IVSE threshold were (compared to those 
below this threshold): slightly less likely to be male and more likely to be older, more likely 
to be enrolled in a public school and ninth grade. The group with higher IVSE scores also 
had a lower average grade. Additionally, a smaller fraction had progressed to the following 
grade in the previous year. Finally, minor differences across groups exist in the proportion 
who were enrolled in technical-professional schools and resided in the metropolitan region. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values) by BARE Cohorts and IVSE scores 
Variables 
BARE Cohorts 
2014 2015 2014 & 2015 
< 84.625 >=84.625 Total < 84.150 >=84.150 Total < Cutoff >=Cutoff Total 
Panel A: IVSE Score and BARE Recipient 
IVSE 48.92 94.29 51.60 50.55 96.02 53.55 49.72 95.19 52.55 
BARE 0.005 0.492 0.034 0.018 0.401 0.043 0.011 0.445 0.038 
Panel B: IVSE Variables 
Attendance (%) 89.5 68.4 88.3 90.6 70.1 89.2 90.0 69.3 88.7 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (Months) 0.39 15.31 1.27 -0.13 14.87 0.85 0.14 15.08 1.07 
Welfare Recipient 0.236 0.935 0.278 0.301 0.927 0.342 0.268 0.931 0.309 
Parent 0.001 0.063 0.005 0.001 0.132 0.010 0.001 0.099 0.007 
Pregnancy 0.001 0.058 0.005 0.000 0.064 0.004 0.001 0.061 0.004 
Mother Schooling (Years)47 9.54 7.92 9.45 10.07 8.28 9.95 9.81 8.11 9.70 
Panel C: Demographic Information 
Male 0.525 0.494 0.523 0.513 0.498 0.512 0.519 0.496 0.517 
Age (Years) 16.06 17.19 16.13 16.00 17.17 16.08 16.03 17.18 16.10 
Metropolitan Region 0.287 0.278 0.287 0.261 0.263 0.261 0.275 0.270 0.274 
Panel D: Academic Information 
Technical-Professional School 0.513 0.506 0.512 0.519 0.513 0.518 0.516 0.510 0.515 
Public School 0.694 0.788 0.700 0.708 0.775 0.712 0.701 0.781 0.706 
Ninth Grade 0.335 0.407 0.339 0.350 0.402 0.353 0.342 0.404 0.346 
Tenth Grade 0.347 0.316 0.345 0.336 0.314 0.334 0.341 0.315 0.340 
Eleventh Grade 0.319 0.277 0.316 0.314 0.284 0.312 0.317 0.280 0.314 
Previous Average Grade  5.20 4.28 5.15 5.31 4.73 5.27 5.25 4.51 5.21 
Progressed Previous Year 0.905 0.585 0.886 0.924 0.624 0.904 0.914 0.605 0.895 
Number of Observations 245,307 15,372 260,679 233,442 16,445 249,887 478,749 31,817 510,566 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
                                                          
47 This variable has a 6% to 7% of observations that are not available. The percentage of data that is not available does not vary depending on IVSE scores (above and below 
the cutoff). 
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4.2.3 Administrative Sorting Invalidates the RD Design 
 
Can IVSE be used as a Running Variable? 
 
A researcher interested in obtaining the causal relationship between being a BARE recipient 
and future enrolment in secondary education needs a suitable identification strategy. An 
intuitive approach is to implement a fuzzy RD design using IVSE scores as a running 
variable. Figure 4.1 shows that in principle this method is appealing. IVSE scores are a strong 
predictor of being a recipient of BARE in 2014 and 2015. In particular, BARE recipient 
status changes abruptly after crossing the respective IVSE threshold used each year. 
 
Figure 4.1: BARE Recipient by IVSE Scores (by Different Years)48 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
However, having a strong relationship between the running variable and participation in 
BARE is not sufficient to recover unbiased estimates in a fuzzy RD design. It is also required 
that, at least close to the threshold, the variation in eligibility for BARE is as good as random. 
If RD falsification tests are passed there is an increased likelihood that the continuity 
assumption will hold. If I use a local randomisation RD framework, then I should show 
balance in pre-treatment variables as in experimental designs. Not observing balance among 
these variables would cast doubt on the comparability of units close to the cutoff point.    
 
Table 4.3 presents comparisons of means for pre-treatment variables for adolescents just 
                                                          
48 I derive the continuous lines from a quadratic regression. The parameters of the regressions vary at each side 
of the threshold. The dots correspond to the average of BARE recipient for each non-overlapping bin of one 
point of the IVSE score. The vertical dashed lines are the thresholds used by BARE to determine eligibility. 
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above and just below the IVSE thresholds. These two groups of adolescents differ 
substantially. For example, in 2014 adolescents scoring between 84.625 and 85 in the IVSE 
(and therefore who were eligible for BARE) had on average (relative to adolescents scoring 
between 84.150 but lower than 84.625): lower levels of attendance in the previous year 
(0.068 percent points), a lower ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (10.13 months) and mothers with more years of 
schooling (3.78 years). All these differences are statistically significant at a 99% level of 
confidence. 
 
A similar phenomenon can be observed in 2015. Adolescents scoring between 84.150 but 
lower than 84.625 (who were thus eligible for BARE) had different pre-treatment variables 
relative to those scoring above 83.500 and below 84.150. The former group had on average 
(relative to the latter group): more levels of attendance in the previous year (0.077 percentage 
points), a higher ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (13.17 months) and mothers with fewer years of schooling (4.68 
years).   
 
Statistically significant differences between groups can be observed not only in variables 
that are part of the IVSE index but also in other demographic and academic characteristics. 
For example, in 2014, adolescents just above the threshold (compared to those just below): 
were more likely to live in the metropolitan region, were less likely to be in eleventh grade, 
and had on average lower grades and rates of progress to the following grade in 2013. In 
2015, those adolescents just above the threshold (relative to those just below): were less 
likely to live in the metropolitan region, were more likely to be enrolled in a technical-
professional school, were more likely to be in the eleventh grade and had a higher academic 
performance in 2014. All these differences are significant at a 99% level of confidence.  
 
To provide unbiased causal estimates, the local randomisation framework requires 
independence between potential outcomes and the running variable within a neighbourhood 
near the threshold (Cattaneo et al., 2018b). A potential explanation for the lack of balance in 
average pre-treatment variables is that the neighbourhood I use is too large. In other words, 
as the IVSE neighbourhood increases it becomes less likely to observe variation in treatment 
assignment being as good as random and more likely to observe differences in pre-treatment 
variables below and above the threshold. To avoid this problem, I compare these variables 
only at the threshold where it should be guaranteed that variation is as good as random. 
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The continuity-based framework in RD designs is suitable for this purpose. In this approach, 
the distribution of each pre-treatment variable along the running variable should not show a 
discontinuity exactly at the threshold. If there are no such discontinuities, then it is more 
likely that variation in eligibility is as good as random at the IVSE threshold.  
 
Using local regressions, I test for discontinuities for multiple pre-treatment variables 
following Cattaneo et al. (2018a). The regression model I use in this part is as follows: 
 
𝑋ଵ௜ =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐼ଵ௜ +  𝛾𝑍ଵ௜ + 𝜃𝑍ଵ௜𝐼ଵ௜  +  𝜔𝑍ଵ௜ଶ + 𝛿𝑍ଵ௜ଶ𝐼ଵ௜ +  𝜀ଵ௜ , 
 
where 𝑋ଵ௜ is a pre-treatment variable for adolescent i, 𝑍ଵ௜ is the difference between the IVSE 
score for adolescent i and the IVSE threshold. 𝐼ଵ௜ is an indicator function, which takes the 
value of one if 𝑍ଵ௜ ≥ 0  and zero otherwise. 𝜀ଵ௜ represents the error term of the regression. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the RD falsification tests for the continuity-based 
framework. The first two columns show the results for the 2014 BARE cohort. The next two 
columns focus in the 2015 group while in the last two columns I pool both BARE cohorts. 
Each pair of estimates vary by the size of bandwidth I use in the regression. Almost all the 
𝛽 coefficients are statistically significant at a 99% level of confidence. Therefore, I cannot 
assume that a continuous conditional distribution exists for each pre-treatment variable at 
the IVSE threshold used by BARE. Hence, the continuity assumption is unlikely to hold in 
this case and the treatment estimates are likely to be biased.  
 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 suggest that the variation in BARE eligibility in 2014 and 2015 
cannot be considered as good as random near each IVSE threshold. There are systematic 
differences in adolescents across the thresholds each year. For example, in 2015 adolescents 
just above the threshold (compared to those just below) had a higher ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ and attendance. 
These differences will affect impact estimates in ways that are not straightforward to 
anticipate as these variables are negatively and positively correlated with future school 
enrolment, respectively.  
 
To summarise, this part of the subsection has shown that the IVSE scores are not useful as a 
running variable in an RD design. The following part explains the reason for these findings.  
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Table 4.3: Mean Values by IVSE Scores and RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Local Randomisation Framework 
Pre-Treatment Variables  
BARE Cohorts 
2014 2015 
< 84.625 
& >=84.15 
>=84.625 & 
<85 
Difference 
in Means 
p-value 
< 
< 84.15 
& >83.5 
>=84.15 & 
< 84.625 
Difference 
in Means 
p-value 
< 
Panel A: IVSE Variables         
Attendance (%) 96.1 89.3 -6.8 0.000 88.5 96.2 7.7 0.000 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (Months) 27.63 17.50 -10.13 0.000 15.08 28.25 13.17 0.000 
Welfare Recipient 0.986 0.979 -0.007 0.408 0.984 0.986 0.001 0.875 
Parent 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.998 0.016 0.014 -0.001 0.875 
Mother Schooling (Years) 5.63 9.42 3.78 0.000 10.86 6.18 -4.68 0.000 
Panel B: Demographic Information 
Male 0.609 0.609 0.000 1.000 0.610 0.650 0.040 0.224 
Age (Years) 18.35 17.24 -1.102 0.000 17.09 18.29 1.203 0.000 
Metropolitan Region 0.065 0.197 0.132 0.000 0.252 0.117 -0.135 0.000 
Panel C: Academic and School Information 
Technical Professional School 0.552 0.506 -0.047 0.144 0.485 0.593 0.107 0.001 
Public School 0.683 0.724 0.041 0.157 0.739 0.689 -0.050 0.102 
Ninth Grade 0.411 0.393 -0.017 0.581 0.352 0.439 0.086 0.009 
Tenth Grade 0.218 0.419 0.201 0.000 0.418 0.219 -0.199 0.000 
Eleventh Grade 0.371 0.188 -0.183 0.000 0.230 0.342 0.112 0.000 
Previous Average Grade  5.07 4.83 -0.238 0.000 4.93 5.08 0.157 0.000 
Progressed Previous Year 0.827 0.734 -0.093 0.001 0.765 0.801 0.035 0.207 
Number of Observations 353 793 1,146  579 351 930  
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
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Table 4.4: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Continuity-Based Framework (Observed IVSE as a Running Variable) 
Pre-Treatment Variables BARE Cohorts (Columns Additionally Vary by Bandwidth Size) 2014 2015 2014 & 2015 
Panel A: IVSE Variables 
Attendance (%) -1.574*** 4.724*** 7.566*** 12.072*** 3.575*** 8.163*** 
 (0.368) (0.274) (0.294) (0.227) (0.231) (0.174) 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (Months) -5.116*** 6.403*** 13.337*** 15.871*** 5.579*** 11.104*** 
 (0.511) (0.324) (0.391) (0.282) (0.315) (0.211) 
Mother Schooling (Years) 0.565*** -0.587*** -0.210 -2.967*** 0.155 -2.028*** 
 (0.181) (0.111) (0.211) (0.130) (0.140) (0.087) 
Panel B: Non IVSE Variables 
Male 0.029 0.064*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.072*** 0.100*** 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) 
Metropolitan Region 0.039 -0.144*** -0.104*** -0.174*** -0.053*** -0.160*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) 
Ninth Grade -0.011 0.134*** 0.100*** 0.227*** 0.037** 0.176*** 
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) 
Previous Average Grade -0.101*** -0.149*** 0.027 -0.034* -0.053*** -0.106*** 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) 
Progressed Previous Year -0.018 -0.107*** -0.046** -0.110*** -0.040*** -0.109*** 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) 
Bandwidth Size 5 10 5 10 5 10 
Number of Observations 15,540 41,183 18,306 51,598 33,846 92,781 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
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Understanding the IVSE´s Lack of Suitability as a Running Variable 
 
A potential reason for my previous findings is that adolescents sorted themselves above the 
threshold, making themselves eligible for BARE. However, IVSE scores are hard for 
adolescents to manipulate as the variables from which the index is derived are difficult to 
manipulate. For example, mother´s schooling, parenthood and pregnancy decisions are 
unlikely to be affected by BARE. ∆𝑎𝑔𝑒 is a variable that partly depends on the date of birth. 
Being a welfare recipient depends on the characteristics of the adolescent´s household and 
is determined after complex and long assessments.  
 
The variable that adolescents could exercise more control over is attendance. However, 
manipulation of attendance does not imply necessarily precise manipulation of IVSE scores. 
Even if some adolescents could manipulate their attendance, they would need to have precise 
knowledge of the structure of the IVSE formula, the weights assigned to each variable 
(which are not public), and the threshold to be used in the future by BARE (which changed 
between 2014 and 2015) to precisely manipulate their eligibility. 
 
For all the given reasons, the lack of suitability of the IVSE as a running variable for an RD 
design seems surprising. Features of the design of the IVSE cause adolescents just above 
and just below the threshold to be dissimilar. Table 4.5 illustrates this point.  
 
Table 4.5: Three Types of Adolescents With IVSE Scores Close to the BARE Threshold 
Variables Adolescent Type Adolescent A Adolescent B Adolescent C 
Panel A: IVSE Score and Eligibility 
IVSE Score 83.925 84.150 84.625 
Eligible in 2014 No No Yes 
Eligible in 2015 No Yes Yes 
Panel B: IVSE Variables (All types are welfare recipients, but not parents nor pregnant) 
Attendance Between 85% and 94% 95% or over Between 85% and 94% 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (Months) Between 13 and 24 25 or over Between 13 and 24 
Mother Schooling 12 Years 1 to 7 Years 9 to 11 Years 
 
Adolescents who are close in terms of IVSE scores near the threshold are, by design, 
different in regard to fundamental characteristics. In 2014, type C adolescents ended up 
being eligible for BARE while type B adolescents (one of the closest in terms of IVSE) 
ended up not being eligible. Both types of adolescents differ in their values of attendance, 
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⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ and their mothers’ schooling. A similar situation happened in 2015, when type B 
adolescents were eligible, but type A adolescents were not. As in the previous example these 
two types of adolescents are entirely different in regard to the three mentioned variables. 
 
In practice, the IVSE formula generates clusters of adolescents. Adolescents who have the 
same score in the IVSE also share the same category of values for attendance, ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ and 
mother schooling. This logic explains the results of Table 4.3. In 2014, the comparison of 
adolescents just above and below the threshold is primarily between type C adolescents and 
type B. Likewise, in 2015 the comparison is mainly between type A and type B adolescents. 
 
These points become clear from Table 4.6, which describes the functions 𝑓ଵ(∙), 𝑓ଶ(∙), 𝑓ଷ(∙), 
and 𝑓ସ(∙) that transform all IVSE variables into the scores that are used in the IVSE formula 
(shown in subsection 4.2.1). Table 4.6 shows that attendance is divided into five categories. 
On the one hand, the minimum score given by 𝑓ଵ(∙) is 5, which corresponds to students whose 
attendance is between 95% and 100%. On the other hand, the maximum score returned by 
𝑓ଵ(∙) is 165. There are four categories for ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ and a similar number of scores associated 
with 𝑓ଶ(∙). In this case, the minimum and maximum scores reach 30 and 135, respectively. 
 
Table 4.6: Functions 𝑓௞(∙) Transforming IVSE Variables into Scores 
𝑓௞(∙) Variables Formula Score 
𝑓ଵ(∙) Attendance if Attendance is between 0% and 50% 
if Attendance is between 51% and 74% 
if Attendance is between 75% and 84% 
if Attendance is between 85% and 94% 
if Attendance is between 95% and 100% 
165 
125 
85 
45 
5 
𝑓ଶ(∙) ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is lower or equal than 6 months 
if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is between 7 and 12 months 
if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is between 13 and 24 months  
if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is equal to or higher than 25 months 
30 
65 
100 
135 
𝑓ଷ(∙) Welfare Recipient 
Paternity 
Pregnancy 
if No 
if Yes 
40 
210 
𝑓ସ(∙) Mother Schooling 
(Years) 
if Mother Schooling is 0 
if Mother Schooling is between 1 and 7 
if Mother Schooling is 8 
if Mother Schooling is between 9 and 11 
if Mother Schooling is 12 
if Mother Schooling is between 13 and 17 
if Mother Schooling is equal to or higher than 18 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Source: author’s compilation based on official documents, Ministry of Education 
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The design of the IVSE leads to an irregular distribution of scores - see the left panel of 
Figure 4.2. The IVSE distribution could have been smoother. The latter argument can be 
understood by looking at the right-hand panel of Figure 4.2 in which I show a hypothetical 
distribution of IVSE scores. The only difference between this hypothetical distribution and 
the original is that I replace 𝑓ଵ(∙) and 𝑓ଶ(∙) by two new functions 𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) and 𝑓ଶᇱ(∙), respectively. 
 
Figure 4.2: Observed IVSE Density and Hypothetical IVSE Density (Year 2014) 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
The irregular distribution of the IVSE scores is mainly explained by the design of 𝑓ଵ(∙) and 
𝑓ଶ(∙), the functions that transform attendance and ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ into scores respectively. Table 4.7 
presents 𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) and 𝑓ଶᇱ(∙), the functions that I use to estimate hypothetical IVSE scores. The 
logic I utilise to design 𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) and 𝑓ଶᇱ(∙) follows two criterions. Firstly, to preserve the original 
scale of IVSE, 𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) and 𝑓ଶᇱ(∙) return the same minimum and maximum scores as 𝑓ଵ(∙) and 
𝑓ଶ(∙), respectively. Secondly, 𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) and 𝑓ଶᇱ(∙) intend to break with the categorisation of 
attendance and ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ of 𝑓ଵ(∙) and 𝑓ଶ(∙). Instead, in these new functions, I use almost the 
entire range of values available for each variable to return a unique score for each value.  
 
Table 4.7: Functions 𝑓௞ᇱ(∙) Transforming IVSE Variables into Scores 
𝑓௞ᇱ(∙) Variables Formula 
Min. 
Score 
Max. 
Score 
𝑓ଵᇱ(∙) Attendance 5+1.6(100–Attendance) 5 165 
𝑓ଶᇱ(∙) ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ 30   if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is lower than –13 months 
135 if ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is higher than 37 months 
30+2.1(⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋+13) otherwise 
30 135 
 
The left panel of Figure 4.3 shows the hypothetical distribution of the IVSE (from the right-
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hand panel of Figure 4.2) but close to the BARE threshold. The right-hand panel of Figure 
4.3 shows that a McCrary test does not reject this new distribution. No discontinuity can be 
observed in the density of the hypothetical IVSE index at the threshold used by BARE.  
 
Figure 4.3: Hypothetical IVSE Density & McCrary Test (Year 2014) 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
Table 4.8 presents the RD continuity-based estimates for the pre-treatment variables using 
the hypothetical IVSE index as a running variable instead of the observed IVSE scores. The 
organisation of Table 4.8 follows a similar pattern as Table 4.4. Almost no coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 95% level. Figure 4.4 shows that the conditional distribution 
of each pre-treatment variable varies smoothly along the hypothetical index, showing no 
statistically significant discontinuities at the BARE threshold.49 
 
The IVSE index is an inappropriate running variable for an RD design due to the design of 
𝑓ଵ(∙) and 𝑓ଶ(∙). These functions transform discrete variables into categorical ones to build the 
index. The design of the IVSE affects non-randomly the position of adolescents near the 
threshold. The continuity assumption is unlikely to hold when using this index. Without 
administrative sorting, a researcher could have found that variation close to the threshold 
was as good as random. The continuity assumption is likely to have held. For BARE 
administrative sorting, not manipulation, undermines the RD design. In summary, this 
finding demonstrates that lack of ability to manipulate a running variable does not 
automatically translate into randomised variation in treatment assignment near the threshold. 
                                                          
49 I derive the continuous lines in each graph from a quadratic regression. The parameters of the regressions 
vary at each side of the threshold (the vertical dashed line). The dots correspond to the average of the pre-
treatment variable for each non-overlapping bin of one point of the hypothetical IVSE score. The dashed lines 
surrounding the continuous lines in each graph represent the 95% confidence interval of each polynomial fit.   
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Table 4.8: RD Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables in Continuity-Based Framework (Hypothetical IVSE as a Running Variable) 
Pre-Treatment Variables BARE Cohorts (Columns Additionally Vary by Bandwidth Size) 2014 2015 2014 & 2015 
Panel A: IVSE Variables 
Attendance (%) -0.368 0.075 0.432 -0.114 0.064 -0.019 
 (0.610) (0.344) (0.538) (0.303) (0.404) (0.228) 
⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ (Months) -0.512 -0.071 0.165 -0.088 -0.165 -0.098 
 (0.578) (0.321) (0.490) (0.278) (0.376) (0.211) 
Mother Schooling (Years) 0.061 -0.100 -0.363* -0.168 -0.168 -0.134 
 (0.194) (0.140) (0.220) (0.162) (0.149) (0.109) 
Panel B: Non IVSE Variables 
Male -0.008 -0.017 0.005 0.007 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
Metropolitan Region -0.006 -0.006 -0.049** -0.012 -0.029* -0.009 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) 
Ninth Grade -0.028 0.005 0.019 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) 
Previous Average Grade 0.036 0.007 0.051 -0.001 0.045* 0.004 
 (0.038) (0.025) (0.034) (0.022) (0.025) (0.017) 
Progressed Previous Year 0.001 0.016 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.008 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) 
Bandwidth Size 5 10 5 10 5 10 
Number of Observations 12,630 37,827 14,292 45,803 26,922 83,630 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
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Figure 4.4: Pre-Treatment Variables by Hypothetical IVSE Scores 
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Figure 4.4 (continued): Pre-Treatment Variables by Hypothetical IVSE Scores 
 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
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4.2.4 Intermediate Contamination Threatens the RD Design 
 
Can Day of Birth be Used as a Running Variable rather than the IVSE? 
 
The existence of administrative sorting for the IVSE does not rule out the use of an RD 
design to recover the causal effect of BARE on school enrolment. A careful analysis of the 
sources of variation in BARE eligibility opens up new options, as I explain in this subsection.  
 
A promising feature for an RD design corresponds to the rules associated with ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋. The 
first rule is the creation of categorical boundaries when using 𝑓ଶ(∙). Table 4.6 shows that the 
boundaries for ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ are 7, 13 and 25 months. The second rule is that the IVSE formula is 
based on ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋, not ∆𝑎𝑔𝑒. The reference day used to calculate ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ is June 30th. There 
is no difference in ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ for two students who are in the same grade, one of whom has a 
birth date on the 1st and the other on the 30th of the same month and year. However, there is 
a difference of one month in ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ between two students in the same grade, where one’s 
birth date is the 30th of a given month while the other’s is the 31st of the same month. 
 
Because of the floor function and the categorical boundaries created by 𝑓ଶ(∙), a difference of 
one day in the day of birth can impact the score derived from 𝑓ଶ(⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋), and along these 
lines, eligibility for BARE and access to the CCT. For example, a student with ∆𝑎𝑔𝑒 of 7 
months has a higher probability of being a BARE recipient than a student with ∆𝑎𝑔𝑒 slightly 
less than 7 months. Individuals born on November 30th, who are also exactly seven months 
behind with respect to their expected age for the grade, end up receiving a score of 65 from 
𝑓ଶ(⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋). In contrast, those born on December 1st, who are also almost seven months 
behind, receive a score of 30. All other characteristics being equal, the first group have an 
IVSE score 4.725 points higher than the second group and are more likely to receive BARE.  
 
A similar situation occurs at the two categorical boundaries of 13 months and 25 months. In 
these cases, the key day of birth corresponds to May 30th. Adolescents born on this day 
receive 35 more points from 𝑓ଶ(⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋) than those adolescents whose birthday is on May 
31st or June 1st (among the group 13 or 25 months behind their expected age for the grade). 
 
∆𝑎𝑔𝑒 is affected by two factors. The first is the number of years that a student is behind 
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concerning his or her expected age for the grade. For example, students who are not behind 
have values of ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ of between –12 and –1 months. Students who are one year behind 
have values of ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ of between 0 and 11 months. Where in these ranges they are located 
depends on their birthday. For example, an adolescent who is one year behind and born 
between November 1st and 30th has a value of 7 in ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋, whereas an adolescent who is 
one year behind and born between December 1st and 30th has a value of 6 in ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋. 
 
The BARE datasets contain the exact birth date of the students. Hence, I can use variation 
in day of birth to identify the causal effect of BARE on school enrolment. In this case the 
running variable corresponds to ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 (the difference in days between the birthday and the 
day associated with the categorical boundary). Local variation in BARE caused by variation 
in ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 can be thought of as exogenous variation, at least close to the point where ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
equals zero. The running variable ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 can be defined in two ways as explained below: 
 
Table 4.9: Definition of ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 by Categorical Boundaries of ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ and Day of Birth 
∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 Categorical Boundaries of ⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋ 7 Months 13 & 25 Months 
∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠<0 From March 31st (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = –121 or –
122) until December 1st (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = –1) 
From June 30th (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = –31) 
until May 31st (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = –1) 
   
∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠=0 November 30th May 30th 
   
∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠>0 From November 29th (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 1) until 
July 1st (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 152) 
From May 29th (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 1) 
until April 1st (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 59) 
 
For the first boundary (⌊∆𝑎𝑔𝑒⌋=7) the reference day of birth is November 30th (∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠=0). 
Adolescents who were born between July 1st and November 29th have positive values for 
∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠. Conversely, those born between December 1st and March 31st have negative values 
for ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠. For the second and third boundaries, the reference day of birth is May 30th. Those 
born between April 1st and May 29th have positive values for ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 while their peers whose 
birthday is between May 31st and June 30th have negative values for ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠. Adolescents 
with a positive value for ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 (or zero) had a higher probability of receiving BARE. 
 
My selection of the overall range of dates for the first boundary (from July 1st until March 
31st) and the second and third boundaries (from April 1st until June 30th) is consistent with 
the admission rules in the Chilean Education system, as I explained in section 1.4.  
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Variation in ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 should be a good source from which to identify the treatment effect 
because it is improbable that it could have been manipulated precisely. Birth dates are hard 
to manipulate and are related to a period when BARE did not exist. To highlight this, Figure 
4.5 presents ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 density. The left and right-hand panels use November and May 30th as 
reference birthdays, respectively. Neither panel shows a higher density of observations at 
one side of the threshold (the dashed line), suggesting that there is no sorting around it. 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 (by Reference Day of Birth) 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
In some cases, using variation in the day of birth to identify a causal effect is not free of 
risks. For example, Gans and Leigh (2008) show that births are not evenly distributed over 
the week in Australia. The authors claim that nearly one-third of births that would have 
occurred on a weekend were moved to a weekday and that this trend is explained by the rise 
of caesarean sections and inductions. Even if weekends do not play a role in explaining the 
day of birth, these could affect the availability of professional support. Fitzsimons and Vera-
Hernández (2016) show that in the United Kingdom babies born on weekends were less 
likely to be breastfed as some mothers take advantage of hospital staff to start this process.           
 
If any of these situations are prevalent in Chile, then students born on weekdays could result 
in being different from those born on weekends. The continuity assumption may not hold, 
and RD designs will provide biased estimates. For BARE, “weekend-birth effects” are less 
likely to be a matter for concern. In the sample, I pool together adolescents born in different 
years (I use two BARE cohorts where each cohort has students from ninth, tenth and eleventh 
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grade). In other words, in the sample adolescents whose birthday is on May 30th or May 31st 
were not born on a specific day of the week (for example Sunday and Monday, respectively).  
 
Age Requirements to Entry Primary School Contaminates the New Running Variable 
 
Following the standard approach in RD falsification tests, if variation in ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 is as good 
as random in a neighbourhood around the threshold, we should observe balance or continuity 
for the pre-treatment variables. For ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 there is no need to extrapolate to assess continuity 
for these variables at the threshold. Rather, the RD local randomisation framework is more 
suitable than the continuity-based framework.50 In the former framework, balance is tested 
through differences in the means for observations just above and below the threshold.  
 
Table 4.10 presents the results for the second reference day of birth (when ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠=0 on May 
30th) for those adolescents whose scores are close to the IVSE threshold. I show the 
calculations for different ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 windows. Each row in the table represents a different pre-
treatment variable, while each column contains a different window size. Thus, each cell is 
equivalent to the difference in the means of a pre-treatment variable between observations 
with positive (including zero) and negative values of ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 for a given range of birthdays. 
 
There are almost no statistically significant coefficients in Table 4.10. There are no 
differences larger than 0.2% in previous attendance, 0.04 in years of mothers’ schooling and 
two percentage points in gender, course grade, type of school and the rate of progress in the 
previous year. Consequently, at first glance ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 is a suitable running variable. The new 
running variable does not seem to be prone to manipulation and there is balance among the 
different pre-treatment variables for those adolescents whose birthday is close to May 30th.  
 
However, a more detailed analysis reveals some problems. Table 4.11 shows that adolescents 
who were born before or on May 30th are on average 0.097 to 0.176 years younger than those 
whose birthday is after May 30th (with results varying depending on the range of days used 
for the estimation). All these differences are statistically significant at a 95% level. Also, the 
F-statistic of joint significance for all the pre-treatment variables is statistically significant. 
                                                          
50 The local randomisation framework assumes independence between potential outcomes and the running 
variable within a neighbourhood around the threshold. In this context, this means assuming that differences in 
the day of birth (or relative age) are uncorrelated with the potential outcomes in the neighbourhood.  
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The most likely explanation for these findings is the discontinuous relationship between date 
of birth and age to enrol in primary school in Chile. May 30th or May 31st are not fixed days 
determining the age requirements to access primary education in the country. However, for 
children born between April 1st and June 30th, the age at which they can enter school depends 
on the discretion of academic directors. In practice, Chilean children born on June 1st, or 
some days later, are more likely to enrol in the first grade of primary education at an older 
age than children whose birthday is in the final days of May (McEwan & Shapiro, 2007). 
Thus, Chilean children born in May are more likely to be the youngest in their cohorts. 
 
Using ∆𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 as a running variable in an RD design for BARE offers initial promise. 
However, intermediate contamination partly rules out the approach. The new running 
variable largely depends on the date of birth. The running variable, which was determined 
long ago, and the threshold affected other determinants before BARE was implemented. As 
a result, observations on either side of the threshold become incomparable. This fact does 
not rule out the RD design. The main problem appears if these determinants are not neutral 
regarding their relationship with the outcomes of interest. In this case, age is likely to be an 
explanatory factor of secondary school enrolment. In this scenario the continuity assumption 
at the new threshold is unlikely to hold and RD estimates are most likely to be biased.         
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Table 4.10: RD Local Randomisation Estimates for Pre-Treatment Variables 
Pre-Treatment Variables Window Size 10 20 31 45 59 
 
Panel A: IVSE Variables 
     
Attendance (%) -0.171 -0.081 -0.067 -0.086 -0.064 
 (0.107) (0.077) (0.062) (0.057) (0.054) 
Mother Schooling (Years) -0.032 -0.040 -0.021 -0.033 -0.006 
 (0.102) (0.073) (0.060) (0.054) (0.051) 
Panel B: Non IVSE Variables      
Male -0.005 0.016 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Metropolitan Region 0.003 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Technical Professional School 0.021 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Public School 0.025 0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ninth Grade 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.004 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Tenth Grade -0.012 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Previous Average Grade -0.027 -0.014 -0.020* -0.024** -0.027*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Progressed Last Year -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of Observations 3,090 6,092 9,249 11,292 13,206 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
 
Table 4.11: RD Local Randomisation Estimates for Age 
Pre-Treatment Variable Window Size 10 20 31 45 59 
Age (Years) -0.097** -0.143*** -0.153*** -0.172*** -0.176*** 
 (0.042) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
Number of Observations 3,090 6,092 9,249 11,292 13,206 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Education 
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4.3 Case 2: Subsidio Familiar & Asignación Social  
 
This section analyses the cases of Subsidio Familiar (SUF) and Asignación Social (AS). The 
first part provides an overview of the two CCTs and their targeting strategy. Both CCTs use 
the Social Protection File (SPF) index to assess eligibility. The second subsection presents 
the data sources and summary statistics. The third part introduces a case of administrative 
sorting near the SPF threshold used by SUF. This subsection shows that administrative 
sorting induces abrupt changes in the SPF index density, threatening the RD design. The 
fourth part elaborates on a case of intermediate contamination near the SPF threshold used 
by AS.  
 
4.3.1 Programmes and Targeting Description51 
 
SUF Overview and Rollout 
 
SUF is a monthly cash benefit that operates as a CCT in practice. SUF has two goals. First, 
the CCT seeks to increase households’ present income and, secondly, it intends to promote 
human capital accumulation among children and adolescents no more than 18 years old.  
 
The mother is the recipient. The monthly SUF-related income she receives varies by the 
number of entitlements within the household. In 2013, the average number of entitlements 
per household that received SUF was 2.60. 64.9% of the entitlements corresponded to 
children until 18 years old while mothers accounted for 34.7% of the share of entitlements. 
From July 2014 until June 2015 the monthly cash transfer per entitlement was $9,242 CLP 
($14.6 USD at June 30th 2015). The government updates this amount annually.   
 
SUF is currently the largest CCT in Chile, with more than 760,000 households and 2 million 
entitlements since 2010. In 2013, approximately 11.7% of Chileans were entitled to SUF. 
SUF’s target population is households belonging to the poorest 40% of the national 
population. Low-income status was measured using the SPF index. Since September 2007, 
when the SPF was implemented, selection into SUF has been primarily decided by two 
                                                          
51 The information in this section comes from various official reports (Comité de Expertos Ficha de Protección 
Social, 2010; Focus. Consultorías y Estudios, 2016; Universidad del Desarrollo, 2014). 
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factors: i) having a score equal to or lower than 11,734 points in the SPF index, and ii) self-
selection - a household member must apply for SUF at the local government (municipality) 
office.  
 
These rules hold if a person is claiming SUF for the first time or if they are renewing it after 
three years. To receive SUF the person must bring, at the time of application (or renewal), 
proof of school enrolment for those children aged between 7 and 18 years old within the 
household. 
 
AS Overview and Rollout 
 
AS was a pilot programme provided in 2011 and 2012 before the implementation of Ingreso 
Ético Familiar (IEF), currently the largest programme in Chile designed to reduce extreme 
poverty. AS had different goals. First, the scheme intended to increase households’ income. 
Additionally, it intended to promote human capital accumulation among children. AS was 
launched in April 2011, providing cash transfers to 123,757 households. The programme 
then grew to 148,775 households in January 2012. In 2013, AS was replaced by IEF.  
 
AS provided different types of cash transfers, which can be classified into unconditional and 
conditional cash transfers. The conditional cash transfers were provided as follows, per 
child: i) $5,000 CLP ($10.4 USD on March 31st 2011) per month for those aged no more 
than 6 years old attending regular health check-ups, and ii) $25,000 CLP per year ($51.9 
USD) for those aged between 7 and 18 years old enrolled in primary or secondary education, 
plus $35,000 CLP ($72.6 USD) per year if the annual attendance rate reached 85%.  
 
The target population of AS was households in extreme poverty. Every household that met 
the eligibility criteria on March 31st 2011 was classified as a “stock” household. This was 
operationalised to mean: i) having a score equal to or lower than 4,213 points in the SPF, 
and ii) being an active member of Chile Solidario (previously the largest programme in Chile 
designed to reduce extreme poverty), where this implied receiving the unconditional cash 
transfers of this programme (provided for five continuous years) or its psychosocial support 
component (which was provided only in the first two years following take-up). 
 
AS took advantage of the infrastructure developed for Chile Solidario to deliver its cash 
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transfers in addition. Hence, enrolment in AS was automatic and 98% of the beneficiaries 
received payments through the same channels as Chile Solidario. Compliance with the 
conditions of school attendance and enrolment was verified by the Chilean Ministry of Social 
Development (MSD) using administrative records.  
 
The Social Protection File (SPF) 
 
Until December 2015, the SPF was the largest targeting instrument in Chile. The instrument 
was developed by the MSD as a tool to assign social programmes among the population.  
 
Any household could ask for an SPF assessment in their respective municipality. However, 
in practice, the wealthiest tended not to ask for it. The data collection was carried out through 
an interview conducted by municipality personnel that had a standardised procedure. The 
process started in 2006 and the first scores were provided to households in late 2007. As of 
January 2010, the dataset had 10,782,270 individuals, approximately 63.5% of Chile’s 
population. 
 
SPF scores estimate household income. Specifically, the formula estimates household 
members’ income using variables correlated to their income. Therefore, the instrument is a 
form of a proxy means test. The score of the household derives in part from the sum of the 
predicted incomes of each member. Most of the variables that go into the formula are 
collected during the household interview. The general formula for the SPF score is as 
follows: 
 
𝑆𝑃𝐹_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒௛ = 𝐺 ቀ
∑ {[஼ீூ೔∗଴.ଽା௒஽೔∗଴.ଵ]ା௉೔∗௒௉೔}೙೔
ூே೓
ቁ, 
 
where 𝐶𝐺𝐼௜ is the proxy means test prediction of the (potential) labour income of individual 
i in household h.52 𝑌𝐷௜ is the self-reported income (mostly from labour) of individual i in 
household h. 𝑌𝑃௜ is the permanent income (public pensions being the most relevant) for 
                                                          
52 Six different equations are used to estimate the 𝐶𝐺𝐼 depending on the gender of individual i and whether he 
or she is: i) a paid employee, ii) self-employed or, iii) unemployed or economically inactive. This categorisation 
acknowledges the differences in (potential) income across groups within the country. Education plays a vital 
role in all equations. For example, more years of schooling and concluding levels (such as secondary or higher 
education) are positively correlated with 𝐶𝐺𝐼 predictions. Additionally, other variables such as the type of 
education received, the age, and the district where the individual lives affect these predictions.  
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individual i in household h. 𝐼𝑁௛ is a needs index (or a form of equivalence scale) for 
household h. Finally, 𝐺(∙) is a monotonic function that transforms household h income 
prediction into an SPF score. 
 
Given its formula, in theory, the SPF index ranks households from the poorest to the richest 
in a similar way to a ranking of households by income per capita.53 The SPF scale ranges 
from 2,072 points (the poorest households) to infinity (the richest) in theory. In practice, by 
2014, only two households had an SPF score higher than 16,000 points. 
 
4.3.2 Data, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Data and Sample 
 
Every administrative dataset I use in this section was provided by the Chilean Ministry of 
Social Development at my request. I link individuals in each dataset using the ID number 
provided by the Chilean State. For privacy purposes the ID numbers were changed by the 
MSD using an algorithm that is unknown to me but that enabled me to link the datasets. 
 
The Social Protection File Dataset provide information on: i) SPF scores, which are crucial 
for the identification of both SUF and AS, ii) household structure, and iii) variables such as 
years of schooling, employment status, and self-reported income. The Social Protection File 
is available on a monthly basis from September 2007 until December 2015. 
 
The Ministry of Education annual Performance Dataset contains information on enrolment, 
attendance, performance and end of year academic classification for all Chilean primary and 
secondary school students (except those in adult flexible and differential education). This 
dataset is available annually from the MSD. Additionally, I use the SUF and AS datasets to 
identify treated and non-treated adolescents for each CCT. These two datasets are available 
on a monthly basis. The Chile Solidario historic dataset is useful to identify eligible 
adolescents (active members of Chile Solidario) for AS.  
 
                                                          
53 SPF scores do not account for all sources of income (for example many subsidies are not included). 
Additionally, the SPF formula uses a needs index not the number of household members n in the denominator. 
Despite these differences, for simplicity, I refer to SPF scores as a prediction of household income per capita. 
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My analysis focuses on adolescents aged between 13 and 17 years old (using December 31st 
as the reference day to calculate their age). I restrict the sample by age range because of two 
factors. First, in Chile, dropout rates are most problematic in secondary studies and so 
including children younger than 13 years old does not seem pertinent in the context of 
evaluating the impact of Chilean CCTs on school enrolment. Second, adolescents older than 
17 years old were not eligible for SUF and AS. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first three columns of Table 4.12 provide descriptive statistics relevant to SUF for two 
cohorts, corresponding to adolescents in 2013 and 2014. The last three columns of Table 
4.10 present descriptive statistics for AS. The sample I use in this case is adolescents who 
were living in an active Chile Solidario household in March 2011. 
 
Panel A shows that adolescents scoring no more than 11,734 in the SPF were more likely to 
be entitled to SUF. Overall, 41.2% of eligible adolescents received SUF. Conversely, less 
than 1% of adolescents scoring above this threshold received SUF. Panel A additionally 
shows AS high rates of compliance. 97.6% of adolescents who were active in Chile Solidario 
and had no more than 4,213 in the SPF of March 2011 received AS. In contrast, practically 
no Chile Solidario adolescents scoring above this threshold received AS. 
 
Panel B presents variables that are used in the SPF formula. Adolescents scoring below 
11,734 are more vulnerable than those scoring above this threshold. On average, the former 
group has a head of household with fewer years of schooling and a lower chance of working 
formally (defined as working and contributing to social security). Their households also have 
a lower income and are larger. Chile Solidario adolescents with SPF scores no higher than 
4,213 live in households with a lower income that is more likely to be headed by a female 
compared to Chile Solidario adolescents with SPF scores higher than 4,213.  
 
Concerning their demographic and academic information, Panels C and D show that 
adolescents scoring below the SUF threshold are also more disadvantaged in terms of 
academic features compared to adolescents with SPF scores higher than 11,734. Contrarily, 
Chile Solidario adolescents with an SPF score no higher than 4,213 are similar to their 
counterparts whose SPF score is higher than 4,213.  
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Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics (Mean Values) by Conditional Cash Transfer With Its Respective SPF Threshold 
Variables 
Conditional Cash Transfer and Sample Utilised 
SUF: All Adolescents AS: Active Chile Solidario Adolescents 
<= 11,734 >11,734 Total <= 4,213 >4,213 Total 
Panel A: SPF Score and CCT Recipient  
SPF Score 5,907.2 13,222.8 6,976.0 2,939.2 7,013.0 4,261 
SUF Recipient 0.412 0.008 0.353 - - - 
AS Recipient - - - 0.976 0.000 0.659 
Panel B: SPF Relevant Variables (HH: Head of Household)  
HH Years of Schooling 9.17 12.10 9.60 8.08 7.68 7.95 
HH Working  0.741 0.838 0.755 0.682 0.670 0.678 
HH Working Formally 0.351 0.730 0.406 0.118 0.261 0.164 
Household Monthly Income ($CLP) 154,970 423,502 194,201 62,181 124,632 82,444 
Household Size 4.30 4.00 4.26 4.66 4.78 4.70 
Female HH 0.510 0.291 0.478 0.660 0.430 0.586 
Panel C: Demographic Information  
Male 0.513 0.515 0.513 0.506 0.519 0.510 
Age (Years) 14.93 14.95 14.93 14.91 14.96 14.93 
Metropolitan Region 0.335 0.429 0.349 0.222 0.231 0.225 
Panel D: Academic and School Information  
Enrolment Previous Year 0.913 0.954 0.919 0.899 0.877 0.892 
Seventh or Eighth Grade 0.377 0.354 0.373 0.386 0.380 0.384 
Ninth or Tenth Grade 0.424 0.446 0.427 0.409 0.411 0.409 
Eleventh or Twelfth Grade 0.144 0.178 0.150 0.129 0.130 0.129 
Attendance Previous Year (%) 90.20 91.74 90.43 91.00 91.24 91.08 
Average Grade Previous Year 5.32 5.48 5.35 5.25 5.24 5.24 
Progressed Previous Year 0.914 0.939 0.918 0.893 0.895 0.894 
Number of Observations 1,627,331 278,419 1,905,750 60,934 29,266 90,200 
Note: grades, attendance, average grade and progression measured only among those who were enrolled in the previous year 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Chilean Ministry of Social Development and Ministry of Education 
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4.3.3 Administrative Sorting Threatens the RD Design 
 
Can SPF Scores be used as a Running Variable? 
 
A regression discontinuity design seems to be a suitable method to estimate the causal effect 
of SUF and AS on school enrolment of adolescents. The high degree of compliance in AS 
take-up suggests that a sharp RD design could be implemented for this CCT. Conversely, 
SUF needs to be assessed through a fuzzy RD design, as many factors, beyond having an 
SPF score of 11,734, play a role in determining which adolescents access the cash transfer. 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between the treatment and SPF scores for AS and SUF. 
Figure 4.6 supports the idea of using an RD design because for each CCT there exists an 
SPF threshold (the dashed line) that affects treatment propensity. For AS the change in 
treatment status is almost deterministic after crossing the 4,213 SPF threshold. For SUF only 
a change in the probability of treatment is observed for adolescents with an SPF score no 
higher than 11,734. 
 
Figure 4.6: Asignación Social and Subsidio Familiar Recipient by SPF Scores54 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
SPF scores act as a potential running variable. Observing a smooth distribution in the running 
variable in the neighbourhood of the threshold is essential to believe that treatment 
assignment is as good as random. Conversely, any discontinuity in the density of the running 
variable close to the threshold is generally interpreted as a sign of manipulation. Whenever 
                                                          
54 The dots correspond to the proportion of recipients for each CCT by 20-point SPF bins. I derive the 
continuous lines from a quadratic regression. The parameters of the regressions vary at each side of the cutoffs.  
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there is manipulation the plausibility of the continuity assumption holding weakens. 
Therefore, it becomes essential to assess whether any discontinuities emerge in the 
distribution of SPF scores. 
 
Figure 4.7 presents the density of SPF scores in a small neighbourhood close to the AS and 
SUF thresholds. The left panel of the figure presents the case of AS: this is the distribution 
of SPF scores for Chile Solidario active adolescents around the 4,213 SPF score (the dashed 
line). The density is uneven, but no clear discontinuity is observed when crossing this 
threshold. 
 
The right-hand panel of Figure 4.7 presents the case of SUF: this is the distribution of SPF 
scores for all adolescents around the 11,734 SPF threshold (the dashed line). Unlike the case 
of AS, a clear discontinuity can be observed in the density of SPF scores to the right side of 
the 11,734 SPF threshold, though this is not observed immediately after crossing the 
threshold. 
 
Figure 4.7: SPF Scores Distribution for Asignación Social and Subsidio Familiar 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
A McCrary test (2008) formally assesses whether there is a discontinuity in the density of a 
running variable at a threshold. The test produces an estimation of the distribution of the 
running variable at each side of the threshold. If the estimate of the discontinuity in the 
density is not statistically significant there is no evidence to claim that such a discontinuity 
exists. Graphically, this is mostly the case when the confidence intervals of the estimates 
overlap at the threshold. 
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Figure 4.8 presents the results of the McCrary test for SUF and AS. The figure shows the 
estimated density of SPF scores (in the wider central line) with its 95% confidence interval 
(the dashed side lines) at each side of the threshold. In the right-hand panel, no overlap 
between the estimated density of SPF scores can be observed at the 11,734 SPF threshold. 
In contrast, the left panel of Figure 4.8 shows some degree of overlap in the confidence 
intervals of the estimated density of SPF scores at the 4,213 SPF threshold. 
 
Figure 4.8: McCrary Test for Asignación Social and Subsidio Familiar 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
The McCrary test result raises the question of the suitability of using SPF scores as a running 
variable to evaluate SUF. Conversely, the test does not reject the use of SPF scores as a 
running variable to evaluate AS. At first glance, the discontinuity in the density of SPF scores 
around 11,734 suggests that the variation in SUF eligibility is not as good as random close 
to this threshold. In this case, the continuity assumption is less likely to hold and RD 
estimates for SUF are more likely to be biased. The next subsection explains the underlying 
cause of these results.  
 
Understanding SPF Scores Distribution 
 
The discontinuity in the distribution of SPF scores shown previously is not an isolated case. 
The SPF scores distribution shows clear discontinuities in at least four parts of its range. 
Moreover, I distinguish a sequence in these discontinuities. This can be seen in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9: Social Protection File Scores Distribution 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
The dashed lines divide the SPF scores distribution into ten sections. Each section has a size 
of 1,385 or 1,386 SPF points. The first discontinuity in the distribution is observed at the 
SPF score of 3,458 (where the first dashed line is), 1,386 points away from the lowest SPF 
score of 2,072. On the right-hand side of the figure, larger discontinuities can be observed at 
the SPF scores of 11,772, 13,157 and 14,543 (the seventh, eighth and ninth lines, 
respectively). 
 
Figure 4.9 suggests the existence of a pattern in the SPF scores. Every 1,385 or 1,386 SPF 
points there is a discontinuity in the distribution. Public policies in Chile used none of the 
points where these discontinuities are observed. Hence, these discontinuities are unlikely to 
be explained by individuals' manipulation of SPF scores. That argument seems more suitable 
for explaining the accumulation of observations at the very left side of the distribution. 
 
A better explanation is that the discontinuities are administratively produced. The function 
𝐺(∙), which transforms households’ income per capita predictions into SPF scores is 
responsible for these discontinuities. This hypothesis is supported by the feasibility of 
obtaining from the Chilean income per capita distribution a density with a similar shape to 
the SPF in a short number of steps. This sequence of steps, or function 𝑔(∙), is described as 
follows: 
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1. Estimate the independent income per capita for each household (using CASEN).55 56 
2. Obtain the nine percentiles of income that divide the sample into ten decile groups.  
 The ten decile groups have different sizes in terms of the income range. For 
example, income per capita for the first group ranges from $0 CLP to $43,960 
CLP, while for the ninth group it ranges from $329,507 CLP to $567,581 
CLP. 
3. Divide each decile group into ten additional subgroups with an equal income range. 
 Each subgroup has the same income band within each decile group (for 
example each subgroup in the first decile has an income band of $4,396 CLP).  
 Income ranges differ for two subgroups from different income decile groups. 
Thus, the income band for the tenth subgroup is different from the eleventh. 
4. Assign each household in CASEN to 1 of the 100 independent income per capita 
subgroups by observing their independent income per capita. 
 
I present the resulting distribution in the left panel of Figure 4.10.57 The dashed lines in this 
panel separate income decile groups. This is compared with the right-hand panel of Figure 
4.10, which shows the density of SPF scores when 100 bins of 138.6 points are used to 
construct the histogram. The dashed lines in this panel separate SPF scores by 1,386 points. 
 
There are many similarities between these two distributions, including: i) an increasing 
density from the sixth to the tenth bin, ii) a sharp decline at the eleventh bin, iii) a flat density 
thereafter (albeit with more variance in CASEN), iv) a moderate discontinuity at the 71st bin, 
v) a steady decline in the density until the 80th bin, vi) a repetition of the pattern noticed in 
points iv) and v) between the 81st to the 90th bin, and finally, vii) a very sharp increase in the 
91st bin that leads to the highest concentration of observations in both distributions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
55 The Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica de Hogares (CASEN) is the cornerstone of Chilean 
welfare measurement. In Chile, official statistics about poverty and inequality are based on income, not 
consumption. Therefore, CASEN collects detailed information about every source of income within the 
household. Since 1990, CASEN has been held every two or three years. The survey is representative at a 
national and a regional level. In CASEN 2011, 86,836 households (approximately 1.75% of the population) 
were interviewed. CASEN datasets are available from http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/ 
56 Independent income refers to all monthly payments received related to labour and property of assets.  
57 After using 𝑔(∙) I randomly assign 7% of observations from the second to the tenth decile groups to one of 
the first five subgroups to account for the higher density in the left side of the distribution of SPF scores. 
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Figure 4.10: One Hundred Bins of Income per Capita in CASEN and the SPF58 
 
Source: public and administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
The monotonic function 𝐺(∙) that produces SPF scores from income predictions seems to 
affect non-randomly the position of units near some SPF thresholds. Thus, administrative 
sorting in the running variable is the primary explanation for the McCrary test result in the 
case of SUF. The 11,734 SPF threshold used by SUF for targeting is too close to 11,772, 
where one of the discontinuities in the density of SPF scores explained by 𝐺(∙) emerges. The 
AS threshold of 4,213 SPF points is not close enough to 3,458 and 4,843 (scores where 
discontinuities caused by 𝐺(∙) are observed) to lead to a similar McCrary test outcome. 
 
As SPF scores are derived from a prediction of income per capita and a monotonic function 
𝐺(∙), using the inverse function of 𝐺(∙) on SPF scores will provide the original income 
prediction. Accordingly, if the national household income per capita distribution is 
continuous then the SPF predicted income per capita distribution is likely to be continuous. 
I present the result of inverting the SPF scores, using similar ideas as in function 𝑔(∙), in the 
left panel of Figure 4.11. The density of SPF predicted income per capita does not show the 
discontinuities of the SPF distribution. This is the case in all parts shown in this distribution 
except on its tails, which are not shown. Moreover, the density is similar to CASEN’s (which 
is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 4.11). 
 
 
                                                          
58 SPF scores do not precisely predict independent income per capita, but a different measure of income (which 
includes some public pensions and subsidies and excludes income related to the property of assets) divided by 
a needs index. Many of these factors cannot be easily accounted for in CASEN. For this reason, I select 
independent income per capita as the standard for comparison. 
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Figure 4.11: Income per Capita Distribution (SPF Prediction and CASEN) 
 
Source: public and administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
SPF predicted income per capita is a more suitable running variable for an RD design for 
SUF than SPF scores because this running variable is smoother around the threshold used 
by SUF. This can be better appreciated from Figure 4.12. The left panel of the figure shows 
the distribution of SPF predicted income per capita around the equivalent (to 11,734 SPF 
points) threshold. The density is smooth in the relevant neighbourhood. The discontinuity in 
the estimated density is narrower relative to the one I presented in Figure 4.8. However, the 
new running variable still does not pass the McCrary test (in the right-hand panel of Figure 
4.12). 
 
Figure 4.12: SPF Predicted Income per Capita Distribution and McCrary Test 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
All these findings confirm that administrative sorting, not manipulation, is the primary driver 
of the discontinuities in the distribution of SPF scores. This situation highlights the relevance 
of fully understanding the running variable generating process when applying an RD design. 
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4.3.4 Intermediate Contamination Invalidates the RD Design 
 
In Figures 4.7 and 4.8 I show that the neighbourhood of scores close to the 4,213 SPF threshold 
is free of discontinuities. For this reason, using an RD design for AS seems more promising 
relative to the case of SUF, due to SUF’s threshold being affected by administrative sorting. 
However, an RD design for AS presents additional complications caused by intermediate 
contamination. Active Chile Solidario adolescents just below and above the 4,213 SPF 
threshold were not comparable when AS was launched. This can be observed in Figure 4.13.  
 
Figure 4.13: Chile Solidario Variables by SPF Predicted Income per Capita ($CLP)59 
 
 Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
Figure 4.13 shows the SPF predicted income per capita on the horizontal axis. I use this variable 
instead of SPF scores due to its better properties as a running variable. In the vertical axis of 
Figure 4.13 I present two pre-treatment variables related to the Chile Solidario programme. 
Active Chile Solidario adolescents just below the SPF predicted income per capita threshold, 
equivalent to 4,213 SPF points (the vertical lines), were more likely to be receiving the 
psychosocial component of Chile Solidario and had a later date of entry into this programme. 
A discontinuity in the distribution of these two intermediate variables is visible at the threshold. 
 
I show estimates of the discontinuities in the distribution of both variables in Table 4.13. Given 
that income and Chile Solidario participation are expected to be correlated, I implement a 
                                                          
59 The dots correspond to the proportion of psychosocial support recipients and year of entry to Chile Solidario 
by $1000 Chilean Pesos non-overlapping bins of SPF predicted income per capita. I derive the continuous lines 
from a quadratic regression. The parameters of the regressions vary at each side of the threshold. The dashed lines 
surrounding each of the continuous lines represent the 95% confidence interval of each polynomial fit.  
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continuity-based RD framework for the falsification test. I use the following local regression: 
 
𝑋ଶ௜ =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝐼ଶ௜ +  𝛾𝑍ଶ௜ + 𝜃𝑍ଶ௜𝐼ଶ௜  +  𝜔𝑍ଶ௜ଶ + 𝛿𝑍ଶ௜ଶ𝐼ଶ௜ +  𝜀ଶ௜ 
 
where 𝑋ଶ௜ is a pre-treatment variable for adolescent i, 𝑍ଶ௜ is the difference between the SPF 
predicted income per capita equivalent to 4,213 points and the SPF predicted income per capita 
for adolescent i. 𝐼ଶ௜  is an indicator function, which takes the value of one if 𝑍ଶ௜ ≥ 0  and zero 
otherwise. 𝜀ଶ௜ represents the difference between the observed value and the model prediction. 
 
The continuity-based RD estimates (𝛽) are statistically significant and robust to bandwidth 
selection. Adolescents just below the threshold were approximately ten percentage points more 
likely to have been receiving the Chile Solidario (CS) psychosocial support when AS was 
launched. Additionally, those adolescents who barely qualified for AS were around a quarter 
of a year younger in Chile Solidario relative to their peers who just missed out on AS. 
 
Table 4.13: Continuity-Based RD Estimates for Chile Solidario Variables 
Pre-Treatment Variables Bandwidth ($CLP) 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
Psychosocial Support  
Recipient (March 2011) 
0.094*** 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.094*** 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) 
Year of Entry 
to Chile Solidario 
0.252*** 0.271*** 0.239*** 0.232*** 
(0.075) (0.053) (0.043) (0.038) 
Number of Observations 11,318 23,830 37,834 50,677 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: own calculations using administrative datasets, Ministry of Social Development 
 
Because one requirement for receiving AS was being an active member of CS, the difference 
across groups in terms of the CS-related variables could come as a surprise. However, the fact 
that from late 2007 treatment into CS was mainly decided by having a score equal to or lower 
than 4,213 in the SPF (same criterion as AS) helps to explain these results. Older CS cohorts, 
which entered this five-year programme before late 2007, could have had, in March 2011, any 
SPF score without their CS condition being affected. Conversely, the cohorts that entered the 
programme after late 2007 could only have entered CS if they had less than 4,213 in the SPF. 
Thus, in March 2011 those CS recipients scoring just above 4,213 in the SPF tended to be on 
average older beneficiaries of CS relative to those scoring just below this threshold. 
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The school enrolment decisions of adolescents are likely to be affected by differential exposure 
to CS components. Therefore, the differences I observe for these intermediate variables at the 
threshold weaken the plausibility of the continuity assumption holding in an RD design. Thus, 
AS impact estimates can be biased. This is explained by intermediate contamination. The 
running variable, which was determined long before AS was implemented, differentially 
affected Chile Solidario active adolescents near the 4,213 SPF threshold.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This paper focuses on two threats to internal validity in RD designs that have received little 
attention in the methodological RD literature. I analyse administrative sorting and intermediate 
contamination in the context of the evaluation of three CCTs using RD designs. Table 4.14 
outlines the CCTs, running variables and thresholds I use and the threats to validity I observe. 
 
Table 4.14: Summary of CCTs, Running Variables, Thresholds and Threats to Validity 
CCT Running Variable Threshold Threat to Internal Validity 
BARE IVSE 84.625 or 84.150 Administrative Sorting Day of Birth May 30th Intermediate Contamination 
SUF SPF 11,734 Administrative Sorting AS 4,213 Intermediate Contamination 
 
Administrative sorting differs from the threat of manipulation, which is characterised by 
individuals' deliberate action for their benefit. Administrative sorting is the result of 
administrative procedures that are beyond the control and knowledge of individuals. These 
procedures affect non-randomly the position of individuals in the running variable near the 
threshold. As a result, the continuity assumption becomes less plausible.  
 
I present two cases of administrative sorting. The first is caused by the categorisation of discrete 
variables in the index used to target BARE. The index formula generates clusters of students 
rather than a smooth distribution of scores, so students just above and below the threshold differ 
in terms of key features. I show that minor adjustments in the formula would have prevented 
these problems and made the index suitable to be used as a running variable in an RD design. 
 
In the second case, administrative sorting is caused by the monotonic function used to 
transform the predicted values of a proxy means test into ordinal scores. The function generates 
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noticeable discontinuities in the distribution of index’ scores. For one of the CCTs evaluated, 
SUF, a discontinuity is close to the threshold used for targeting. As a result, the density of the 
index fails to pass the McCrary test. The paper shows that the predicted income of the targeting 
instrument is a more suitable running variable for an RD design. 
 
How administrative sorting unfolds differs in each of my examples. In the first case, BARE, 
one type of adolescents ends up at one side of the threshold while a different type of adolescents 
ends up at the other side of the threshold. A better design of the index would have caused both 
types of adolescents to have equal probabilities of being at one side or the other of the threshold. 
In the second case, SUF, adolescents at one side of the threshold have been artificially 
compressed inducing a discontinuity in the density of the running variable. In this case, what 
is affected is the distance of individuals from the threshold rather than the side where they 
finish. 
 
In these two cases, lack of manipulation of the running variable does not translate automatically 
into variation in treatment assignment being as good as random near the threshold. This finding 
contradicts one of the most highlighted points in Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) influential paper 
on RD designs. Here administrative sorting undermines the RD design, not manipulation. 
Accordingly, lack of manipulation is a necessary condition but not sufficient for valid RD 
designs. My paper shows that a McCrary test can fail for reasons other than manipulation of 
the running variable. This finding broadens our understanding of the interpretation of the test. 
 
If administrative sorting is not properly recognised as driving a McCrary test result it could be 
mistaken as manipulation in contexts where indexes such as proxy means tests are used as 
running variables. In Chile, a lack of acknowledgement of this kind may lead readers to discard 
viable research designs when using the SPF (Centro de Microdatos, 2012). In Ecuador, 
administrative sorting has not been considered as a potential cause that could explain why more 
individuals are found above the threshold used by the CCT Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
(Ponce & Bedi, 2010). The authors only explain that this difference could not be attributed to 
manipulation of the index. 
 
My findings highlight the importance of fully understanding the data generation process. If 
administrative rules, not individual manipulation, explain the shape of the running variable 
density near the threshold then useful variation for identification may still exist. For example, 
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future research on the effect of BARE on school enrolment could exploit the categorisation of 
attendance in the IVSE formula if adolescents were unaware of the effect of this variable for 
selection into BARE. Adolescents who differ by a few decimal places in their attendance have 
a different likelihood of being eligible for BARE. In the case of SUF, future research could 
focus on fully reconstructing the SPF predicted income. If this variable passes the McCrary 
test, it may be useful as a running variable to identify the impact of SUF on school enrolment. 
 
I discuss two examples of intermediate contamination in the paper. In each case, the running 
variable and threshold affected other factors, potentially associated with the outcomes of the 
treatment, before the running variable and the threshold were used to assign the treatment of 
interest. Timing matters here. Units near the threshold were no longer similar when the 
treatment of interest occurred, hence affecting the plausibility of the continuity assumption. 
 
The first case of intermediate contamination relates to the BARE assessment that uses day of 
birth. The paper shows that adolescents born before and after May 30th have similar pre-
treatment characteristics. For example, it is not possible to observe statistically significant 
differences in multiple variables such as gender, region and rate of progression. However, these 
adolescents are statistically significantly different in their age, a result that is likely to be 
explained by the discontinuous effect of date of birth on age of entry to primary school in Chile.  
 
Settings in which a substantive time lag exists between the realisation of the running variable 
and its use for the treatment of interest are more prone to intermediate contamination. Thus, 
RD designs that use age at a later stage in life as a running variable deserve careful analysis. 
Age depends on the date of birth, which affects among other factors, the timing of entry into 
school and, as a consequence, future outcomes in multiple social dimensions (Crawford et al., 
2010; Elder, 2010; Fredriksson & Ockert, 2005). In the first years of life, date of birth could 
also affect exposure to vaccination campaigns (Helleringer, Asuming, & Abdelwahab, 2016) 
and access to pre-school education and care (Blanden et al., 2017). Multiple RD designs that 
use age at a later stage in life can be found in the causal inference literature, such as evaluations 
of the effect of the minimum legal drinking age (Carpenter & Dobkin, 2009; Yörük & Yörük, 
2011) or of the impact of labour market policies on young adults (Cockx & Dejemeppe, 2012; 
Dickens, Riley, & Wilkinson, 2014; Lemieux & Milligan, 2008).   
 
The second case of intermediate contamination is associated with the use of a specific threshold 
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of a proxy means test by another intervention in the past. The threshold used for eligibility for 
one CCT had previously affected the timing of entry into another social programme. 
Consequently, individuals were no longer comparable when the treatment of interest, AS, took 
place. RD practitioners should take additional precautions in settings where their running 
variables are expected, or have been used, to serve multiple purposes. For example, Barrientos 
and Villa (2015) use a running variable and threshold previously used by another policy in 
Colombia (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2007) to assess the impact of the CCT Familias en Acción.   
 
Intermediate contamination can be classified within the concern, “other changes at the same 
threshold of the running variable” (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008) (p.631). However, intermediate 
contamination is more complex and subtler than other changes that happen at the same time at 
the threshold, such as discounts and retirement for individuals who have just turned 65 years 
old. If intermediate contamination occurred, then balance is likely to be observed on baseline 
characteristics but not on intermediate variables. RD designs that rely on running variables 
determined long before treatment can strengthen their validity by providing tailored evidence 
against intermediate contamination. In this context, my finding highlights the relevance of 
scrutinising beyond baseline characteristics and placebo outcomes in RD falsification tests. 
 
A complete set of robustness checks in RD designs should include: i) a McCrary test for 
manipulation and administrative sorting, and ii) intent to treat estimates for baseline 
characteristics, intermediate variables and placebo outcomes to assess the quality of 
randomisation and any signs of intermediate contamination and simultaneous interventions.  
 
Many of the threats to validity in RD designs discussed in this paper are closely related to the 
use of proxy means tests as running variables. At least 20 developing countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia such as Peru, Nicaragua, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon and 
Rwanda have used this mechanism for targeting (Australian Aid, 2011; Brown et al., 2016; 
Coady et al., 2004). Hence, this paper could also prove useful for public officers who are 
designing new social policies using PMTs that are expected to be evaluated with RD designs. 
 
The recent breakthrough of RD designs in causal inference has been a major contribution. This 
is particularly true where experimental approaches are less feasible. In this spirit, this paper 
contributes clarifications regarding RD applications. It does so by highlighting administrative 
sorting and intermediate contamination, which are relatively overlooked threats to validity.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
The development of quality administrative records has expanded the possibilities for 
conducting cost-effective research outside developed countries. Utilising large and rich 
administrative datasets from Chile, in this thesis I answer three questions located at the 
intersection of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), targeting mechanisms of CCTs, especially 
proxy means tests (PMTs), and educational outcomes in primary and secondary school.  
 
Each empirical chapter or paper addresses a different type of inquiry. Chapter 2 provides a 
targeting evaluation of a CCT. In other words, this chapter investigates the extent to which the 
target groups of CCTs (would) receive them in practice. Specifically, the second chapter 
analyses the effectiveness of a PMT and a predictive model of school dropout to find two target 
groups, poor students and future school dropouts. Chapter 3 focuses on measuring the causal 
effects of a cash transfer on subsequent attendance and academic performance. I use a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design for this purpose given that the cash for grades programme 
was targeted using different indexes. Hence, this chapter offers an impact assessment among 
subgroups of students who received a cash transfer. Chapter 4 elaborates on threats to internal 
validity in RD designs that have been overlooked in the context of three evaluations of CCTs, 
which use PMTs or similar indexes, on school enrolment.  
 
Together the papers advance current knowledge both for social policy and methodology. I 
summarise the main findings and contributions of the papers in the first section of this chapter. 
Its second part discusses the thesis’ most important implications for the improved design and 
evaluation of CCTs, and beyond CCTs. The third section of this chapter elaborates on further 
projections of my research and some limitations. The final section concludes the thesis. 
 
5.1 Main Findings and Contributions  
 
Chapter 2 addresses a noticeable gap in the targeting literature of CCTs and provides novel 
contributions to the social policy targeting field. I argue that the poor are not the exclusive 
target group of CCTs. Students at risk of leaving primary or secondary education are an 
additional target group of CCTs. However, targeting assessments of CCTs have primarily 
focused on the income dimension, with the notable exception of Azevedo and Robles (2013). 
179 
 
 
 
I compare the targeting effectiveness of a PMT to find poor students or future school dropouts 
with other simulated mechanisms that use the outputs of a predictive model of school dropout.  
 
I build the predictive model of school dropout using machine learning algorithms, providing 
one of the first applications of this tool to predict school dropout outside a developed country. 
I compare the algorithms using receiver operating characteristic curves. My best algorithm 
produces results that are better than the ones obtained in Guatemala and Honduras (Adelman 
et al., 2017), in the same region or above as 107 out of the 110 dropout flags analysed by 
Bowers et al. (2013) and in line with the best models tested in the United States (Knowles, 
2015; Sorensen, 2018). 
 
The targeting assessment shows that a trade-off exists between using a PMT relative to the 
predictive model of school dropout. Using the PMT for targeting, instead of the predictive 
model, is more income progressive as poor undercoverage and non-poor leakage are reduced. 
However, future dropout undercoverage and non-dropout leakage increase. The paper shows 
that using the outputs of the predictive model in conjunction with the PMT increases targeting 
effectiveness by identifying more students who are either poor or future dropouts. This joint 
targeting approach increases effectiveness in different scenarios except when the social 
valuation of the two target groups differs to a large extent. In these cases, the most likely 
optimal approach is to use only the mechanism designed to find the target group that is valued 
the most. 
 
While Chapter 2 aims to assess whether two target groups of a CCT were (would be) reached, 
Chapter 3 analyses the impact of a cash transfer. The paper does not focus on the most common 
design of CCTs in developing countries, in which there are conditions on school enrolment and 
attendance. Instead it analyses whether it is convenient to reward students according to their 
academic performance. Specifically, Chapter 3 estimates the impact of a cash for grades 
programme, Bono por Logro Escolar (BLE) in 2013, on future attendance and average grade. 
The conditional cash transfer was targeted using two indexes from 2012, a PMT and academic 
performance. I implement a sharp RD design along each running variable. I show that students 
marginally at each side of the two thresholds used for targeting only differ in terms of receiving 
the BLE in 2013.  
 
The main causal estimates for the outcomes are not statistically significantly different from 
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zero. Additionally, the analysis by subgroups does not consistently show estimates that are 
statistically significantly different from zero. If anything, the BLE local average effects in 2013 
are modest and smaller than for previous interventions of this kind in developing countries, 
where effects of near 0.2 of a standard deviation on test scores have been found (Behrman et 
al., 2015; Kremer et al., 2009). 
 
These findings are not necessarily surprising given that the evidence of the effectiveness of 
cash for grades schemes is mixed. In developed countries the literature has shown negligible 
effects (Fryer, 2011; Riccio et al., 2013) and statistically significant impacts only among 
specific topics or subgroups (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Bettinger, 2012).  
 
Like Chapter 3, Chapter 4 is written in the context of impact assessments of CCTs using RD 
designs supported by proxy means tests or similar indexes. However, the purpose of this paper 
is not to identify the causal effects of CCTs per se. Rather, Chapter 4 highlights atypical threats 
to validity in RD designs. The paper contributes to the causal inference literature by 
strengthening our theoretical understanding of this popular and rapidly developing method.   
 
The main conceptual contributions of Chapter 4 are threefold: i) administrative sorting and 
intermediate contamination represent overlooked threats to internal validity in RD designs, ii) 
lack of individuals’ manipulation (of the index) does not translate automatically into variation 
in treatment assignment being as good as random, and iii) distinguishing among pre-treatment 
variables (between baseline and intermediate) in RD falsification tests is beneficial for 
assessing whether intermediate contamination is affecting the internal validity of an RD design.  
 
The second finding of Chapter 4, related to the manipulation of the index near the threshold 
used, questions a conclusion from Lee and Lemieux’s (2010) influential paper on RD designs. 
The authors claim that, if individuals are unable to manipulate the index precisely, variation in 
treatment assignment near the threshold is as good as random. However, Chapter 4 shows twice 
that variation in treatment assignment is not as good as random even in the absence of 
individuals’ manipulation. Additionally, Chapter 3 offers an additional equivalent case (partly 
introduced in Appendix H). Three times in my research, administrative procedures outside of 
individuals’ control or knowledge, affect non-randomly the position of units near the threshold. 
As a result, units at each side of the respective thresholds are not comparable. Therefore, 
administrative sorting decreases the plausibility of the continuity assumption of RD designs. 
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The third finding of Chapter 4 is associated with the concept of time. Intermediate 
contamination is more likely to originate if a substantive time lag exists between the realisation 
of the index and the actual use of the index to assign the treatment of interest. Intermediate 
contamination relates to the impact on key variables of using the index and threshold within 
the referred time frame, making units near the threshold no longer comparable. Unlike the case 
of administrative sorting, which represents the most novel contribution of the paper, the 
concern about other changes happening at the same threshold of the index has been pointed out 
in the methodological RD literature (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). However, in the context of a 
running variable created well in advance and that is used to assign the treatment of interest, the 
guidelines in RD falsification tests can be too broad and may not identify cases of intermediate 
contamination specifically.  
 
5.2 Policy and Methodological Implications  
 
The findings of the thesis have several implications for advancements in the design of CCTs. 
For example, in Chapter 2, I show that the targeting of CCTs can be improved when other 
dimensions beyond income, related to human capital accumulation, are incorporated in the 
targeting design. Given that CCTs have multiple target groups, a problem of misidentification 
exists if only one of them is considered for targeting. Households with students who are likely 
to drop out of school but who are not poor would most likely not receive a CCT.  Public officials 
that value equally providing a CCT to a student who is poor or who is likely to drop out of 
school may find opportunities for increased targeting effectiveness by modifying the allocation 
rules of CCTs from using only a PMT to using a predictive model of school dropout with a 
PMT. 
 
This conclusion does not necessarily hold if public officials mostly prioritise finding the poor 
over future dropouts. In this case maintaining the status quo, which is targeting CCTs on the 
basis of income, is appropriate. Alternatively, policy designers should evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of adopting new targeting mechanisms for CCTs. A first step in this direction 
would be to: i) estimate the costs of developing and implementing a new targeting mechanism, 
ii) estimate the gains in targeting effectiveness, and iii) compare these with the default scenario. 
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Section 1.3 explains that CCTs might have gone too far in Latin America. The number of CCT 
beneficiaries overtook the number of poor on the continent in 2006 (Stampini & Tornarolli, 
2012). A country in this position has increased difficulties in finding new CCT recipients who 
are poor. However, that CCTs have gone too far in the income dimension does not necessarily 
imply that CCTs have gone equally far in every important dimension. Instead of reducing the 
scope of CCTs, a potential policy alternative would be to redirect part of these cash transfers 
from non-poor households to households that underinvest in the human capital of their children. 
The findings of Chapter 2 invite the inclusion of students that are most likely to drop out of 
school in the targeting design of CCTs.  
 
Taking CCTs away from multiple households, even if these are above the poverty line, may 
prove too complicated politically. Instead, another alternative to incorporate students who are 
likely to drop out of school in the targeting design of CCTs would be to modify only the amount 
of the cash transfer for current CCT recipients. For example, giving an increased amount for 
each child who has a high risk of dropping out of school, as informed by the predictive model.  
 
If CCTs have gone too far in Latin America another policy alternative would be to reduce their 
coverage and invest the resources that are freed up in employment subsidies or cash for grades 
programmes. This path should improve the targeting accuracy of current CCTs in respect to 
income measures if the households abandoning the CCTs are mostly non-poor. Additionally, 
in theory, the new programmes should promote increased levels of employment among the 
unemployed and of students’ effort and academic performance, respectively. These outcomes 
are not generally considered in the design of CCTs typically observed in developing countries.  
 
However, Chapter 3 shows no statistically significant results in the assessment of the BLE. 
This highlights the need to understand why this cash for grades evaluation does not show a 
major impact on attendance and academic performance. For example, if children’s 
unawareness of the cash transfer is a relevant factor then actions to increase this awareness 
should be pursued. Conversely, if students are aware of the benefits of the cash transfer but for 
them it is too difficult to improve their average grade then subject-specific goals could be 
considered. 
 
Another potential explanation for not finding statistically significant results in Chapter 3 is that 
the size of the transfer is too small to affect behaviour. If this is true for all the population 
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receiving the BLE then increasing this amount should be considered. However, it is also 
possible that the size of the cash transfer is appropriate for the poorest students and not enough 
for the non-poor. The RD design only allows for capturing the impact of the BLE for students 
near the thresholds used in targeting. These thresholds are the 30% with the lowest income in 
the population (measured by a PMT) and the 30% with the highest academic achievement in 
their cohorts. Therefore, for the BLE it is not possible to estimate the impact for a student at 
the lower end of the income distribution who is also at the median of academic performance 
within the cohort. 
 
Given the results found in Chapter 3 and the multiple goals of conditional cash transfers an 
appealing alternative would be to modify the thresholds used by the BLE. A potential budget 
neutral policy would be to lower the income threshold (for example from the 30% to the 20% 
poorest as measured by the PMT) and raise the academic performance threshold (for example 
from the 30% to the 40% of highest academic achievement). This change would increase access 
to the cash transfer for the first quintile group of PMT scores as students between the 30% and 
40% of academic performance and within the 20% poorest would be able to access the BLE. 
Even if no impacts were observed on educational outcomes for students near these new 
thresholds the modification should at least have a positive impact on income measures for the 
20% poorest. 
 
Beyond CCTs, the thesis shows that appropriate predictive models of school dropout are at 
hand for public officials. The models I implement in Chapter 2 rely only on data currently 
available in the Chilean government. Using these models for targeting, once large and rich 
administrative datasets exist within a country, can be cost-effective as no surveys are required. 
Where countries are improving their administrative records, this idea deserves consideration. 
Predictive models of this kind can prove useful not only for CCTs but also for further policies, 
such as Early Warning Systems, whose purpose is to prevent school dropouts. After the model 
has identified every student who is likely to drop out of school an initial diagnostic of the 
student could be implemented to understand the main drivers behind the likelihood of dropping 
out. A targeted intervention could follow to encourage them to keep enrolled in school.  
 
The thesis also contributes in methodological grounds. For example, an essential and implicit 
lesson from the thesis is that effective targeting depends on consistency. There is a need to 
avoid misalignment between the policy goals, the target groups identified and the selection of 
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the targeting mechanisms. Ideally, targeting design must follow the goals of the policy and its 
consequential definition of target groups. If a policy has multiple purposes and target groups, 
then using only one dimension for targeting is most likely not to be the most effective approach. 
For example, CCT targeting mechanisms, using primarily income measures, have not been 
fully aligned with CCT objectives and their target population (Azevedo & Robles, 2013). 
 
In a similar vein, CCT targeting assessments should ideally cover the totality of the target 
groups involved. These lessons invite to broaden the outreach on CCT targeting evaluations, 
as these evaluations have provided valuable information though mostly regarding income 
measures (Maluccio, 2009; Robles et al., 2015; Skoufias et al., 2001; Stampini & Tornarolli, 
2012). An additional methodological contribution of my thesis is that it offers two indicators 
to assess CCT targeting that combine information about poor students and future school 
dropouts. 
 
Regarding causal inference methodological contributions, my work shows that administrative 
sorting and intermediate contamination may play a role in threatening or invalidating RD 
designs in contexts where indexes such as PMTs are used as a running variable. Given the 
central role of PMTs in the targeting of CCTs, these findings could be especially useful within 
this context.  
 
In terms of administrative sorting, my thesis highlights the importance of fully understanding 
the data generation process behind any index. Chapter 3 shows that useful variation could still 
be used for identification as administrative procedures explain that students are not comparable 
near the 30% relative ranking (of academic performance) threshold used by the BLE. Chapter 
4 demonstrates that administrative sorting explains the shape of two running variables’ density 
near their respective thresholds and that minor adjustments would have prevented 
administrative sorting. Additionally, I show that a McCrary test can fail due to reasons other 
than manipulation of the running variable. This finding broadens our understanding of the 
interpretation of the test. 
 
All these findings are important because if administrative sorting is not recognised correctly it 
could be mistaken for manipulation, potentially leading to viable research designs being 
discarded. The causes behind administrative sorting can potentially be fixed for future versions 
of the index and facilitate the implementation of an RD design. In other cases, for example 
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when treatment probabilities are not affected, administrative sorting may not invalidate an RD 
design.  
 
The thesis also emphasises that RD practitioners should take increased precautions in settings 
where their running variables are expected, or have been used, to serve multiple purposes. In 
contexts where the running variable is in place well in advance of the treatment of interest, RD 
designs are more prone to suffer from intermediate contamination. For example, in Colombia, 
to assess the impact of a CCT, Barrientos and Villa (2015) use a running variable and threshold 
previously used by a school fee reduction policy (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2007).  
 
Considering all the RD method findings a complete routine for robustness checks in RD 
designs should include: a McCrary or Frandsen test to assess for manipulation or administrative 
sorting, and intent to treat estimates for baseline characteristics, intermediate variables and 
placebo outcomes to assess the plausibility of the continuity assumption on which RD designs 
rely. 
 
5.3 Further Research 
 
Many CCTs promote human capital accumulation beyond educational dimensions. For 
example, a common condition used by CCTs is the regular attendance of children no older than 
six years old at health check-ups. None of my empirical chapters consider health outcomes. 
For example, in Chapter 2, children who have not been taken by their parents to preventive 
health check-ups could be included as a target group for CCTs. Unfortunately, unlike 
educational variables, quality administrative records for CCT health-related outcomes are not 
available in Chile. Future research could be implemented, related to either CCT targeting or 
impact, after children’s health-related administrative datasets improve in the country. 
 
Further research could explore the feasibility of measuring the impact of Chilean CCTs on 
school enrolment, for example, assessing the impact of BARE on preventing school dropout 
and evaluating whether eligibility to receive SUF helps to bring back to school those who are 
outside. The findings of Chapter 4 could be helpful to the latter goals in an RD design. 
Administrative sorting explains the shape of the BARE and SUF targeting indexes near their 
respective thresholds. Fully understanding the generation process of the scores for each index 
could help in making amendments to implement RD designs in the future or to identify any 
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useful variation left for identification in the present. Prospective research on BARE or SUF 
could rely on revised indexes that are not affected by administrative sorting. Retrospective 
research could exploit the categorisation of one variable in the BARE index and fully 
reconstruct the income prediction of the SUF index. 
 
RD estimates are informative for the population around the thresholds but not necessarily away 
from them. Given this caveat, it is not possible to generalise the results of Chapter 3 for the 
entire population who received the BLE in 2013. As RD provides average effects for the 
population near the thresholds, we cannot learn about the effect of the BLE for all students at 
the lower end of the income distribution. An RD design estimating the impact of SUF on school 
enrolment would have a similar problem. This subgroup of students may be the one that is more 
susceptible to benefitting from conditional cash transfers. Future research could overcome 
these limitations by introducing some degree of randomisation, allowing for obtaining 
estimates for this entire subgroup of interest. 
 
Acknowledging the limitations of the findings of Chapter 3 it is essential to understand more 
deeply why the BLE is producing little effect on educational outcomes. Interviewing parents and 
students could help us to comprehend the causal mechanisms (or lack of such mechanisms) 
between providing this cash transfer and subsequent gains in attendance and academic 
performance. Additionally, these interviews could prove useful to find out how aware families 
are of the BLE implementation. Given the nature of these inquiries, this research probably ought 
to be qualitative. Experiments could follow that analyse different modalities of implementing the 
BLE. For example, it could be tested whether giving a diploma to students increases their 
awareness of the BLE and subsequent outcomes. 
 
Distinguishing between the poorest of the population and those who are close to a certain 
threshold (for example those who are marginally poor or who barely access a CCT given their 
proxy means test score) can be important in targeting assessments too. A limitation of Chapter 
2 is that I implicitly assume that there is equal social value in finding any poor student. Given 
the measures I use, I make no distinction between students at the bottom of the income 
distribution and those who are slightly below the poverty line. Building upon my research, 
future projects could account for these differences to strengthen the targeting assessment. 
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Regarding the predictive model of school dropout, future research has room for improvement. 
The efficacy of the predictions could be further enhanced if the Chilean government were to 
add new administrative variables such as motherhood (which can be identified through the 
Civil Register administrative datasets). Major modifications to the structure of the predictive 
model also deserve further exploration. For example, the model could be run on a monthly 
instead of an annual basis. The Chilean Ministry of Education possesses monthly attendance 
records at the individual level that could be useful for capturing additional variation in school 
dropout. Another alternative would be to implement longitudinal growth models instead of 
machine learning algorithms. Also, the logic and variables I use in my model could be applied 
to predict other educational outcomes such as performance, attendance and enrolment in higher 
education. 
 
Future research to uncover further improvements in CCT targeting, estimate the impact of 
Chilean CCTs on school enrolment and health-related outcomes, identify the effects for 
individuals in the lower end of the income distribution and provide a better understanding of 
the channels that explain the relationship, or lack of such a relationship, between CCTs and 
educational outcomes for Chilean students will inform policymakers allowing them to enhance 
the design of CCTs in the country. This research can be informative not just only for Chile but 
all nations using or considering CCTs in their toolkit. 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
During the last 30 years the world has observed the rise of different types of social policies. 
Latin American countries were the first to implement income support schemes targeted towards 
poor households, conditional on recipients carrying out actions to foster human capital 
accumulation among their children and adolescents. These conditional cash transfers later 
expanded across the globe reaching Asia, the Middle East, Africa and even the United States. 
The surge in the prevalence of CCTs has been correlated with a rise in the use of income 
targeting through proxy means tests. CCTs continue to be an important social policy model 
across the globe. Their goals of poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation remain 
valid in multiple regions. 
 
Have CCTs worked? In multiple countries CCTs have been successful in alleviating poverty, 
increasing health care utilisation, and raising school enrolment and attendance rates. Have they 
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gone too far? In Latin America the number of beneficiaries of CCTs surpassed the number of 
the poor in 2006. Within the latter policy framework, my research has answered questions 
located at the intersection of CCTs, their targeting (especially through PMTs) and educational 
outcomes using large and rich Chilean administrative datasets. Although the thesis has focused 
its analysis on one country, it has provided findings and implications that will be useful in 
multiple contexts. 
 
My thesis advances knowledge in the policy domains of the targeting and impact of CCTs. My 
findings show that CCT targeting can be improved if students at risk of dropping out of school 
are included as a target group and if a predictive model of school dropout is used in conjunction 
with a PMT for targeting. If a CCT has gone too far in terms of reaching non-poor households 
these findings offer an appealing policy alternative to increase their targeting effectiveness. 
Another appealing policy alternative is to partly replace CCTs with cash for grades initiatives. 
However, my research shows that a Chilean cash for grades scheme did not have a major effect 
on educational outcomes of students around the thresholds used for targeting. This finding 
suggests that some modifications to this programme are needed for increased impact. 
 
My thesis offers substantial contributions in regard to methodological grounds too. Among 
these are one of the first machine learning applications to predict school dropout outside a 
developed nation, implementing a CCT targeting assessment using more dimensions than 
income, and highlighting administrative sorting as a threat to the internal validity in RD designs 
and potential solutions to overcome it. All these findings not only contribute to strengthening 
the future targeting and impact evaluations of CCTs but are also helpful beyond the context of 
CCT assessments. 
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